State v. Rogers
Decision Date | 26 May 1964 |
Citation | 200 A.2d 740,105 N.H. 366 |
Parties | STATE v. Norman ROGERS. STATE v. Roger VANASSE. |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
William Maynard, Atty. Gen., and George S. Pappagianis, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.
Fisher, Parsons, Moran & Temple, Harold D. Moran, Dover, for defendants.
The transferred questions pertain generally to the validity of RSA 578:4, 5; the validity and effect of Chapter 32, Section 3 of the Dover ordinances which became effective when approved at an election held December 1, 1931; and the validity and effect of a resolution adopted by the city council of Dover on October 9, 1956, purportedly in pursuance of RSA 578:5.
RSA 578:4 reads as follows:
The above section was first adopted in 1860 (Laws 1860, 2365:1) in substantially its present language as 'An Act for the better observance of the Sabbath.' In 1878 it was incorporated in our General Laws as section 10 of Chapter 273 entitled 'Offenses against Morality and Religion.'
Section 3 of that chapter prohibited, in substantially the same language as RSA 578:3, work, business, labor (except works of necessity and mercy), play, game or recreation on the first day of the week, commonly called the Lord's day. The main provisions of section 3 had been contained, in somewhat different language, in the N. H. Provincial Act of William 3d, passed July 19, 1700. 1 Laws of N.H. 672. George v. George, 47 N.H. 27, 29. They were also in an act passed June 23, 1785 (5 Laws of N.H. 1784-1792, ch. 6, p. 75); in an act passed February 2, 1789 (Id., ch. 37, p. 372); and can be found in the different compilations of our laws to the present.
An examination of the history and language of the early provisions of what are now RSA 578:3 and 4 dealing with Sunday work and sales leads to the inevitable conclusion that their original enactment was motivated by religious forces and considerations. They originated as essentially religious statutes designed to promote and assure the due observance of religious duties on Sunday. Varney v. French, 19 N.H. 233, 235; George v. George, 47 N.H. 27, 34.
RSA 578:5, however, was adopted more than two centuries after the first legislation pertaining to the observance of Sunday. Laws 1931, 155:1. It now reads as follows:
The question before us is whether the presently existing Sunday legislation regulating work and sales, particularly RSA 578:4 and 5, is still essentially religious in character, as contended by the defendants, and thus constitutes 'law respecting an establishment of religion' in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and is also violative of our State Constitution. There is nothing in the record before us, nor has argument been made, that the free exercise of the faith of either defendant has been interfered with. Hence we are not called upon to consider the 'free exercise' clause of the First Amendment nor is there any basis for doing so. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393.
If, as properly contended by the defendants, in their brief, the original purpose of Sunday legislation 'was to promote due observance of the Lord's Day by putting a stop to unnecessary worldly business and labor, not only for the sake of public decency and order, but to withdraw a man's own thoughts from secular concerns and turn them to the duties of religion,' enactment in 1931 of RSA 578:5 was a strong indication of a decided change in the purpose of this legislation. This exception, to the previous strict prohibition of business transactions (RSA 578:4) and of work and sports (Id., :3) on Sundays, which would permit on that day activities previously considered as profane, lends substance to the State's contention that the present purpose and effect of such Sunday legislation is to provide a uniform day of rest for all New Hampshire citizens under authority of the police power. 73 Harv.L.Rev. 729, 730-732. Furthermore enactment by the Legislature shortly thereafter of RSA 275:32 and 33 (Laws 1933, 130:1) 'AN ACT TO PROVIDE ONE DAY REST IN SEVEN,' corroborates the State's position that the concern of the legislators in maintaining and amending the existing Sunday legislation was not to coerce religious observance of the Lord's Day but to safeguard and improve the health, safety, recreation and general well-being of our citizens.
It is fair to assume that the Legislature was prompted to adopt these measures to obviate the deleterious effect of the adoption by cities and towns of ordinances authorized by RSA 578:5 permitting and regulating retail business, plays, games, sports and exhibitions on the Lord's Day which might militate against the State's legitimate concern for the health and welfare of its citizens fostered by an enforced day of rest. It thus provided that if an employee is required 'to do on Sunday the usual work of his occupation * * * he is allowed during the six days next ensuing twenty-four consecutive hours without labor.' RSA 275:32. To further assure the day of rest of the employee, this legislation provided that (Emphasis supplied).
In order to better promote the general welfare which results from periodic respite from work by its citizens, a State may 'set one day apart from all others as a day of rest, repose, recreation and tranquility--a day which all members of the family and community have the opportunity to spend and enjoy together, a day on which there exists relative quiet and disassociation from the everyday intensity of commercial activities, a day on which people may visit friends and relatives who are not available during working days'. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1118; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563.
If for this purpose a single day is to be chosen as a day of rest, it would be unrealistic, unpopular, wasteful and detrimental to its enforcement to select a day other than that which most citizens would chose of their own accord. McGowan v. Maryland, supra, 366 U.S. 452, 81 S.Ct. 1101; 73 Harv.L.Rev. 729, 735. ...
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