State v. Rogers

Decision Date30 July 1895
PartiesSTATE EX REL. BRAGG v. ROGERS ET AL.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from circuit court, Lowndes county; John R. Tyson, Judge.

Quo warranto, instituted by the state of Alabama, on the relation of Shirley Bragg, against C. P. Rogers, Jr., and others. The relator demurred to defendants' answer, and from an order overruling the demurrer, and a judgment for defendants, the relator appeals. Affirmed.

This was a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto, instituted by the state of Alabama, on the relation of Shirley Bragg against C. P. Rogers, Jr., R. W. Russell, J. B. Mitchell, J C. Wood, R. J. Stagers, and J. H. Sheppard. A complaint was filed in the circuit court of Lowndes county, April 24, 1895 alleging that the defendants are unlawfully assuming to be the rightful board of revenue of Lowndes county, C. P Rogers, Jr., acting as chairman, and J. H. Sheppard acting as clerk thereof, administering the finances of the county, taking control of the property of the county, and holding sessions of court as the board of revenue of the county; that, so constituted, they are not the lawful board of revenue of said county; that the true and legal board of revenue consists of A. E. Caffee, probate judge of said county, as rightful chairman and clerk, R. W. Russell, R. J. Stagers, J. B. Mitchell, and J. C. Wood; and that they are entitled to the said offices by virtue of the statute and of their election to the same at a general election in said county, held on the 6th day of August, 1894, and the commissions issued to them thereunder. The prayer of the complaint was that judgment be rendered against defendants, declaring that they were not entitled to the possession, exercise, and control of the offices of the members of the board of revenue of Lowndes county, and that "A. E. Caffee, judge of probate, acting as chairman and clerk of said board, consisting of R. W. Russell, R. J. Stagers, J. B. Mitchell, and J. C. Wood as members thereof, and so constituted, be declared to be the legal and rightful court of the board of revenue of said Lowndes county, Alabama." The defendants filed their answer to the complaint of the relator, which was as follows: "(1) That under the statute of Alabama approved December 17, 1894, and contained on pages 186-189 of the Acts of Alabama of 1894-95, and entitled 'An act to establish a board of revenue for Lowndes county, and define the powers and duties of said board of revenue,' A. E. Caffee was retired from his official connection with such board, and James B. Mitchell, R. W. Russell, J. C. Wood, and R. J. Stagers confirmed as members of said board, and C. P. Rogers, Jr., constituted the fifth member of said board,-which said act is made a part of this plea. That said defendants are in the exercise of the powers and duties conferred on them by law, as changed by said statutes, and defendants plead said statute as a defense to this suit. (2) That under the statute of Alabama, C. P. Rogers, Jr., James B. Mitchell, R. W. Russell, J. C. Wood, and R. J. Stagers constitute the board of revenue for Lowndes county, Alabama, authorized by law to exercise all the powers and duties of said board of revenue." To this answer the relator demurred on the following grounds: "(1) Because said answer sets up no legal defense to the said complaint. (2) Because the said act of the legislature of Alabama of December, 1894, entitled 'An act to establish a board of revenue for Lowndes county, and to define the powers and duties of said board of revenue,' contained on pages 186-189 of the Acts of the Legislature of Alabama of the Session of 1894-95, is unconstitutional and void, in that it violates section 2, art. 4, of the constitution of Alabama. (3) Because said act is unconstitutional and void in that it violates section 14, art. 1, of the constitution of the state of Alabama." This demurrer was overruled, and to this ruling the plaintiff duly excepted, and, declining to plead further, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants. The relator (or plaintiff) prosecutes the present appeal, and assigns as error the judgment of the court overruling the demurrers, and the rendition of judgment for the defendants.

Cook & Gordon, for appellant.

J. C. Richardson and Chas. A. Whitten, for appellees.

BRICKELL C.J.

This was an information in the nature of a quo warranto, and its real purpose is to test the legality of the present organization of the board of revenue for the county of Lowndes. The board is organized in conformity to the provisions of an act of the last general assembly, entitled "An act to establish a board of revenue for Lowndes county, and define the powers and duties of said board of revenue." Pamph. Acts 1894-95, p. 186. The first section declares the board of revenue for the county shall be so changed as to consist of five members, to be elected at the biennial election for state and county officers, and relieves the judge of probate from all official connection with the board. The second section declares the board, as changed, shall have and continue in the exercise of all the powers and duties now conferred or hereafter to be conferred on them by law, and that the board "is in nowise changed from what it is now, except as herein provided." The third section declares that the four members of the board elected at the preceding August election shall remain members, and that C. P. Rogers, Jr., shall constitute the fifth member. The term of office and compensation is fixed, and vacancies are to be filled by the appointment of the governor. The fourth section requires the board, as changed, to hold its first meeting on the 22d day of December, 1894, at the office of the circuit clerk of the county, and fixes that as their general place of meeting. At such meeting, a chairman of the board was to be elected, holding office during the term of the board; vacancies in the chairmanship to be filled by the board. The fifth section declares the clerk of the circuit court of the county clerk of the board, and prescribes his duties and compensation. The sixth section requires the sessions of the board to be held at the time appointed by the existing law, and makes provision for extraordinary meetings. The seventh section declares that claims against the county may be passed on, or contracts for the payment of money entered into, only at the regular meetings; and at least three members must concur in the allowance of a claim or the making of a contract. If there be division, the clerk is required, as part of the proceedings of the board, to record the vote; and the last clause is: "Nor shall any claim be passed on, or any contract awarded, save when the said board and their clerk are in private." The eighth section relates to the issue of warrants for the payment of claims, the payment of jury certificates, and other matters not now of importance.

The primary insistence is that the whole act is unconstitutional and void, because offensive to the clause of the second section of the fourth article of the constitution, which with exceptions it is not necessary to enumerate, requires that "each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." The unity of the subject of the act is not and could not be doubted. The insistence is that the title does not fairly indicate or express it,-that it expresses the purpose to originate or create a board of revenue, while there is no more than a reconstruction or reformation of the existing board,-and that, of consequence, the title is deceptive and misleading. The history and purposes of this constitutional mandate are so well known and understood, and the principles of interpretation which control in determining its application and operation have been the subject of such repeated judicial consideration and decision, that there is n room or reason for further discussion or elucidation of them. In considering whether a legislative enactment is violative of this requirement, the courts proceed upon the presumption which obtains when considering whether any other limitation of the constitution has been violated. The presumption is that the legislature has not exceeded its powers, and, unless it be clear that there has been a substantial departure from the constitution, the validity of the legislative act must be supported. People v. Briggs, 50 N.Y. 558. Until 1861, in this state, following the common law, the title of an act was not considered part of it. It did not control the words of the body of the act, however foreign or diverse to the title they may have been. If, in themselves, the words were ambiguous or of doubtful import, to aid in their construction resort was had to the title. Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port. (Ala.) 266. The constitution of 1861 was the origin of constitutional requirements relating to the titles of statutes. The words of the requirement were: "Each law shall embrace but one subject, which shall be described in its title." And in this form it passed into the constitution of 1865. The phraseology was changed by the constitution of 1868 to the present form. The difference in phraseology has not caused any change...

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