State v. Roper, 21085

Decision Date14 November 1979
Docket NumberNo. 21085,21085
Citation260 S.E.2d 705,274 S.C. 14
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Lawrence ROPER and Raythum Johnson, Appellants.

George A. Anderson, Aiken, and William T. Toal, of Johnson, Toal & Battiste, Columbia, for appellants.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen. Brian P. Gibbes and Russell D. Ghent, Columbia, and Sol. Sylvia W. Westerdahl, Aiken, for respondent.

RHODES, Justice:

Appellants were convicted of armed robbery of a pawn shop and sentenced to terms of twenty-five years each. In this appeal they assert three trial errors. We affirm.

Based upon information from the pawn shop operator that the robbery was perpetrated by two black males, as well as a witness' description of the car used by the robbers to make their escape as a late model, green Thunderbird with a red and white license tag bearing the letters "MVB" or "MVF", the police were able, within a period of three hours, to locate an automobile occupied by two black males meeting the description given in all material respects. The car was subsequently pulled over in a residential neighborhood, at which point appellants allegedly jumped from the car shouting profanities. They were thereupon arrested for disorderly conduct pursuant to section 16-17-530(b) of the South Carolina Code (1976) and taken to the county jail. Their car was subsequently taken to the county jail yard and an inventory search conducted without benefit of warrant, a previous superficial search of the car having been made at the scene of the arrest. As a result of these searches, a sum of money, various articles stolen from the pawn shop, and several guns were recovered. These instrumentalities and fruits of the crime were thereafter entered into evidence at trial over the objections of appellants.

Appellants assert that the evidence produced by the search was the product of an arrest made without probable cause. A police officer has probable cause to arrest without a warrant where he, "in good faith, believes that a person is guilty of a felony, and his belief rests on such grounds as would induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man, under the circumstances, to believe likewise . . . ." State v. Swilling, 249 S.C. 541, 558, 155 S.E.2d 607, 617 (1967). In determining whether the evidence is sufficiently detailed to give rise to probable cause, all the evidence within the arresting officer's knowledge may be considered, including the details observed while responding to information received. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 248 S.E.2d 475 (1978). The factual situation in this case is similar to that of the Peters case. In that case an informant told a police officer that a yellow Grand Prix with a white top and South Carolina license tags bearing the digits "308" would be leaving the beach within a short period of time transporting a quantity of marijuana. This was held to be sufficient to constitute probable cause. See also, State v. Gilbert, 258 S.E.2d 890 (S.C.1979). As the police had similarly detailed information in the case at bar, there was sufficient information to give rise to probable cause to stop the automobile.

Likewise there was sufficient knowledge on the part of the officers to arrest appellants for disorderly conduct. Under section 16-17-530(b), any person who shall "use obscene or profane language on any highway or at any public place" is guilty of disorderly conduct. Appellants, upon the police's stopping them, immediately jumped from the car, shouting profanities. There was obviously probable cause to arrest for violation of the statute.

Appellants further contend, however, that the disorderly conduct statute is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Because the statute is unconstitutional, the argument continues, the arrest was made without probable cause, thereby making the search of the car illegal since it was a search incident to an arrest. Even if it were assumed the statute is unconstitutional, it would not avail appellants. The United States Supreme Court has recently held in Michigan v. DeFillippo,--- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) that where an officer who arrested the defendants in that case had abundant probable cause to believe the defendant's conduct violated a presumptively valid city ordinance, the arrest of that defendant was lawful even though the ordinance was later declared unconstitutional. Since the arrest of the defendant was valid, the court found that the search of his person incident to the arrest was proper and evidence discovered during the search need not be suppressed.

Similarly, based upon the valid arrest in this instance, the search of the automobile incident to that arrest was proper. It is well settled that a follow-up search is sanctioned where the initial seizure of the automobile was based upon probable cause. State v. Peters, supra. As the search of appellants' car was legal, the motion to suppress was properly denied by the trial judge.

The next question raised by appellants involves the admissibility of certain impeachment testimony. While the victim of the crime was being cross-examined, defense counsel asked him a question concerning an alleged inconsistent answer made by him at the preliminary hearing. As soon as the question was asked and before an answer was given, the solicitor asked that defense counsel be...

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54 cases
  • State v. Santiago
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • June 19, 2006
    ...the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been. State v. Roper, 274 S.C. 14, 20, 260 S.E.2d 705, 708 (1979); State v. King, 367 S.C. 131, 136, 623 S.E.2d 865, 868 Here, the trial court conducted a Jackson v. Denno5 hearing pri......
  • Jamison v. Ford Motor Co.
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    ...the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the rejected testimony would have been. State v. Roper, 274 S.C. 14, 20, 260 S.E.2d 705, 708 (1979). However, this rule regarding proffers has been relaxed where the appellate court is able determine from the record wh......
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    ...[Id. at 37-38, 99 S.Ct. at 2632, 61 L.Ed.2d at 350.] See also Johnson v. Palange, 406 A.2d 360 (R.I.1979); State v. Roper, 274 S.C. 14, 260 S.E.2d 705 (1979). Here, Officer Gavin, while being vulgarly abused by a person whose yelling and screaming was drawing a crowd, was, in my view, entit......
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    ...preserved for appellate review under South Carolina law. See State v. Schmidt, 342 S.E.2d 401, 402-03 (S.C. 1986) (citing State v. Roper, 260 S.E.2d 705 (S.C. 1979) ("Ordinarily, this Court will not review alleged error of the exclusion of testimony unless a proffer of testimony is properly......
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