State v. Rogers
| Decision Date | 28 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1993, Sept. Term, 2017,1993, Sept. Term, 2017 |
| Citation | 240 Md.App. 360,205 A.3d 36 |
| Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Jimmie ROGERS |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by: Edward Kelley (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Argued by: Andrew Middleman (Nancy S. Forster, Forster & LeCompte), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: Kehoe, Nazarian, James P. Salmon (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
On October 20, 2015, Jimmie Rogers pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to a single count of human trafficking under Maryland Code § 11-303(a) of the Criminal Law Article ("CR"). Under Maryland Code §§ 11-701(p)(2) and 11-704 of the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP"), Mr. Rogers qualified as a tier II sex offender and was required to register upon release from prison because he was convicted of violating CR § 11-303 and his victim was a minor. Mr. Rogers registered with the Maryland Sex Offender Registry ("MSOR") as instructed on October 4, 2016.
On January 31, 2017, Mr. Rogers filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not required to register as a sex offender because, he argued, the State had failed to establish that his victim was, in fact, a minor. The State and Mr. Rogers both filed motions for summary judgment—the State contended that there was no factual dispute that the victim was a minor, while Mr. Rogers argued that there was no factual dispute that she wasn't. The circuit court granted Mr. Rogers's motion and entered a declaratory judgment stating that Mr. Rogers's conviction did not require him to register as a sex offender. The State appeals that decision and we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On May 1, 2015, Mr. Rogers was charged by indictment in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County with five counts of human trafficking a minor victim and two counts of prostitution. At the start of Mr. Rogers's plea hearing five months later, Count Five of the indictment was amended from alleging that he had trafficked a minor victim, citing CR § 11-303(b), to human trafficking generally, citing CR § 11-303(a). Mr. Rogers pleaded guilty to the amended Count Five and the State entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining charges.
At Mr. Rogers's plea hearing, the State laid out the facts it planned to prove at trial. On April 3, 2015, Maryland State Trooper Heid was searching for a missing young woman, M.H.,1 who was believed to be the victim of human trafficking. In the course of his investigation, Trooper Heid came across a post on Backpage, a website known to him as an advertising hub for sex workers and human trafficking victims.2 Based on his knowledge and experience in human trafficking investigations, he suspected that the person featured in the post was a human trafficking victim and might be M.H.
Trooper Heid called the number provided on the Backpage post to set up a meeting with the subject for 9:00 that morning. He suspected that the person he spoke to on the phone was a man attempting to disguise his voice as a woman's. Based on the pictures on Backpage, Trooper Heid believed the victim was at a Red Roof Inn in Linthicum, a hotel he knew was a popular prostitution venue. Trooper Heid and several colleagues surveilled the Red Roof Inn's parking lot and saw Mr. Rogers emerge from a vehicle, enter a motel room, return minutes later, and drive off. Shortly thereafter, Trooper Heid received a phone call from the number he'd found on Backpage. The caller, who had a different voice than the individual to whom he had spoken earlier, instructed him to come to room 333.
When the police knocked on the door, a young woman, later revealed to be M.H., answered. The officers identified themselves and M.H. explained that her "boss," later identified as Mr. Rogers, had rented the hotel room for her and would be back to check on her soon. She stated that Mr. Rogers had posted her ad on Backpage and that she had, over several days, had sexual intercourse with men for money at Mr. Rogers's direction. M.H. explained that Mr. Rogers set up "dates" for her through Backpage and kept half of the proceeds in exchange for security. It was later revealed that Mr. Rogers had, in fact, been holding all of the proceeds from M.H.'s sex work.
Mr. Rogers was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and two years' probation. All but 548 days of Mr. Rogers's imprisonment were suspended and he got credit for 202 days already served. Upon release, he registered as a tier II sex offender, as mandated by CP § 11-704, when a person is convicted under CR § 11-303, and their victim is a minor. See CP § 11-701(p)(2).
On January 31, 2017, Mr. Rogers filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit court seeking a declaration that he was not required to register as a sex offender and ordering the State to remove his name from the MSOR. In his motion for summary judgment, he argued that because he had not been convicted under CR § 11-303(b), and because the State had failed to produce any evidence that M.H. was a minor, he did not qualify as a tier II sex offender under CP § 11-701(p)(2). Mr. Rogers provided no evidence to support his motion.
The State filed its own motion for summary judgment and countered that because Mr. Rogers indisputably had been convicted under CR § 11-303 and had never contested M.H.'s minority, the plain language of CP § 11-704 required him to register. The State attached to its motion the affidavit of Allison Gilford, the supervisor and custodian of records for the MSOR, and several documents that purported to demonstrate M.H.'s minority status: (1) Mr. Rogers's Criminal Hearing Sheet indicating he pleaded guilty to Count Five after it was amended to cite CR § 11-303(b) rather than § 11-303(a), (2) the Statement of Charges prepared by Trooper Heid, which indicated repeatedly that M.H. was a minor, and (3) the indictment charging him with five counts of trafficking a minor victim.
After a hearing, the circuit court granted Mr. Rogers's motion for summary judgment and issued a declaration stating that "Jimmie Rogers is not required to register as a tier II sex offender on the basis of his conviction in State of Maryland vs. Jimmie Junior Rogers, 02-K-15-1039 " and that "Defendants State of Maryland and Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services ... shall remove Mr. Rogers' name from any and all sex offender registries on which it appears as a result of his conviction in State of Maryland vs. Jimmie Junior Rogers, 02-K-15-1039. " (emphasis in original). The State appeals.
Summary judgment provides trial courts the opportunity to "determine whether there are facts in dispute that must be resolved through a more formal resolution process, such as a trial on the merits." Hines v. French , 157 Md. App. 536, 549, 852 A.2d 1047 (2004). Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [ ] the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Md. Rule 2-501(f). We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo , construing all "reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts" in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Myers v. Kayhoe , 391 Md. 188, 203, 892 A.2d 520 (2006).
"[I]t is wholly appropriate for a trial court to grant a declaratory judgment at the summary judgment stage."
Piney Orchard Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Piney Pad A, LLC , 221 Md. App. 196, 206, 108 A.3d 536 (2015). We review that decision to determine "whether [it] was correct as a matter of law." Olde Severna Park Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. Gunby , 402 Md. 317, 329, 936 A.2d 365 (2007) (quoting South Easton Neighborhood Ass'n v. Town of Easton , 387 Md. 468, 487, 876 A.2d 58 (2005) ).
The State argues that because Mr. Rogers was convicted of human trafficking under CR § 11-303(a) and M.H. was a minor at the time of the offense, he must register with the MSOR under CP § 11-704. Mr. Rogers does not dispute that he was convicted under CR § 11-303(a), but argues that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his victim was a minor to trigger the registration requirement. Mr. Rogers cites no law that supports this argument, and the plain language of the MSOR registration statutes and the caselaw surrounding the MSOR debunk his position.
CR § 11-303(a) forbids the knowing "tak[ing] or caus[ing] another to be taken to any place for prostitution; plac[ing], caus[ing] to be placed, or harbor[ing] another in any place for prostitution; persuad[ing], induc[ing], entic[ing], or encourage[ing] another to be taken or placed in any place for prostitution ...." In layman's terms, CR § 11-303(a) criminalizes human trafficking, but says nothing specific about the victim. Section 11-303(b), a more serious offense, specifically criminalizes trafficking children and provides that "[a] person may not violate subsection (a) ... involving a victim who is a minor." Section 11-303(a) is a misdemeanor that carries a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment, a $ 5,000 fine, or both. CR § 11-303(c)(1)(i). CR § 11-303(b), a felony, carries a maximum sentence of 25 years' imprisonment, a fine $ 15,000 fine, or both. CR § 11-303(c)(2).
Individuals convicted of violating CR § 11-303 are Tier II sex offenders if the offense is perpetrated against a minor, CP § 11-701(p)(2),3 and they must register with the MSOR. CP § 11-704. The registration statute does not differentiate between convictions under CR § 11-303(b), a crime for which the victim's age is an element, and CR § 11-303(a), for which the victim's age is not—a conviction under either subparagraph triggers tier II status if the victim is a minor.
Mr. Rogers contends that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the prerequisites for...
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