State v. Rolfe

Decision Date08 July 1968
Docket NumberNo. 10118,10118
Citation92 Idaho 467,444 P.2d 428
PartiesThe STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Edward ROLFE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Robert E. Bakes, Boise, John R. Black and Max F. Parrish, Pocatello, for appellant.

Allan G. Shepard, Atty. Gen., and Roger B. Wright, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, Hugh C. Maguire, Jr., Pros. Atty., for Bannock County, Pocatello, for respondent.

SPEAR, Justice.

On April 4, 1967, defendant and appellant herein, Edward Rolfe, was charged by Information with the crime of statutory rape, alleging that he did 'knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have and accomplish an act of sexual intercourse with and upon one * * *, then and there a female under the age of eighteen (18) years, and of the age of fifteen (15) years, who was not then and there the wife of said defendant Edward Rolfe.'

Trial was commenced on July 5, 1967, and resulted in a jury verdict finding appellant guilty July 10, 1967. On July 24, 1967, appellant was sentenced to be confined in the State penitentiary for life.

Appellant raises several assignments of error concerning procedural and evidentiary matters which, he contends, whether viewed separately or cumulatively, deprived him of his right to a fair trial. These assignments will be discussed in the order charged by appellant.

(1) Motion for Change of Venue

Initially, appellant contends that the court erred not only in denying his motion for a change of venue, but also in allowing him just 24 hours to prepare and present proof in support of the motion.

On May 2, 1967, appellant appeared before the district court for arraignment.

Counsel for appellant requested additional time within which to enter his plea and advised the court that a motion for change of venue would be forthcoming, which motion he would like to have considered prior to the entering of his plea on the arraignment. The trial court allowed counsel 24 hours in which to answer the Information pursuant to I.C. § 19-1516. On May 3, the following day, counsel filed his motion for a change of venue together with several newspaper articles and the supporting affidavits of Edward Rolfe and 18 other persons representative of the community at large to the effect that appellant could not receive a fair and impartial trial in the southeastern Idaho area.

Mr. P. A. McDermott, the deputy prosecuting attorney for Bannock County, Idaho, thereafter filed a motion in opposition to a change of venue alleging that there remained 18,668 qualified electors eligible for jury duty in this case in Bannock County and that none of the affiants listed by appellant had been selected to serve on the present jury panel in this case.

The trial court's memorandum decision and order filed on May 8, 1967, denying appellant's motion, states in part that:

'Upon the face of it it doesn't appear that the defendant cannot have a fair and impartial trial here in Bannock County. If at the time of trial it is revealed by examination on voir dire that there is a prejudice existing which would prevent the defendant from having a fair and impartial trial, the Court will then consider the question of change of venue.'

In the recently decided case of State v. Cypher, 92 Idaho 159, 438 P.2d 904 (1968), this court held that refusal to grant a change of venue will not result in the reversal of a conviction where it appears that the defendant had a fair trial and that no difficulty was experienced in securing a jury.

There is no evidence in the record to suggest that appellant experienced any difficulty in selecting an impartial jury. Thus,

'Under the well settled rule, it is not sufficient merely to show that prejudice exists against the accused; it must appear that the prejudice against him is of such magnitude as to prevent him from receiving a fair and impartial trial; and where the evidence before the court is conflicting, its decision will not be reversed upon appeal.' (State v. Cypher, 438 P.2d at p. 911)

Nor is there any evidence to support appellant's contention that he was prejudiced by the trial court's allowing him only 24 hours in which to enter his plea. Counsel did not raise this issue at the time of the ruling nor did he attempt to produce additional information in support of his motion which the trial court could consider during the voir dire examination. This contention is without merit.

(2) Alleged Misconduct by Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
(a) Motion to Produce

On June 14, 1967, counsel for appellant filed with the court a motion to produce 'requiring the Prosecuting Attorney to produce all evidence, records, interviews, statements and any and all other information available to the prosecution in the above entitled case,' which motion was granted.

During oral argument before the court (June 15th) on this motion, Mr. McDermott stated that the State was not possessed of any information which appellant's counsel did not already have at his disposal. During the trial witness Hollingsworth testified that he had previously been interviewed at the prosecuting attorney's office wherein a tape recording was made of his statement concerning appellant's attempted bribery. However, witness Leaman, Hollingsworth's mother, testified that she had advised counsel for appellant of the attempted bribery over the telephone in February.

Counsel for appellant therefore had substantial knowledge as to what the testimony of this witness would be. Furthermore, it appears from the record that counsel knew of this tape recording as far back as March, 1967, but did not request to hear it at any time.

In view of these facts it was incumbent upon defense counsel to follow up the advantage afforded him under the court order to produce by specifically requesting to hear this tape available to him at the prosecuting attorney's office. People v. Garner, 57 Cal.2d 135, 18 Cal.Rptr. 40, 367 P.2d 680 (1961); cert, denied 370 U.S. 929, 8 L.Ed.2d 508, 82 S.Ct. 1571 (1962); Drozewski v. State, 84 So.2d 329 (Fla.1955). Counsel cannot now be heard to complain that his omission deprived him of the opportunity to obtain this information and resulted in prejudicial error.

(b) Interview of Witnesses

In conjunction with his motion to produce, counsel also argued before the court (June 15th) that he had the right to interview those witnesses the State intended to produce at trial. During the colloquy that followed the trial court reaffirmed defense counsel's position to the effect that he had every right to talk to these witnesses if they so desired and that just because they were the State's witnesses didn't mean they would be isolated from the defense. The court added that it might be a little more orderly if Mr. McDermott would make the arrangements to set up an interview at his office between the witnesses and defense counsel because otherwise they probably would not want to speak with counsel.

But the court was also specific in not limiting counsel's right to contact the witnesses on his own initiative as disclosed in the record as follows:

'THE COURT: That's right. But what I mean to say is I am not restricting your activities. You can dig up the evidence any way that you can. If they want to talk to you, say anything to you, that is their business. If they don't want to, they don't have to * * *'

Thereafter counsel received a letter from Mr. McDermott stating that he had contacted the witnesses but that they did not wish to discuss the case with him; hence there would be no arrangements made for an interview at his office. During the course of trial it was adduced that Mr. McDermott had not contacted two of the minor witnesses directly but had, instead, contacted their parents whom, he felt, could speak for them in view of their age. Moreover, it appeared that Mr. McDermott had not clearly advised the witnesses that the contemplated interview would take place at the prosecutor's office.

However, in light of the trial court's explicit statements leaving counsel unhampered in his efforts to interview the witnesses we find that the course actually pursued did not result in any prejudicial error to appellant.

(3) Testimony on Attempted Bribery

Over defense counsel's objections the trial court permitted testimony to the effect that appellant had offered witness Hollingsworth a sum of money if he would testify that he had taken the prosecutrix home on the night of the alleged crime. We find no error in this ruling.

It has long been held in Idaho (State v. Marren, 17 Idaho 766, 107 P. 993 (1910)) as well as in numerous other jurisdictions (22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 633, p. 480; State v. Sowards, 99 Ariz. 22, 406 P.2d 202 (1965); State v. Russell, 62 Wash.2d 635, 384 P.2d 334 (1963); Johnson v. People, 149 Colo. 13, 367 P.2d 896 (1961); People v. Caruso, 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 345 P.2d 282 (1959)) that evidence which tends to show that the accused has attempted to fabricate or procure false evidence is admissible as showing a consciousness of guilt.

(4) Rebuttal Testimony of the Prosecuting Attorney

Appellant assigns error to the rebuttal testimony of Hugh Maguire, the prosecuting attorney of Bannock County, because his name was not indorsed on the Information and because the nature of his testimony was highly prejudicial. In testifying about various phone conversations he had with appellant in his official capacity, Mr. Maguire referred to one conversation wherein appellant wanted to know if there wasn't something that could be done to have the pending charges against him dismissed and 'wanted to make a deal.' The trial court ordered this testimony stricken from the record and instructed the jury to disregard it.

I.C. § 19-1302 provides in pertinent part that 'witnesses called by the state in rebuttal need not be indorsed upon the information.' Moreover, any prejudicial effect occasioned by this testimony was cured by the trial court's explicit admonition to the jury to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
31 cases
  • State v. Tucker
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 22 Julio 1975
    ...was accorded the opportunity to examine the pre-sentence report and to explain and rebut adverse evidence. See, State v. Rolfe, 92 Idaho 467, 444 P.2d 428 (1968). We find no error in the trial court's consideration of the defendant's pre-sentence investigation Appellant contends that the tr......
  • State v. Owens
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 18 Octubre 1979
    ...an improper question and to avoid speculation as to what the witness might have answered if permitted to do so. See State v. Rolfe, 92 Idaho 467, 444 P.2d 428 (1968); State v. Urie, 92 Idaho 71, 437 P.2d 24 (1968). A motion for mistrial is directed to the trial court's sound discretion and ......
  • State v. Tolman
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 31 Marzo 1992
    ...be presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court's direction. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989); State v. Rolfe, 92 Idaho 467, 444 P.2d 428 (1968); State v. Urie, 92 Idaho 71, 437 P.2d 24 (1968). Therefore, this court must presume that the jury did not consider the testim......
  • State v. Byington, 23273
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • 29 Mayo 1998
    ... ... We presume that the jury followed the instructions given by the district court. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989); State v. Rolfe, 92 Idaho 467, 471, 444 P.2d 428, 432 (1968); State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187, 192, 646 P.2d 429, 434 (Ct.App.1982) ...         Next, we address the second prong of the prior bad acts analysis--a balancing of the probative value of the evidence with the danger of unfair prejudice. As ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT