State v. Roseboro

• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: LAKE
• Citation: State v. Roseboro, 474 S.E.2d 314, 344 N.C. 364 (N.C. 1996)
• Decision Date: 06 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 156A94,156A94
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Christopher Lunore ROSEBORO.

Page 314

474 S.E.2d 314

344 N.C. 364

STATE of North Carolina v. Christopher Lunore ROSEBORO.

No. 156A94.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 6, 1996.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender by Constance H. Everhart, Assistant Appellate Defender, Durham, for defendant-appellant.

LAKE, Justice.

Defendant was tried capitally for the first-degree murder of Martha Edwards. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder on the theory of premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder doctrine. The jury additionally returned verdicts of guilty of first-degree burglary, first-degree rape, felonious larceny and possession of stolen property. Following a capital sentencing proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, the jury recommended a sentence of death, and the trial court sentenced defendant accordingly. The trial court further sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of life imprisonment for the rape conviction, fourteen years for the burglary conviction and three years for the felonious larceny conviction. Judgment was arrested as to defendant's possession of stolen property conviction.

The State's evidence at trial tended to show the following. Roger Bell lived with defendant in a one-bedroom apartment on West Second Avenue beside the victim's apartment. On the evening of 13 March 1992, Bell and defendant were both at home, and Bell was in need of money to pay rent. He noticed the victim's apartment was dark, so he removed the window screen, reached inside and took two ceramic vases and a telephone. Bell brought these items to the apartment he shared with defendant and hid them. Bell then went back to the victim's apartment and crawled in through the window. As he looked for other items to take, he heard someone snoring and discovered the victim asleep in her bed. This unnerved Bell, as he had previously thought no one was at home, so he unlocked the kitchen door and left. Bell explained to defendant what had happened, and together, they decided to go back to the victim's apartment and take a floor-model television set Bell had seen. They entered the apartment through the kitchen door and carried the victim's television back to their apartment. Upon returning again to the victim's apartment to wipe away their fingerprints, Bell noticed defendant walking toward the bedroom. Bell told defendant they needed to leave, but defendant "shushed" him. Bell left defendant in the apartment and went home; he fell asleep before defendant returned.

In the following days, defendant showed Bell a microwave, a radio, silverware and a pocketbook that he had taken from the victim's apartment after Bell left.

Defendant testified on his own behalf that on the night of 13 March 1992, he smoked crack cocaine and went to bed. He woke up later that evening and saw Bell carrying two ceramic vases and a telephone into their apartment. Defendant asked Bell what he was doing, but Bell told defendant not to worry about anything. Bell left and came back again with a microwave and a radio. This time, defendant asked Bell how he was able to take these things from someone's house without waking them up. Bell again told defendant not to worry about it. Bell left once more, and while he was gone, defendant smoked more crack cocaine. When Bell returned this time, he had a pocketbook and silverware. Bell gave defendant a twenty-dollar bill he found in the pocketbook, and together, they walked to Cherry Street so defendant could buy some more cocaine. On the way, they passed a topless bar known as "Leather and Lace," and Bell tossed the pocketbook into the bed of a blue truck in the parking lot.

Defendant decided to go with Bell to the victim's apartment and take the floor-model television set. When they returned to wipe away any fingerprints they might have left behind, defendant went into the victim's bedroom. The victim had a pillow over her face, and defendant thought she was dead. Defendant testified he then decided to have sex with the victim.

An autopsy of the victim revealed the presence of several recent bruises on her arms, nose and lips. Additionally, her shoulder bone was dislocated, and fluid was found in her lungs. The pathologist indicated that in his opinion, the cause of death was consistent with smothering. Based upon fluid and blood present in the vagina and lacerations on the vaginal wall, the pathologist concluded the victim had been raped. In the pathologist's opinion, because of the small amount of blood present in the vagina, the victim died just before she was raped or just after the rape began. According to DNA test results, the DNA banding patterns from the male fraction of the rectal and vaginal swabs taken from the victim were a visual match to the DNA banding patterns of the defendant; this visual match was confirmed by computer analysis. Bell's DNA banding patterns were a nonmatch. The probability of another unrelated individual having the same DNA banding patterns as defendant's is approximately 1 in 3.5 billion for the North Carolina black population. Other evidence introduced at trial will be discussed at later points in this opinion where relevant.

In his first assignment of error, defendant contends he was denied due process when the trial court refused defendant's request to apply retroactively the 1995 legislative changes contained in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002, refusing to allow defendant to question prospective jurors about their understanding of parole eligibility.

This Court has consistently held that prospective jurors should not be questioned about their understanding regarding parole eligibility during voir dire. State v. Lynch, 340 N.C. 435, 459 S.E.2d 679 (1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1436, 134 L.Ed.2d 558 (1996). "[E]vidence about parole eligibility is not relevant in a capital sentencing proceeding because it does not reveal anything about defendant's character or record or about any circumstances of the offense." State v. Payne, 337 N.C. 505, 516, 448 S.E.2d 93, 99 (1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1405, 131 L.Ed.2d 292 (1995). We have further held that Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), "does not affect our position on this issue when, as here, the defendant remains eligible for parole if given a life sentence." State v. Miller, 339 N.C. 663, 676, 455 S.E.2d 137, 144, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 242, 133 L.Ed.2d 169 (1995); accord State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 453 S.E.2d 824, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 223, 133 L.Ed.2d 153 (1995). Given our repeated holdings on this issue, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to allow defendant, who was clearly eligible for parole, to question prospective jurors regarding parole eligibility.

Defendant correctly notes that our legislature has amended N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002 to now require a trial court to instruct a jury during a capital sentencing proceeding "that a sentence of life imprisonment means a sentence of life without parole." N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002 (Supp.1995). However, in State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 446 S.E.2d 252 [344 N.C. 371] (1994), cert. denied,--- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 953, 130 L.Ed.2d 895 (1995), this Court recognized that the effective date for this legislative change was 1 October 1994 and that "the General Assembly has decided that the legislation is to be applied prospectively." Id. at 43, 446 S.E.2d at 275; accord State v. DeCastro, 342 N.C. 667, 467 S.E.2d 653 (1996). In the present case, defendant committed his crimes in 1992, and his trial began in February 1994. Thus, the legislative changes contained in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002, deemed only to have prospective force, are inapplicable to defendant, and the trial court did not err in refusing to apply the statute retroactively. Defendant has not been denied due process, and we hereby overrule this assignment of error.

In a related assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to properly respond to questions from prospective jurors regarding the meaning of a life sentence and parole. During jury selection, two prospective jurors asked the trial court the meaning of life in prison. The trial court responded to both prospective jurors as follows: "For the purposes of this trial, life imprisonment means life in prison." Defendant argues that the trial court's response was "untruthful," fundamentally unfair and amounted to a denial of due process.

Should a juror raise the question of parole eligibility, we have held that the trial court is to instruct the juror that he or she is to assume that life imprisonment means imprisonment for life. State v. Conner, 241 N.C. 468, 85 S.E.2d 584 (1955). In the present case, the trial court instructed both prospective jurors correctly under the applicable laws of this state. Defendant advances no persuasive reason for us to reverse our prior holdings with respect to this issue, and this assignment of error is without merit and overruled.

In his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to sustain defendant's motion to strike vague and conjectural identification testimony placing defendant at a topless bar the night of the murder. Mark Thompson, a bouncer at Leather and Lace, testified that during the evening hours of 13 March 1992 or the early morning hours of 14 March 1992, he "could have swore [sic] ... [defendant] would have been inside the bar." Defendant objected, and the trial court sustained defendant's objection. Defendant then made a motion to strike, and the trial court asked the jury to leave the courtroom. After hearing voir dire testimony, the trial court again sustained defendant's objection to the identification testimony on the grounds that it was conjectural and, therefore, had no probative value. The jury was...