State v. Rogers

Decision Date05 June 2013
Docket NumberNo. 11–0621.,11–0621.
Citation231 W.Va. 205,744 S.E.2d 315
PartiesSTATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent v. Clayton Eugene ROGERS, Defendant Below, Petitioner.
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court

1. “On appeal, legal conclusions made with regard to suppression determinations are reviewed de novo. Factual determinations upon which these legal conclusions are based are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. In addition, factual findings based, at least in part, on determinations of witness credibility are accorded great deference.” Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428, 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994).

2. “When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court should construe all facts in the light most favorable to the State, as it was the prevailing party below. Because of the highly fact-specific nature of a motion to suppress, particular deference is given to the findings of the circuit court because it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to hear testimony on the issues. Therefore, the circuit court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Lacy, 196 W.Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996).

3. [A] circuit court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence will be affirmed unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake has been made.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v. Lacy, 196 W.Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996).

4. “Our prompt presentment rule contained in W. Va.Code, 62–1–5, and Rule 5(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, is triggered when an accused is placed under arrest. Furthermore, once a defendant is in police custody with sufficient probable cause to warrant an arrest, the prompt presentment rule is also triggered.” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Humphrey, 177 W.Va. 264, 351 S.E.2d 613 (1986).

5. ‘The delay in taking a defendant to a magistrate may be a critical factor [in the totality of circumstances making a confession involuntary and hence inadmissable] where it appears that the primary purpose of the delay was to obtain a confession from the defendant.’ Syllabus Point 6, State v. Persinger, , 286 S.E.2d 261 (1982), as amended.” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Guthrie, 173 W.Va. 290, 315 S.E.2d 397 (1984).

6. “Before disqualification of counsel can be ordered on grounds of conflict arising from confidences presumably disclosed in the course of discussions regarding a prospective attorney-client relationship, the court must satisfy itself from a review of the available evidence, including affidavits and testimony of affected individuals, that confidential information was in fact discussed.” Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Youngblood v. Sanders, 212 W.Va. 885, 575 S.E.2d 864 (2002).

7. “When the information that is the subject of a disqualification motion predicated on prospective representation was ‘generally known’ or otherwise disclosed to individuals other than prospective counsel, the information cannot serve as a basis for disqualification under Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Syl. Pt. 4, State ex rel. Youngblood v. Sanders, 212 W.Va. 885, 575 S.E.2d 864 (2002).

8. “A judgment of conviction will not be set aside because of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice.” Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388, 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995).

9. “Four factors are taken into account in determining whether improper prosecutorial comment is so damaging as to require reversal: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive;(3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters.” Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388, 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995).

Crystal L. Walden, Esq., Deputy Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Charleston, WV, for the Petitioner.

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Benjamin F. Yancey, III, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for the Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This case is before the Court upon the appeal of the Petitioner, Clayton Eugene Rogers, from the April 7, 2011,1 sentencing order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, wherein the Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison without mercy after a jury convicted him of first degree murder without a recommendation of mercy. The Petitioner argues that the trial court erred: 1) in determining that his statement was not taken in violation of the prompt presentment statute, West Virginia Code § 62–1–5(a)(1) (2010); 2) in denying the Petitioner's due process rights when it denied counsel's motion to withdraw based on an actual conflict of interest; and 3) in denying the Petitioner's due process right to a fair trial based upon the prosecutor's improper, prejudicial closing argument. Having carefully reviewed the parties' briefs and arguments, the appendix record and all other matters submitted to the Court, the decision of the circuit court is hereby affirmed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Keith Hubbard testified that on August 28, 2010, he, the victim, Laura Amos, and the Petitioner were all drinking under a bridge in St. Albans, West Virginia. The Petitioner and Ms. Amos had been in a relationship off and on for years. Mr. Hubbard stated that the Petitioner and Ms. Amos got into an argument with one another due to another man, Greg Lacy, supposedly proposing marriage to her. The Petitioner was angered by this proposal and told Ms. Amos that he would kill her. Mr. Hubbard and Ms. Amos left the area under the bridge and went to Mr. Lacy's home that was also located in St. Albans. The two spent the night at Mr. Lacy's home.

The next day, August 29, 2010, the Petitioner, Mr. Hubbard and another man, Larry Means, were hanging out at an abandoned house on West Main Street in St. Albans and had been drinking beer and vodka together throughout the day. 2 Mr. Hubbard testified that the Petitioner was still angry about the proposal made to the victim. Ms. Amos joined them at the abandoned house. Everyone was sitting on the front porch of the house, drinking alcohol in celebration of the Petitioner's birthday. Mr. Lacy came by the abandoned home and walked up to the porch. Mr. Lacy and the Petitioner argued about Mr. Lacy's proposal to Ms. Amos. Mr. Lacy left the house.

Mr. Hubbard testified that about five minutes later, the Petitioner and Ms. Amos got up and walked around the corner of the abandoned house. Mr. Hubbard and Mr. Means remained on the porch of the abandoned house. Mr. Hubbard stated that about ten or fifteen minutes later, he heard Ms. Amos scream his name three times. Mr. Hubbard ran around to the side of the house to see what was happening, but he did not see anybody. He stated that he did not know where the Petitioner and Ms. Amos had gone, so he went back to the front porch.

Mr. Hubbard testified that he and Mr. Means sat on the front porch for a while until Rusty Martin came by the house and informed Mr. Hubbard that he was looking for a house to rent. Mr. Hubbard told him that he should check out the house where they had been sitting. When Mr. Hubbard and Mr. Martin started to enter the home, they saw Ms. Amos lying on the floor in a pool of blood. She had been stabbed twice in the neck.3

The police were called to the home. Upon their investigation at the scene, including talking to Mr. Means, Mr. Martin and Mr. Hubbard, the police obtained an arrest warrant for the Petitioner, who had fled the scene. The police searched for the Petitioner, but did not find him until the next day.

On August 30, 2010, pursuant to an arrest warrant, Captain Donald Scurlock of the Nitro Police Department 4 and Detective Sean Snuffer of the Kanawha County Sheriff's Office arrested the Petitioner around 3:15 p.m. near the home of the Petitioner's friend, Timothy Ward, in St. Albans. At approximately 3:18 p.m., while the Petitioner was being transported to the Kanawha County Sheriff's Office, he was advised of his Miranda5 rights by Captain Scurlock.

Upon arriving at the Sheriff's department, at approximately 3:55 p.m., the Petitioner was again read his Miranda rights by Detective Snuffer. The Petitioner signed a waiver of rights form on which he circled and initialed on the form that he was willing to make a statement to the law enforcement officers. The Petitioner was interviewed by Captain Scurlock and Detective Snuffer. During the interview, the Petitioner admitted to slicing/cutting the victim's throat. He stated that he fled out the side door of the house and into a wooded area behind the house. The Petitioner explained to the officers where he discarded the knives. The interview concluded at approximately at 4:50 p.m.

At the conclusion of the interview, Captain Scurlock and Detective Snuffer indicated that they were going to begin processing the Petitioner by fingerprinting him, photographing him and doing paperwork. At this time, Detective Snuffer advised the Petitioner that he had the right to be promptly presented to a magistrate because he was under arrest. The Petitioner, however, agreed to waive his right to prompt presentment and to take the officers to where he had discarded the knives he used to murder the victim. The officers, even after the Petitioner indicated he would waive his right to prompt presentment, told the Petitioner that if at any time he changed his mind and wanted to be taken to the magistrate, all he had to do was to let them know that and they would immediately bring him to the magistrate. The Petitioner was allowed to speak to his daughter who came to the sheriff's office. He then...

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12 cases
  • State v. Sites
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 7 février 2019
    ..., 237 W. Va. 44, 55, 784 S.E.2d 743, 754 (2016) ("we decline to invoke the plain error rule on this issue."); State v. Rogers , 231 W. Va. 205, 216, 744 S.E.2d 315, 326 (2013) ("we decline to invoke the plain error doctrine regarding alleged misstatement of law made by the prosecutor."). We......
  • State v. A. B.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 17 novembre 2022
    ... ... discretion standard when reviewing decisions on ... disqualification motions. We agree that this is the ... appropriate standard of review ... Blake , 218 W.Va. at 417-18, 624 S.E.2d at 854-55 ... (citations omitted). Accord State v. Rogers , 231 ... W.Va. 205, 214, 744 S.E.2d 315, 324 (2013) (per curiam) ... Additionally, while A.B. is challenging the circuit ... court's decision denying her counsel's motion to ... withdraw, she is essentially claiming that due to the circuit ... court's decision, she ... ...
  • Rogers v. Ames, No. 19-0612
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 12 novembre 2020
    ...of mercy following a jury trial in February of 2011. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence in State v. Rogers, 231 W. Va. 205, 744 S.E.2d 315 (2013). Prior to discussing Petitioner's habeas petition, we will provide a brief recitation of the factual and procedural history of this ......
  • State v. Simmons
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    • 16 juin 2017
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