State v. Rose, 10471

Decision Date22 December 1992
Docket NumberNo. 10471,10471
Citation615 A.2d 1058,29 Conn.App. 421
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Michael ROSE.

Deborah Del Prete Sullivan, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, were G. Douglas Nash, Public Defender, and John W. Watson, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Mitchell S. Brody, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Atty., and James G. Clark, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and FOTI and FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN, JJ.

FOTI, Judge.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of robbery in the first degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134(a)(4). 1 He was sentenced to a term of twenty years imprisonment on the first count and five years imprisonment on the second count, with the sentences ordered to run consecutively. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) failed to suppress identification evidence, (2) declined to allow an in-court lineup, and (3) failed to sever the offenses. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. At approximately 12:40 a.m. on March 16, 1990, a black male approached the service counter at the Shell Food Mart at 144 Arch Street in Hamden. He was wearing a San Francisco 49ers jacket, a T-shirt, and jeans. He had a gun drawn and ordered the cashier, Lori Kemp, to remove the cash register drawer and place it on the counter. Kemp did as she was told, and the man took money from the drawer. He then asked her if more money was available, and she gave him additional money from beneath the counter. The robber took between $150 and $200 before fleeing. A security camera recorded the incident on videotape.

Later that day at police headquarters, Kemp viewed 200 to 300 photographs but was unable to identify the robber. On April 6, 1990, the police visited her at another place of employment and showed her an array of eight photographs. She selected the defendant's photograph and identified him as the robber. At trial, Kemp again identified the defendant as the robber.

Five days after the robbery, on March 21, 1990, at approximately 10 p.m., two black males entered the same Shell Food Mart. One of the men, who wore a long heavy jacket, was armed with a gun. At that time, Kemp's mother, Beverly LaFreniere, was working behind the cashier's counter. Also present in the store was the owner, Theresa Kubick, who was arranging merchandise in one of the aisles. One of the robbers grabbed Kubick and pushed her behind the counter, while the other, with the gun, ordered LaFreniere to open the cash register. She complied, and the second man took between $100 and $200 from the cash drawer. The armed robber then asked about money under the counter, and instructed the second robber to look beneath the counter for additional money. Kubick stated there was no more money, and the robbers departed. This incident was also recorded by the security camera.

On April 5, 1990, the police visited LaFreniere at the Food Mart and showed her an array of eight photographs. She picked out the defendant's photograph as that of the robber with the gun. On the following day, Kubick separately viewed the same array and also selected the defendant's photograph as that of the robber with the gun. At trial, both LaFreniere and Kubick made in-court identifications of the defendant as the robber with the gun.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court should not have admitted into evidence the three out-of-court identifications and the three in-court identifications, because the photographic identifications were unnecessarily suggestive and unreliable. He therefore alleges that his due process rights were violated. 2

"An in-court identification must be excluded, as violative of the defendant's due process rights, only if it is the product of an unconstitutional pretrial identification procedure." State v. Tatum, 219 Conn. 721, 726-27, 595 A.2d 322 (1991). "In determining whether identification procedures violate a defendant's due process rights, the required inquiry is made on an ad hoc basis and is two-pronged: first, it must be determined whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive; and second, if it is found to have been so, it must be determined whether the identification was nevertheless reliable based on an examination of the 'totality of the circumstances.' " State v. Theriault, 182 Conn. 366, 371-72, 438 A.2d 432 (1980); see also State v. Johnson, 28 Conn.App. 645, 648-49, 612 A.2d 799 (1992).

To determine whether an identification that resulted from an unduly suggestive procedure is nevertheless reliable, we must weigh the corrupting effect of the suggestive procedure in light of certain factors such as "the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of [that person's] prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Theriault, supra, 182 Conn. at 373-74, 438 A.2d 432; State v. Lago, 28 Conn.App. 9, 18, 611 A.2d 866, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 919, 614 A.2d 828 (1992).

The defendant, as the one seeking to suppress identification evidence, bears the initial burden of proving that the identification resulted from an unconstitutional procedure. State v. Payne, 219 Conn. 93, 106, 591 A.2d 1246 (1991); State v. Johnson upra, 28 Conn.App. at 649, 612 A.2d 799. We conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that the photographic array was impermissibly suggestive. While in light of this failure we need not address the reliability of the out-of-court identifications; State v. Outlaw, 216 Conn. 492, 503, 582 A.2d 751 (1990); even if we were to assume that the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the defendant has also failed to meet his burden of proving that, under the totality of the circumstances, these identifications were so unreliable as to be inadmissible into evidence. See State v. Mayette, 204 Conn. 571, 529 A.2d 673 (1987).

The general description of the armed robber given by the witnesses was of a black male in his early twenties, who was clean shaven and wore a flattop hairstyle with the sides shaved. It is the defendant's claim that while the eight photographs in the array shown to the witnesses all depicted young black males of that general age group, only the defendant's photograph matched the entire description of the robber. He contends that the hairstyles of some were different, that some had beards and mustaches, that some appeared older than the "early twenties," and that some appeared heavier than the robber described by the witnesses. As such, the defendant argues, the array was unnecessarily suggestive in that it focused the witnesses' attention on the defendant's photograph, thereby conveying a message to them that the police suspected him.

At the suppression hearing, Kemp indicated that she had selected the defendant's photograph because of the hairstyle and the cold, uncaring eyes which she recognized as those of the robber. She also observed that one photograph resembled the defendant and showed a clean shaven, young black male, with hair cut close on the sides. The person in the photograph may have had a flattop hairstyle, but she could not tell because "the top of the picture is cut off." The other six photographs showed men with either a beard or a mustache, and five of those six depicted men without flattop hairstyles. The record is silent as to whether the defendant's photograph was among the hundreds of pictures Kemp viewed on the night of the crime.

LaFreniere testified during the suppression hearing that of the eight photographs shown to her, the defendant's and two others had flattop hairstyles, with two others depicting men with mustaches. She eliminated those because the face of one was totally different from that of the robber and the eyes and face of the second were unlike the robber's eyes and large nose, which she felt made the robber appear mean. She selected the defendant's photograph on the basis of facial features.

Kubick selected the defendant's photograph on the basis of his eyes and long neck. Like LaFreniere, she excluded the others not because of facial hair or hairstyle, but because of facial features.

We conclude that the defendant has not established that the photographic arrays were impermissibly or unnecessarily suggestive. See State v. Hamele, 188 Conn. 372, 377-78, 449 A.2d 1020 (1982). Having so concluded, we need go no further. State v. Holliman, 214 Conn. 38, 49, 570 A.2d 680 (1990). Nevertheless, we will consider the reliability of the resulting identifications. See State v. Johnson, 22 Conn.App. 477, 483, 578 A.2d 1085 (1990).

Under the totality of the circumstances, the victims' identifications of the defendant were reliable. They had ample opportunity to view the unmasked defendant at close range, face-to-face. In each confrontation, there was sufficient lighting and all three victims focused on the robber as he pointed a gun at them. The three victims were able to give him a high degree of attention. As victims, and not mere spectators, they were apt to be more reliable sources of identification. State v. Payne, supra, 219 Conn. at 109, 591 A.2d 1246. They were able to give accurate and detailed descriptions initially, and they showed no hesitation, but rather a high degree of certainty in their individually selecting the defendant's photograph from the array. The fact that fourteen, fifteen and twenty-one days had passed between the crime and the extrajudicial identifications does not render those identifications unreliable. See State v. Payne, s...

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