State v. Rosales-Contreras
| Decision Date | 18 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 72911-0-I,72911-0-I |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JOSE JAIME ROSALES-CONTRERAS, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
APPELWICK, J. — Rosales-Contreras appeals his conviction for first degree assault. He argues that the State failed to prove that he intended to inflict great bodily harm. In a statement of additional grounds, Rosales-Contreras contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenge to remove a juror for cause. We affirm.
FACTS
Jose Rosales-Contreras and Maria Dimas were married in 2003. Shortly after they were married, the two began arguing frequently. They argued most often about finances and disciplining the children.
Dimas had two sons from a previous relationship, Emilio and Jacob. And, Rosales-Contreras and Dimas had two sons together, Andrew and Giovanni. Rosales-Contreras treated Emilio and Jacob differently than Andrew and Giovanni. Emilio and Jacob both had long lists of chores that they were expected to complete before Rosales-Contreras came home each night.
On April 2, 2008, Rosales-Contreras came home to find that thirteen year old Emilio had not finished his chores. He was furious, yelling at Emilio in the kitchen. He was just inches away from Emilio. From the bedroom Dimas heard Rosales-Contreras yelling, and she went into the kitchen to protect her son. She inserted herself in between Rosales-Contreras and Emilio. Rosales-Contreras told Dimas to move, but she refused, telling him," 'I'm not moving. You're not going to hit my son.' " Rosales-Contreras again told Dimas, " 'Move or I'm going to hit you.'" Dimas stood her ground, and told Rosales-Contreras, " "
Dimas then saw Rosales-Contreras lift up his arm, and his fist came at her. Dimas saw a flash of bright light. She felt something dripping from her eye. Dimas was in unbearable pain, and she was afraid.
The next thing Dimas remembered, she was in the bathroom. She could tell that her eye was bleeding, and she could not open up her eyelid because it hurt too much. After lying in bed in pain for several hours, Dimas realized she had to see a doctor about her eye. She asked Rosales-Contreras to take her to the hospital, but he was too afraid that he would be arrested. So, Dimas drove herself to the urgent care that was 10 minutes away from her home.
Dimas had surgery, but she ultimately lost her vision in that eye. Her eye had shrunk, and she had to have a plastic sphere implanted to maintain the shape of her eye.
Dimas did not immediately report what Rosales-Contreras had done to her. Rosales-Contreras left the family and went to Mexico in December 2008. Once she knew that Rosales-Contreras was not coming back, Dimas filed for dissolution and sought a protection order against him. In March 2009, she went to the Federal Way Police Department to reveal what Rosales-Contreras had done to her.
Rosales-Contreras was first charged with assault in the second degree - domestic violence on March 24, 2009. But, he did not appear at arraignment. The State amended the information on February 3, 2011 to charge Rosales-Contreras with assault in the first degree - domestic violence, with an aggravating factor for committing the crime within the sight or sound of a minor child. Rosales-Contreras was apprehended in January 2014.
The case proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted Rosales-Contreras as charged. He appeals.
DISCUSSION
Rosales-Contreras argues that the sufficiency of the evidence does not support his conviction, because the State did not prove that he intended to inflict great bodily harm. In a statement of additional grounds, Rosales-Contreras asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, because his trial attorney did not present an involuntary intoxication defense, request a lesser included offense instruction, argue that ER 404(b) evidence should be excluded,or obtain evidence to support his theory of the case. And, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenge to remove a juror for cause.
Rosales-Contreras argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with specific intent to inflict great bodily harm on Dimas. He contends that because he struck Dimas only a single time with his fist, and her severe injury was unexpected, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court asks whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sweany, 174 Wn.2d 909, 914, 281 P.3d 305 (2012). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact, and we do not review them on appeal. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990).
A person commits assault in the first degree when he or she "with intent to inflict great bodily harm . . . assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm." RCW 9A.36.011. Great bodily harm is defined as "bodily injury which creates a probability of death, or which causes significant serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ." RCW 9A.04.110. The fact of great bodily harm standingalone is not sufficient to prove assault in the first degree. See State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 218, 883 P.2d 320 (1994) (). The State must also prove intent, which is established when a person acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime. RCW 9A.36.011; RCW 9A.08.010.
Generally, intent to commit a crime may be inferred when the defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances indicate such an intent as a matter of logical probability. State v. Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d 1, 8, 309 P.3d 318 (2013). The same is true with the intent to inflict great bodily harm—all of the details of the case may indicate intent, including the manner and act of inflicting the wound, and also the nature of the relationship and any prior threats. State v. Ferreira, 69 Wn. App. 465, 468-69, 850 P.2d 541 (1993).
Rosales-Contreras argues that the evidence here did not establish intent, because he struck Dimas only once. He points to two Washington cases where the evidence indicated intent to inflict great bodily harm. See State v. Pierre, 108 Wn. App. 378, 385-86, 31 P.3d 1207 (2001) (); State v. Alcantar-Maldonado, 184 Wn. App. 215, 220, 340 P.3d 859 (2014) (). Rosales-Contreras suggests that these cases—and cases from other jurisdictions—demonstrate that when a defendant did not use a weapon to effect the assault, intent was established by repeated blows against an unresisting victim. The inference from the argument is that asingle blow is necessarily insufficient proof of intent to inflict great bodily harm. We disagree.
Neither Alcantar-Maldanado nor Pierre announced a bright line rule requiring the defendant to strike multiple blows. Instead, the court in both cases analyzed the specific facts of the case to conclude that there was sufficient evidence of intent. Alcantar-Maldonado, 184 Wn. App. at 225-26; Pierre, 108 Wn. App. at 385-86. And, most of the out-of-state cases that Rosales-Contreras cites involved crimes requiring a different specific intent than the one here: either malice or intent to kill. See, e.g., People v. Spring, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1199, 1204, 200 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1984) (malice); McAndrews v. People, 71 Colo. 542, 548-49, 208 P. 486 (1922) (malice); People v. Mighell, 254 III. 53, 59, 98 N.E. 236 (1912) (intent to kill); Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334, 339 (1992) (intent to kill); State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 524-25, 308 S.E.2d 317 (1983) (malice); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 527 Pa. 511, 513, 594 A.2d 300 (1991) (malice). Thus, they offer little guidance as to what evidence is sufficient to prove intent to inflict great bodily harm. The remaining cases he relies upon recognize that whether intent to inflict great bodily harm is established depends on the facts of each case. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 522 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (); Flournoy v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. 395, 396, 63 S.W.2d 558 (1933) (). Instead of supporting an argument that a single blow is insufficient to show intent, these cases demonstrate that intent is a fact specific inquiry.
And, the facts of this case allow a jury to conclude that Rosales-Contreras possessed the requisite intent when he struck Dimas. Jacob, who witnessed thealtercation, testified that he saw Rosales-Contreras raise his right hand and strike Dimas in the head. In the moments leading up to the punch, Rosales-Contreras was furious. He was yelling, his face was tensed up, his eyebrows were furrowed, and his arms were crossed. He told Dimas to get out of the way when she stepped between him and Emilio. When Dimas refused to move, Rosales-Contreras again told her to get out of the way. He specifically threatened her," 'Move or I'm going to hit you.'" When Dimas stood her ground, Rosales-Contreras followed through with this threat, punching her in the eye. The blow was intentional.
The force required to inflict the injury Dimas suffered is indicative of the...
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