State v. Ross

• Decision Date: 29 November 2000
• Citation: State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
• Parties: (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) STATE OF TEXAS, v. RODNEY DEE ROSS, Appellee NO. 1618-99
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 853

32 S.W.3d 853 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)

STATE OF TEXAS, v.RODNEY DEE ROSS, Appellee

NO. 1618-99

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

November 29, 2000.

ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN COUNTY

Before the court en banc.

Price, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Meyers, Mansfield, Holland, and Johnson, JJ., joined.

Appellee filed a motion to suppress evidence that alleged no probable cause for his arrest.At the hearing on the motion, the only witness to testify was the arresting Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission(TABC) agent.Following the testimony, the judge granted the motion and did not file findings of fact.On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the agent's testimony, if believed, showed reasonable suspicion for the initial detention and probable cause for the eventual arrest.¹However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court, sitting as trier of fact, was the sole judge of credibility and could disbelieve any or all of the agent's testimony.²The Court then applied the "almost total deference" standard of review and affirmed the trial court.³We granted review to determine whether "an appellate court may uphold a trial court's decision to suppress evidence as within its discretion, instead of de novo, because the trial court might have disbelieved some or all of the State's uncontroverted evidence."Because the trial court is the sole judge of credibility of the witnesses and we will uphold a trial court's ruling on any theory of law applicable to the case, and because this involves an application of law to facts, the outcome of which turns on the credibility and demeanor of the witness, we will affirm the Court of Appeals.

BACKGROUND

Agent Darnell testified to the following events at the motion to suppress hearing.At approximately 12:50 a.m., on November 2, 1997, Agent Darnell and two other TABC agents finished inspecting a local bar.When they walked out the front door, Agent Darnell noticed the windows of a nearby pickup truck were fogged up.He looked inside the truck and saw two young children sleeping, without any blankets or coverings, in the front seat.Because the night was cold and someone could have broken into the truck, Agent Darnell sent another agent into the bar to find the owner of the pickup.⁴When the owner of the pickup, Ross, came out, Agent Darnell noticed that he held on to things for balance and support, spoke with a thick tongue, had bloodshot eyes, and his breath smelled of alcohol.Agent Darnell asked appellee how he was going to get the children home, and Ross replied that he was going to drive them home.Agent Darnell then arrested appellee for public intoxication.

Ross filed a motion to suppress all evidence surrounding his arrest due to a lack of probable cause.At the hearing on the motion, Agent Darnell was the only witness.Ross presented no evidence himself, although Agent Darnell was cross-examined.The trial court granted the motion to suppress without entering findings of fact or conclusions of law.⁵The State appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it was within the trial court's discretion to grant the motion to suppress if the trial court did not believe any material portion of the State's evidence.⁶However the Court noted an apparent conflict in precedent on the standard of review for suppression hearings.Under Guzman⁷ and Maestas,⁸ mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor are reviewed de novo.⁹A footnote in Maestas indicates that an issue does not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor where the evidence is uncontroverted because the trial court does not have to decide which conflicting testimony deserves more weight.¹⁰The Court of Appeals found that the State's evidence was uncontroverted and showed both reasonable suspicion for appellee's initial detention and probable cause for his arrest.¹¹Because granting the motion on the grounds that the facts simply did not add up to probable cause would be a misapplication of the law to the facts, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court sustained the motion based on the credibility and demeanor of the witness.¹²Since the trial court was the sole judge of credibility, it was within the discretion of the trial court to accept or reject Agent Darnell's testimony and therefore within the discretion of the trial court to grant the motion to suppress.¹³

In its petition to this Court, the State argues that there is no indication that the trial court actually disbelieved the testimony of the Agent Darnell.As such, the appellate court should assume the trial court found the facts testified to were legally insufficient to show reasonable suspicion and probable cause.Because the evidence was sufficient to prove probable cause, the State argues that the trial court should be reversed under a de novo review.Furthermore, the State argues that if we affirm the Court of Appeals's decision, we will create a way for trial courts to completely insulate their motion to suppress rulings, and thus limit the State's right to appeal under article 44.01(a)(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

DISCUSSION

In a motion to suppress hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.¹⁴Accordingly, the judge may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony,¹⁵ even if that testimony is not controverted.¹⁶This is so because it is the trial court that observes first hand the demeanor and appearance of a witness, as opposed to an appellate court which can only read an impersonal record.¹⁷

Furthermore, when the trial court fails to file findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling as long as those findings are supported by the record.¹⁸If the trial judge's decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, the decision will be sustained.¹⁹

While discussing the appropriate level of appellate review, we stated in Guzman v. State:

[T]he appellate courts, including this Court, should afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports especially when the trial court's fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.[2]The appellate court should afford the same amount of deference to trial courts' rulings on "application of law to fact questions," also known as "mixed questions of law and fact," if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.[3]The appellate courts may review de novo "mixed questions of law and fact" not falling within this category.²⁰[citations omitted]

As we pointed out in Carmouche, the typical motion to suppress case alleging a lack of probable cause will be reviewed through a bifurcated standard of review combining the first and third categories of Guzman: we will give almost total deference to a trial court's express or implied determination of historical facts and review de novo the court's application of the law of search and seizure to those facts.²¹This is because in most instances, the appellate court will have facts established by the trial court, either impliedly or expressly, to which the law may be applied.²²But, not every probable cause case will be reviewed under this bifurcated standard.

In a motion to suppress hearing where the only evidence presented is the testimony of the arresting officer (which, if believed, adds up to probable cause) and the trial court grants the motion without any explanation, there is not necessarily a "concrete" set of facts that can be implied from such a ruling.The trial court may have disbelieved the officer on at least one material fact, or the trial court may be in a situation in which it does not know what exactly the facts are, but it does know (on the basis of demeanor, appearance, and credibility) that they are not as the witness describes.In this situation, the appellate court does not necessarily have a set of historical facts to which it may apply the law.The determination of probable cause rests entirely on the credibility of the lone witness.This scenario is a mixed question of law and fact, the resolution of which turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.The proper standard of review is therefore the second category of Guzman, "almost total deference" to the trial ruling.²³

In applying these principles to the case at bar, we will review the trial court's ruling under the "almost total deference" standard.As no findings of fact were filed, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and will uphold the ruling on any theory of law applicable to the case.²⁴

We see two possible theories upon which the trial court's ruling may rest either the testimony of the agent was credible, but the facts established by that testimony do not constitute probable cause (or reasonable suspicion for the initial detention); or the trial court did not find the testimony of the agent to be credible.Because we agree with the Court of Appeals's conclusion that Agent Darnell's testimony (if believed) added up to reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and probable cause for the eventual arrest, we will not presume that the trial court impliedly found that the facts simply did not add up to reasonable suspicion or probable cause; to do so would be to presume error.The trial court, however, was free to disbelieve all of the agent's testimony.As the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility, the trial court was not compelled to believe the agent's testimony, even if uncontroverted, based on credibility and demeanor.Because the evidence, if...