State v. Roll

• Decision Date: 26 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 17584,17584
• Citation: 118 Idaho 936,801 P.2d 1287
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard L. ROLL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 1287

801 P.2d 1287

118 Idaho 936

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard L. ROLL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17584.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Nov. 26, 1990.

Richard L. Roll, appellant pro se.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen. and Michael Kane, Deputy Atty. Gen., argued, Boise, for respondent.

SILAK, Judge.

Richard Roll appeals from a judgment of conviction under City of Notus Ordinance No. 126 for failing to remove rubbish from his property. We reverse.

The facts of the case are as follows. On November 25, 1986, the City of Notus filed a complaint against Roll for alleged violation of Notus City Ordinance No. 126 (the "ordinance"). ¹ The complaint alleged that "on or about the 24th day of November, 1986," Roll had "willfully, intentionally and unlawfully refuse [sic] to remove rubbish refuse and waste matter of everykind [sic] or nature from his real property ... after written demands to do so." The complaint charged Roll with a violation of the ordinance without reference to any particular section. Roll filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that he had not been provided with notice as required by the ordinance. The magistrate denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury was instructed, in Instruction No. 8, that they could find Roll guilty of a misdemeanor under Section 2 of the ordinance if they found that Roll had "willfully, intentionally and unlawfully refused to comply with Section 2 of [the ordinance]." Section 2 was quoted, in pertinent part, in Instruction No. 7. The jury instructions did not require a finding that Roll had been given the notice of violation specified in the ordinance, nor that he had refused or neglected to comply with Section 2 after the fifteen days specified in Section 3 of the ordinance. The jury found Roll guilty, and the magistrate sentenced him to ninety days in jail and a $250 fine. All jail time and $150 of the fine were suspended.

Roll's motion to set aside the judgment was denied. Roll appealed the judgment to the district court. There, he raised several issues, including a challenge stating that he did not receive adequate notice under the ordinance, and a challenge to the jury instructions. The district court affirmed the judgment of the magistrate court. Roll raises essentially the same issues on this appeal.

At trial, counsel for Roll made no objection to any of the jury instructions. Roll challenged the validity of Instruction No. 7 in his appeal to the district court, arguing that the magistrate erred in basing the instruction on only Section 2, since the ordinance contains notice requirements in Sections 3 and 4. Stated differently, Roll objected that not all the elements of the offense were required to be found by the jury, in that the jury should have been instructed that they must find that notice was given as required by Sections 3 and 4 of the ordinance, and that Roll refused to remove the refuse after proper notice. The district court refused to consider the objection to the jury instruction because it was first raised on appeal and was not made to the magistrate. The district court did not, at the time of its decision, have the benefit of the Supreme Court's holding in State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 225, 786 P.2d 1127 (1990). In Smith, the Supreme Court held that the failure to object to an instruction at trial in a criminal case does not constitute a waiver of any objection to the instruction on appeal. Smith at 229, 786 P.2d at 1131. Therefore, we may consider Roll's objection to the jury instruction, first raised before the district court and now raised on appeal to this Court.

Failure to instruct the jury properly regarding an essential element of the crime charged constitutes clear error. See People v. Williams, 707 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Colo.App.1985). The question whether the jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which we exercise free review. Nettleton v. Thompson, 117 Idaho 308, 310, 787 P.2d 294, 296 (Ct.App.1990); see, e.g., State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 867 781 P.2d 197, 204 (1989). Analysis of Roll's argument requires that we interpret what the ordinance requires for conviction of a misdemeanor violation.

After reviewing the ordinance as a whole, we conclude that the ordinance is ambiguous as to the elements of a misdemeanor offense. Section 2 requires owners or occupants of real property to remove from the property rubbish, refuse and waste matter, and concludes that "[v]iolation of this provision shall be a misdemeanor." When read in isolation, Section 2 seems to expose the violator to the criminal penalty when the violator's property is not in compliance with Section 2, without notice by the city of a failure to comply. When Section 3 is consulted, however, it casts doubt upon this interpretation of Section 2. Section 3 states the misdemeanor penalty for violation of Section 2, but appears to permit this penalty only after the violator refuses or neglects to comply with Section 2 "within fifteen (15) days after notice to do so is given in writing by the Police Chief, City Clerk or the Street and Alley Committee."

This apparent inconsistency between Sections 2 and 3 requires that we interpret the ordinance with reference to principles of statutory construction. ² As the Supreme Court stated in State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 437, 614 P.2d 970, 977 (1980), well-settled principles of statutory construction require that, when a criminal statute is ambiguous, it must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. This principle extends to the elements of the substantive crime. Id. Any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971); State v. Thompson, supra; State v. McKaughen, 108 Idaho 471, 473, 700 P.2d 93, 95 (Ct.App.1985).

Challenged Instruction No. 7 defined the misdemeanor crime only with reference to Section 2 of the ordinance. Jury Instruction No. 8, which listed the elements of the offense, basically tracked Section 2. The principles of statutory construction which we must follow compel the conclusion that proof of refusal to remove rubbish after the required form of notice has been given by the city is an element of a misdemeanor offense under the ordinance. Although the city argued to the magistrate that Section 2 alone could support a misdemeanor conviction, the ambiguity in the statute which is created by the seeming conflict between Sections 2 and 3 must be resolved in favor of the criminal defendant. ³ Thus, we hold that an essential element of the offense was omitted from the jury instructions: the refusal or neglect to comply with Section 2 after notice as required by Section 3. ⁴

As to Roll's other arguments, including constitutional claims, we need not reach them because our decision that the jury instructions did not properly instruct the jury on the elements of the offense resolves this case. We will not address constitutional questions not necessary to the resolution of a case. V-1 Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 112 Idaho 508, 733 P.2d 729 (1987); Nelson v. Boundary County, 109 Idaho 205, 706 P.2d 94 (Ct.App.1985); Packard v. Joint School District No. 171, 104 Idaho 604, 661 P.2d 770 (Ct.App.1983).

Roll also objects to actions he claims the city took in removing personal property from his yard. Those actions appear to have been taken following the appellate decision of the district court, but no record has been presented to us regarding the basis for or circumstances of the alleged removal. We therefore decline to make any determination as to this issue, and this opinion has no issue or claim preclusion effect with respect to the claims, if any, that Roll may have as to the seizure of his property.

Roll has requested attorney fees and costs under I.A.R. 40 and 41 and under Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121. Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121 apply only to civil actions and are not applicable to this case. Roll's request for costs and attorney fees under the appellate rules also fails. In State v. Peterson, 113 Idaho 554, 746 P.2d 1013 (Ct.App.1987), this Court held that a successful criminal...