State v. Roman-Rosado

• Decision Date: 23 January 2020
• Docket Number: DOCKET NO. A-3703-17T4
• Citation: 462 N.J.Super. 183,225 A.3d 544
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Miguel A. ROMAN-ROSADO, a/k/a Miguel Roman, Damian Rosado, Miguel A. Roman, and Miguel A. Rosado, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

462 N.J.Super. 183

225 A.3d 544

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Miguel A. ROMAN-ROSADO, a/k/a Miguel Roman, Damian Rosado, Miguel A. Roman, and Miguel A. Rosado, Defendant-Appellant.

DOCKET NO. A-3703-17T4

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued November 12, 2019

Decided January 23, 2020

Emma R. Moore, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Emma R. Moore, of counsel and on the briefs).

Regina M. Oberholzer, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Regina M. Oberholzer, Harrisburg, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges Sumners, Geiger and Natali.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUMNERS, JR., J.A.D.

A stop and a warrantless search of a car defendant was driving¹ uncovered a handgun. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress the search and seizure of the handgun, defendant pled guilty to second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). In defendant's appeal, we are asked to decide: (1) whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop the car for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33, because the license plate frame on the car's rear license plate "conceal[ed] or otherwise obscure[d]" the words "Garden State" at the bottom of the license plate; and (2) whether the subsequent search and seizure of the handgun was legally permissible. Having considered the record and applicable law, we conclude there was no reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33, and thus the seizure of the gun is inadmissible to prove a second-degree certain persons offense. Even if there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car, the search did not satisfy the warrant exceptions of the automobile exception, a search incident to arrest, or protective sweep. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the conviction for second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, and remand so defendant can move to vacate his guilty plea.

I.

We begin with a summary of the facts derived from the trial court's suppression hearing conducted on October 18, 2017.

Deptford Township Police Officer Thomas Warrington provided the only testimony at the suppression hearing. Warrington was on "proactive detail" at approximately 6:47 p.m. on April 17, 2017, when he pulled over defendant's car because the license plate frame covered a portion of the bottom of the words "Garden State" on the rear license plate.² Warrington explained on cross-examination that during proactive detail officers look for traffic code violations and try to "develop criminal investigations from that." Having been shown a picture of the car's rear license plate, Warrington admitted he could still clearly read "Garden State," of which he estimated fifteen to ten percent of the words were covered by the license plate frame. Despite being able to clearly see the words "Garden State," it was Warrington's understanding N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 required that "none of the lettering on the plate including the characters and also the New Jersey Garden State, any lettering [could not] be obstructed by anything." Warrington did not indicate the basis for his understanding but admitted his assessment that N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 was violated was the sole reason for the stop.

Defendant was asked for his driver's license, but he produced a state identification card; his driving license was suspended. Two passengers were also in the car, a woman in the front passenger seat, and a male child³ behind her in the rear seat. Warrington went back to his patrol car and subsequently discovered defendant had warrants out for his arrest.

Warrington then radioed for backup to help take defendant into custody. Warrington approached the car and asked defendant to step out; the record is unclear if Warrington was alone, or if any other police officer had arrived at the scene. After requesting help, Warrington's testimony often refers to "we" instead of "I." For example, he stated, "we weren't sure what it was" ... "[w]e had the other two parties step out of the vehicle" ... "we conducted a further search on that basis."⁴

As defendant stepped out of the car, Warrington saw "a white garment that looked like it had something bulky wrapped in it, shoved partially under the [defendant's] seat." According to Warrington, "[i]t looked like he might have quickly tried to discard something under the seat when we went to stop him." (Emphasis added). After directing defendant to move to the rear of the car, Warrington stated he was concerned about the object under the seat. Although he wasn't "sure what it was," he explained that it was "just strange," and "could have been a weapon" within the reach of the woman in the front passenger's seat.

Warrington reached into the car, removed the object, and discovered it was an unloaded handgun.⁵ Defendant was then placed in handcuffs, and the two other passengers were asked to step out the car. Warrington stated that when he leaned into the car again, he smelled burnt marijuana, and proceeded to search the entire vehicle, but found no other contraband.⁶

Following counsel's arguments, the trial judge rendered an oral decision denying defendant's motion and remarked "a more formal opinion" would be issued. Two days later, the judge issued an order and written opinion denying the motion.

The judge ruled the stop of defendant's car was justified as Warrington reasonably suspected defendant violated N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 because the rear license plate frame of defendant's car concealed or otherwise obscured a part of the marking imprinted upon the car's license plate. The judge noted there was no question that defendant's rear license plate was readable but held readability of "Garden State" was not determinative of the statute's violation. The judge found the statute objective in that "prohibiting obstruction of any marking imprinted on the vehicle license plate[,]" had no subjective issue. Thus, even a de minimis obstruction of any marking on the license plate was a violation. The judge remarked that defendant's car was reasonably stopped "[b]ecause this statute just determines that the imprinted language of the plate can in no way be obstructed."

The judge, discussing an unpublished case from this court,⁷ stated:

The case involved a de novo review of a municipal court appeal as I understand it .... There was a motion to suppress ... based upon the enforcement of the statute, [N.J.S.A.] 39:3-33, and ... on a de novo review of the motion to suppress which was granted that it was clear and unambiguous on its face that the words Garden State were imprinted on the license and thus could not be obstructed under the statute which indicates that nothing can be done or nothing can be mounted around the plate that would conceal or otherwise obscure any part of marking imprinted on the plate.

....

Even if a de minim[i]s, minimal covering of any imprinted portion – I'll give it to you, without question, D-1 is a readable license plate. ... That's really not the question. Because this statute just determines that the imprinted language of the plate can in no way be obstructed .... It is thus valid for a law enforcement officer to enforce that.

Addressing defendant's challenge to the search of his car, the judge ruled that Warrington had a lawful ground to effectuate the stop "and any investigation that flows therefrom is proper." In his written decision, the judge cited State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523, 541, 888 A.2d 1266 (2006), for the proposition that New Jersey recognizes two grounds for a warrantless search of a motor vehicle incident to arrest: officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence. Applying that principle, the judge found that Warrington was concerned for his safety after seeing the object that appeared to be hastily shoved under the driver's side seat. Because defendant was not in handcuffs at the time and there were other occupants in the car, the judge found it reasonable for Warrington to reach into the car and secure the unknown covered object that turned out to be a handgun. The judge further determined that had the officer tried to handcuff defendant, instead of reaching for the unknown object, "he would have exposed himself to possible harm from the passengers as his attention would have been focused on securing [d]efendant."

Defendant appeals the order denying his motion to suppress raising the following points of argument:

POINT I

THE INITIAL STOP OF MR. ROMAN-ROSADO'S VEHICLE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT AN OFFENSE WAS BEING COMMITTED BECAUSE HIS LICENSE PLATE WAS NOT "OBSTRUCTED" WITHIN THE MEANING OF N.J.S.A. 39:3-33. BECAUSE OFFICER WARRINGTON'S

BELIEF TO THE CONTRARY WAS BASED ON AN UNREASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE, THE STOP WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

A. In His Motion to Suppress, Mr. Roman-Rosado Argued That the Stop Was Unconstitutional Because Officer Warrington Had Misinterpreted the Law, Not Because He Had Misapprehended the Facts.

B. Both the Language and Meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:[3-33] Are Unambiguous. Therefore, the Officer's Mistake of Law was Not Objectively Reasonable.

i. To "Obscure" Unambiguously Means to Derogate Visibility.

ii. The Unambiguous Legislative Intent Shows that the Law Pertains to Obstruction of the Identifying Number, Not Any Text or Decorative Element of the Plate.

C. Even If Officer Warrington's Mistake of Law Were Reasonable, the "Reasonable Mistake of Law Doctrine" Is Not Compatible with New Jersey's Jurisprudence and Should Not Change the Court's Conclusion.

[i]. The "Reasonable Mistake of Law" Doctrine is Contrary to this Court's Article I, Paragraph 7 Jurisprudence.

[ii]. The Deleterious Consequences of the Doctrine Are Widely Recognized.

POINT II

BECAUSE MR. ROMAN-ROSADO WAS SAFELY REMOVED FROM THE VEHICLE AND THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THE PASSENGER OR ACCOMPANYING CHILD WERE A THREAT, ENTRY INTO THE VEHICLE AND

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