State v. Romero

• Citation: 156 Ohio St.3d 468,2019 Ohio 1839,129 N.E.3d 404
• Decision Date: 15 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. 2017-0915,2017-0915
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. ROMERO, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

156 Ohio St.3d 468

129 N.E.3d 404

2019 Ohio 1839

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,

v.ROMERO, Appellee.

No. 2017-0915

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted January 29, 2019

Decided May 15, 2019

John D. Ferrero Jr., Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald Mark Caldwell and Jessica L. Logothetides, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

Ryan Muennich, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Immigrant Defense Project.

Pinales, Stachler, Young, Burrell & Crouse Co., L.P.A., and Candace C. Crouse, urging affirmance for amicus curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

French, J. {¶ 1} In this appeal, we address the standard for ruling on a criminal defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the motion is based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from an attorney's alleged failure to advise his noncitizen client of the immigration consequences of entering the plea.

{¶ 2} Appellee, Carlos Romero, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, has been ordered to appear for deportation proceedings as a result of entering guilty pleas to charges of drug trafficking and possession. Romero seeks to withdraw his guilty pleas based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied Romero's motion, but the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed. Appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals.

{¶ 3} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, with a caveat. We agree with the Fifth District that the trial court erred in denying Romero's motion without considering the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel established in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and applied in the immigration context in Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). We conclude, however, that the Fifth District's remand order to the trial court for a full evidentiary hearing is premature. We instead remand the matter to the trial court to evaluate Romero's motion and supporting materials in accordance with the legal framework that we set out in this opinion. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the matter to the trial court for application of the proper standard.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶ 4} Carlos Romero, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1998. He has five children who were born in the United States and whose ages ranged from one year old to 18 years old at the time of the relevant trial-court proceedings.

{¶ 5} In March 2016, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted Romero on felony charges of possession of marijuana, trafficking in marijuana, and possession of cocaine.

{¶ 6} In June 2016, Romero appeared with counsel to enter his pleas to the charges. At the plea hearing, the trial court asked Romero whether he was a United States citizen, and Romero answered no. The court then advised Romero, as R.C. 2943.031(A) requires, of the possible immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea:

THE COURT: If you are not a citizen of the United States, you are going to be advised and you are hereby advised that a conviction of the offense to which you are pleading guilty may have the consequence of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.

Do you understand that, sir?

DEFENDANT ROMERO: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And with that in mind, are you still prepared to proceed?

DEFENDANT ROMERO: Yes, ma'am.

(Capitalization sic.)

{¶ 7} The court confirmed that Romero had had a chance to meet with his counsel to discuss his Crim.R. 11 plea form before signing it and that he had no unanswered questions about the form. Romero stated that he was satisfied with the quality of legal services that counsel had provided. Near the conclusion of the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, the court again asked Romero if he had any questions before entering his pleas. Romero had a question about his ability to work, but he did not bring up any immigration-related questions. After conferring off the record with his counsel, Romero pleaded guilty to all three counts.

{¶ 8} The court sentenced Romero to three years of community-control sanctions and 100 hours of community service and suspended his driver's license for six months.

{¶ 9} According to Romero, in July 2016, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained him and served him with a notice to appear in federal immigration court for removal proceedings; his hearing was scheduled for October 2016. The notice informed Romero that he was subject to deportation from the United States under sections 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, codified in 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Romero's convictions were for an aggravated felony and a violation of law related to a controlled substance, which made him subject to deportation. See id. (noncitizen "shall, upon order of the Attorney General, be removed" if convicted of an "aggravated felony" or violation of law "relating to a controlled substance").

{¶ 10} Four days before his scheduled removal hearing, Romero filed an emergency motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and to vacate the judgment of conviction in the trial court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney had failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his pleas. The court denied the motion. The judge referred to the plea-hearing transcript, noted that she had read to Romero the advisement in R.C. 2943.031(A), and concluded that Romero understood the consequences of deportation and still chose to proceed with the guilty pleas. Accordingly, the trial court found that Romero had entered his pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and it denied his motion.

{¶ 11} The Fifth District Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the trial court's judgment. The court of appeals noted that Romero's ineffective-assistance claim required a two-prong analysis: whether counsel's performance was deficient and whether counsel's ineffectiveness was prejudicial to Romero. The court concluded that the trial court erred by denying Romero's motion without deciding whether counsel properly advised Romero and by relying on its compliance with R.C. 2943.031(A) to dispose of the motion. The court reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court to conduct a hearing.

{¶ 12} We accepted the state's discretionary appeal, 151 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2018-Ohio-365, 90 N.E.3d 945, which presents the following proposition of law:

A trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 when the trial court has fully complied with the colloquy requirements of Crim.R. 11 and with the advisement requirements of R.C. 2943.031 regarding the consequences of a guilty plea on a defendant's immigration status.

ANALYSIS

{¶ 13} Romero asks to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, which provides that a trial court may grant a defendant's postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea only to correct a manifest injustice. A defendant bears the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice. State v. Smith , 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion to withdraw a plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Francis , 104 Ohio St.3d 490, 2004-Ohio-6894, 820 N.E.2d 355, ¶ 32.

Ineffective-assistance claims under Strickland and Padilla

{¶ 14} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the effective assistance of counsel at " ‘critical stages of a criminal proceeding,’ including when he enters a guilty plea." Lee v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1964, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017), quoting Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156, 165, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) ; Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). When a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel arising from the plea process, the defendant must meet the two-prong test set out in Strickland , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. See Hill at 58, 106 S.Ct. 366 (applying Strickland to guilty pleas); State v. Xie , 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992) (same).

{¶ 15} First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; Xie at 524, 584 N.E.2d 715. When an attorney's noncitizen client is considering a plea, the United States Supreme Court has held that "counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation." Padilla , 559 U.S. at 374, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284. Given the grave consequences of deportation, an ineffective-assistance claim is not limited to affirmative misadvice or false information. Id. at 369-371, 130 S.Ct. 1473. The failure to give any advice at all about possible deportation consequences satisfies the first prong of Strickland . Id. "The severity of deportation * * * only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation." Id. at 373-374, 130 S.Ct. 1473.

{¶ 16} Second, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice resulting from counsel's deficient performance. Strickland at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366 ; Xie at 524, 584 N.E.2d 715.

The trial court applied the wrong legal analysis

{¶ 17} In this case, the trial court did not examine Romero's ineffective-assistance claim under either prong of Strickland . Rather, the judge noted...