State v. Rollins
| Decision Date | 29 December 1922 |
| Docket Number | 25633 |
| Citation | 153 La. 10,95 So. 264 |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. ROLLINS |
Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides Leven L. Hooe, Judge.
Ike Rollins was convicted of possessing intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, and he appeals.
Conviction and sentence set aside, and case remanded.
Hakenyos Hunter & Scott, of Alexandria, for appellant.
A. V Coco, Atty. Gen., Cleveland Dear, Dist. Atty., of Alexandria (T. S. Walmsley, of New Orleans, of counsel), for the State.
Defendant appeals from a conviction and sentence for possessing intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes in violation of the Hood Bill. He relies for reversal upon three bills of exception, which we shall discuss in consecutive order, as follows:
The first was to the overruling of a motion to quash which alleged that the bill or of information did not set forth an offense under the laws of the state, and particularly Act 39 of 1921 (Extra Sess.). This motion involves the same contention as was made in the case of State v. Brackins, 152 La. 445, 93 So. 582. Counsel admits that there are other features of the act, embraced in section 1, such as the transportation, etc., of intoxicants, which may be punished or sentenced under the latter part of section 3, as quoted in the Brackins Case; but contends, that, inasmuch as the first part of said section 3, deals with manufacture and possession, it was intended to punish only such manufacture and possession when accompanied by a purpose to sell. It is argued that, although section 1 denounces as unlawful any kind of possession, manufacture, transporting, etc., except upon proper permit, the possession other than for sale is not, in terms, declared to be a misdemeanor, and hence the Legislature did not intend to punish it. We know of nothing which requires that the lawmaking body shall denounce in any particular form any given act. It is sufficient that such act be declared unlawful and a penalty prescribed therefor.
As said in the Brackins Case, we think it was clearly the purpose of the Legislature to make a distinction between manufacture and possessing for sale and all other violations, by requiring a necessary jail sentence for the two former offenses. This seems clearly indicated by the title of the act, which is --
"To prohibit the manufacture, sale, transportation, delivery, possession, advertisement, exportation and importation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, and for non-beverage purposes, except where authorized by permit from proper federal authorities, and to provide penalties for the violation of this Act," etc.
The second bill was reserved to the denial of a motion for a bill of particulars. The motion asked that the state be required to state:
Defendant was entitled to know with reasonable definiteness the time and place where the liquor was possessed; that is, whether in his home, or at some other place, so that his attention might reasonably be directed to the circumstances relied upon. This is especially true, since possession of intoxicants, even for beverage purposes, under the circumstances detailed in section4, is excepted from the operation of the act.
It could hardly be conceived that any court would convict an accused because intoxicating liquor was found in some remote spot upon his premises, unless the evidence showed that it had found its way there at his hands or by his direction. It is not at all impossible, and we might say, not unlikely that some one with a grudge against another, might "plant" or place intoxicants upon one's premises, without his knowledge, and bring about its discovery by the law enforcement agencies for purposes of revenge. Hence, if mere...
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... ... that if, as was claimed in argument in this case, the proof ... should tend to show that he had committed the offense more ... than once, he might know which occasion the state relied ... upon, to be able to plead acquittal or conviction at any ... subsequent prosecution. State v. Rollins, 153 La. 10, 95 So ... 264; Marr's Crim. Juris. (2d Ed.) vol. 1, p. 515.' ... In State v ... Kendrick, 203 La. 63, 13 So.2d 387, 389, the State appealed ... from a judgment sustaining the accused's motion to quash ... the indictment, which was brought under Art. 67, Theft, of ... ...
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Land v. United States
...upon which the state will rely, in order that he may be prepared to meet or rebut the proof submitted by the state. See State v. Rollins, 153 La. 10, 95 So. 264. * * "With reference to the time * * * we think that was sufficiently alleged, for the trail court, we assume, would and did confi......
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State v. Cryar
...of the place. State v. Burkhalter, 118 La. 657, 43 So. 268; State v. Ackerman, 51 La.Ann. 1213, 26 So. 80. In this respect State v. Rollins, 153 La. 10, 95 So. 264, and State v. De Arman, 153 La. 345, 95 So. 803, readily distinguishable. In both these cases the defendant was charged with si......
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