State v. Rogers

• Decision Date: 05 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-784,84-784
• Parties: , 17 O.B.R. 414 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. ROGERS, Appellant
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 174

17 Ohio St.3d 174

478 N.E.2d 984, 17 O.B.R. 414

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. ROGERS, Appellant.

No. 84-784

Supreme Court of Ohio

June 5, 1985.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Ohio's death penalty sentencing procedure does not place a defendant in double jeopardy by allowing the reintroduction of evidence regarding aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase of the trial.

2. In a capital trial, upon a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the bifurcation of the insanity issue from that of the issue of guilt of the defendant rests solely within the discretion of the trial court.

3. The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause based on his views on capital punishment is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath. (Wainwright v. Witt [1985], 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, followed.)

4. A trial court in a capital case is not required to instruct the jury as to the defendant's lawful disposition were he to be found not guilty by reason of insanity.

5. The trial court is required to give a full and correct statement of the law so that the jury can apply the law to the facts in evidence before it. Such a requirement does not obligate the trial court to explain to the jury the difference between the insanity defense and the defendant's mental state as a mitigating factor at the penalty phase of the trial.

6. During the sentencing phase of a capital trial the state, having the burden of proving that aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, has the right to open and close arguments to the jury.

7. The word "age" as used in R.C. 2929.02(A), 2929.023, 2929.03 and 2929.04 refers to a defendant's chronological age.

8. Broadcasting is permitted in a courtroom if the court determines that it would not distract participants, impair the dignity of proceedings, or otherwise materially interfere with the achievement of a fair trial or hearing. (State, ex rel. Grinnell Communications Corp., v. Love [1980], 62 Ohio St.2d 399, 406 N.E.2d 809 , (approved and followed.)

9. The proportionality review required of the court of appeals pursuant to R.C. 2929.05(A) need not include criminal cases outside its geographical jurisdiction.

On the evening of November 14, 1981, the mother of seven-year-old Lisa Bates reported her child missing to the Toledo Police. Lisa had been seen at approximately 1:00 that afternoon in front of the apartment of appellant, Billy Rogers, a.k.a. Raymond L. Hudson, with three other children. The children were watching appellant perform magic tricks. At approximately 3:30 that afternoon the other children were called home but Lisa remained with appellant. About fifteen minutes later neither appellant nor Lisa could be seen on the street; however, Lisa's bicycle remained in front of appellant's apartment.

That evening, in response to the missing person report, the police conducted an extensive search of the neighborhood around Lisa's and appellant's homes. Sometime after 11:55 p.m. police Sergeant Dennie M. Sehlmeyer obtained appellant's consent to search his apartment. During that search Lisa's body was discovered on the closet floor of appellant's second-floor bedroom. Appellant was then arrested. Scientific examination of Lisa's body and clothing revealed that she had been sexually molested and had died from strangulation.

Appellant was indicted for two counts of aggravated murder, murder-kidnapping and murder-rape. Two specifications were coupled with each count and charged (1) that the murder was committed while committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, and (2) that the murder was committed while committing or attempting to commit rape. Appellant was found competent to stand trial and pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.

The cause proceeded to trial and the jury returned a guilty verdict for murder-rape, and for both specifications of rape and kidnapping. At the conclusion of the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury recommended that appellant be sentenced to death. The trial court agreed with the jury's recommendation and ordered that appellant be executed.

The court of appeals affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence.

The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.

Anthony G. Pizza, Pros.Atty., James D. Bates and James E. Yavorcik, Toledo, for appellee.

John J. Callahan, Ralph DeNune III and Douglas A. Wilkins, Toledo, for appellant.

WILLIAM B. BROWN, Justice.

In order to determine whether appellant's death sentence should be affirmed, this court is required to do three things. First, we must answer the specific issues raised by appellant regarding the proceedings below. Second, we must independently weigh the aggravating circumstances in this case against any factors which mitigate against imposition of the death penalty. Finally, we must independently consider whether appellant's sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.

I

Appellant first attacks the constitutionality of Ohio's framework for imposition of capital punishment by advancing arguments similar to those used by the appellants in the recently decided cases of State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264, and State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 473 N.E.2d 768. Appellant argues (1) that a statutory aggravating circumstance in a capital case must encompass a fact independent of the facts of the principal offense in order to comply with the United States and Ohio Constitutions, (2) that Ohio's capital sentencing structure, which requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, violates due process, (3) that Ohio's death penalty law fails to set forth adequate safeguards to prevent the imposition of capital punishment in an arbitrary manner, (4) that Ohio's death penalty statute allows arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty because it does not articulate a method to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors, and (5) that the statutory sentencing scheme for imposition of the death penalty violates the federal and state Constitutions because it is not the least restrictive means of accomplishing the objectives of the administration of justice. This court addressed and rejected each of these arguments in Jenkins. We held in Jenkins that Ohio's statutory framework for imposition of capital punishment, as adopted by the General Assembly effective October 19, 1981, in the context of these arguments, violates neither the United States nor the Ohio Constitutions. They can not, therefore, be the basis for reversal in this case.

Appellant raises an additional constitutional question which was not addressed in either Jenkins or Maurer. Appellant claims that Ohio's death penalty sentencing procedure places a defendant in double jeopardy by allowing re-introduction of evidence regarding aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase of the trial. As noted by the court of appeals in this case, the United States Supreme Court has previously upheld similar statutory schemes providing for bifurcated trials in capital cases. See Proffitt v. Florida (1976), 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913, and Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859. The two phases of a capital trial are just that, two segments of one trial. Appellant was not placed in jeopardy for a second time during the sentencing phase of his trial, but, rather, remained in jeopardy for a final disposition of his case. Accordingly, this argument must be rejected.

Appellant raises several issues citing trial court error which we addressed in Jenkins. Appellant argues that the trial court erred first by advising the jury at the penalty phase of the trial that its decision to recommend the death penalty was not binding, and, second, by instructing the jury to disregard sympathy in its consideration of the evidence. Appellant contends further that the trial court was required to instruct the jury at the penalty phase of the trial that a non-unanimous verdict was sufficient to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. We addressed these contentions in Jenkins and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, they will not be the basis for reversal in this case.

Appellant also contends that due process requires separate trials on the issues of insanity and guilt. There is no authority in Ohio for bifurcation of a trial upon a plea of insanity. Various federal courts have ruled on the issue and have found that due process does not require a separate trial on the issue of insanity, and that the states are free to determine whether such issues should be tried separately or together. E.g., Vardas v. Estelle (C.A.5, 1983), 715 F.2d 206, 212-213; Murphy v. Florida (C.A.5, 1974), 495 F.2d 553, 557, affirmed (1975), 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589. Federal courts have further held that the question of bifurcation rests solely within the discretion of the trial court and that appellant must show an abuse of discretion for reversal. Higgins v. United States (C.A.D.C.1968), 401 F.2d 396, 398. Adopting this standard we find that appellant has failed to show an abuse of discretion in this case. He has merely claimed that:

" * * * Prejudice certainly resulted in this proceeding when Rogers was forced to claim that he was not guilty and simultaneously to admit that he committed the offense but that there were circumstances exonerating him from responsibility for his conduct."

To the contrary, we feel that the pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity and not guilty are not necessarily contradictory. Where the accused is so insane at the time of the act that he is unable to form the requisite guilty purpose, he can not be found guilty. Since it is not...