State v. Rose

• Decision Date: 10 July 2012
• Docket Number: SC18323
• Citation: State v. Rose, SC18323 (Conn. Jul 10, 2012)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. ROSE—DISSENT

STATE v.ROSE—DISSENT

SC18323

Supreme Court of Connecticut

DATED: July 10, 2012

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ZARELLA, J., dissenting.A trial court commits an error of constitutional magnitude when it requires a criminal defendant to appear in prison clothing at trial over the defendant's objection.In virtually every case, however, that error is readily identifiable and, therefore, properly reviewed on appeal under harmless error analysis.Although the inherently prejudicial nature of the error often will merit reversal of a defendant's conviction, in some cases, the circumstances will lead to the conclusion that the error, while serious, was nonetheless harmless.For that reason, I disagree with the majority's approach to deciding this case pursuant to this court's inherent supervisory authority.The majority fails to explain why it is necessary to resort to our supervisory authority for this particular error, instead of following the precedent of this court and the United States Supreme Court dictating that trial errors resulting in an identifiable harm are to be reviewed under harmless error analysis.

In the present case, the elements of the crime and facts of the case necessarily informed the jury that the defendant, Irvin D. Rose, was incarcerated at the time the crime was committed, the defendant introduced evidence that he was incarcerated when the crime was committed, and the state presented overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.Thus, under the harmless error doctrine, I conclude that the state has demonstrated that the defendant's appearance throughout trial in prison clothing, although an error of constitutional magnitude, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and reinstate the defendant's conviction.I therefore respectfully dissent.

The majority thoroughly recites the facts of the case, and I repeat the essential facts.The defendant was incarcerated in a correctional center following his inability to post bail for a separate, charged offense.While housed in isolation in the correctional center's hospital wing, the defendant tore open his mattress, removed its stuffing and crawled inside.Two correction officers, Brian Guerrera and Scott Whiteley, were dispatched to order the defendant to exit the mattress and then to remove the mattress from the defendant's jail cell.The defendant complied initially with the officers' instructions.As the officers were leaving the defendant's cell, the defendant spat at Guerrera.The defendant's saliva came in contact with Guerrera's face and chest.Guerrera then reported to a correctional center nurse and completed medical and incident reports.On the basis of these facts, the defendant was charged with assault of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes(Sup. 2006)§ 53a-167c (a)(5).¹

Prior to the jury selection process, the defendant, who represented himself, objected to appearing in his prison attire.The trial court overruled the defendant's objection, primarily on the ground that the jury would be aware of the defendant's incarceration status at the time the crime was committed because of the nature of the charges.²During jury selection, however, the court instructed the members of the two venire panels not to consider the defendant's attire.The court gave no further instruction during the trial regarding the defendant's attire.

During trial, both the state and the defendant introduced direct and indirect evidence of the defendant's incarceration status at the time the charged offense was committed.Specifically, the state called three witnesses, including Guerrera and Whiteley, who testified that the incident occurred in a correctional center.The defendant also elicited testimony from these witnesses to the same effect and introduced into evidence voluminous exhibits that referred to his incarceration status.At no point during the trial did the state refer to the defendant's attire or suggest that the defendant's incarceration status should factor into the jury's determination of guilt.³The jury found the defendant guilty of violating General Statutes(Sup. 2006)§ 53a-167c (a)(5), and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of conviction.The Appellate Court reversed the defendant's conviction, concluding that the defendant had been denied a fair trial because he had been compelled to stand trial in identifiable prison attire.State v. Rose, 112 Conn. App. 324, 331-32, 342, 963 A.2d 68(2009).In doing so, the Appellate Court rejected the state's argument that the trial court's error should have been reviewed under harmless error analysis.Id., 340.For the reasons that follow, I disagree with the Appellate Court's reasoning that harmless error analysis does not apply to the error in this case.I also disagree with the majority's decision to decide this case pursuant to this court's supervisory authority.

I

In order to determine whether the Appellate Court properly reversed the defendant's conviction on the ground that the trial court impermissibly had compelled the defendant to stand trial in prison attire, two threshold issues must be addressed:⁴ first, whether the alleged impropriety actually constitutes error; and, second, if the trial court did commit error, whether that error is appropriately reviewed under harmless error analysis, or whether it is a structural error requiring automatic reversal.Numerous jurisdictions have addressed these issues, and they provide a thorough documentation of the state of the law.

The question of whether the trial court committed error when it compelled the defendant to appear inprison attire at trial is easily answered.The United States Supreme Court held, in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126(1976), that ''[a][s]tate cannot, consistently with the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes . . . ."Id., 512.⁵Subsequent case law has consistently reaffirmed and applied this holding, including this court in State v. Williamson, 206 Conn. 685, 704-705, 539 A.2d 561(1988).Thus, because the defendant timely and properly objected to appearing at trial in prison attire, the trial court committed an error of constitutional magnitude by overruling the defendant's objec-tion.⁶

Having concluded that the trial court committed an error of constitutional magnitude, it must be determined whether that error properly is reviewed pursuant to our harmless error doctrine, or whether it is structural error.I begin by noting that ''[t]he harmless error doctrine is essential to preserve the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial.Arizona v. Fulminante, [499 U.S. 279, 308, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302(1991)];see alsoRose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 92 L. Ed. 2d 460(1986).State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 444, 773 A.2d 287(2001).In contrast, the [United States]Supreme Court has noted that there is a very limited class of cases involving error that is structural, that is to say, error that transcends the criminal process.Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718(1997);[see]Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, [280-81]113 S. Ct. 2078, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182(1993)(defective reasonable doubt instruction);Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, [263-64]106 S. Ct. 617, 88 L. Ed. 2d 598(1986)(racial discrimination in selection of grand jury);Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, [49-50]104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31(1984)(denial of public [hearing on motion to suppress]);McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, [177 n.8]104 S. Ct. 944, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122(1984)(denial of self-representation at trial) . . . Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, [535]47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749(1927)(biased trial judge).''(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724, 733, 859 A.2d 898(2004).

''In most cases involving constitutional violations . . . this court applies harmless error analysis.See, e.g., State v. Carpenter, 275 Conn. 785, 832-33, 882 A.2d 604(2005)(admission of statements in violation of constitutional right to confrontation was harmless error), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1025, 126 S. Ct. 1578, 164 L. Ed. 2d 309(2006);State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 166-67, 869 A.2d 192(2005)(although improper jury...