State v. Ross
| Decision Date | 28 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 47771 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TALON SCOTT ROSS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge.
Order revoking probation and executing previously suspended sentence, affirmed.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
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Talon Scott Ross appeals from the district court's order revoking probation and executing his previously suspended sentence. Ross argues the district court erred when it found he violated the terms of his probation by committing the crimes of petit theft and injury to child. We affirm the district court's order.
In 2011, Ross pleaded guilty to robbery, Idaho Code § 18-6501. The district court sentenced Ross to a unified term of ten years, with three years determinate, and retained jurisdiction. The district court recommended that Ross participate in the Correctional Alternative Placement Program (CAPP). Ross completed the CAPP, and the district court suspended the sentence and placed Ross on supervised probation for three years.
The State filed four reports of probation violation between 2012 and 2017. Each time, Ross admitted violating his probation, and the district court revoked Ross's probation, imposed his previously suspended sentence, and retained jurisdiction. Following each period of retained jurisdiction, Ross was placed on probation. In 2019, the State filed a fifth report of violation, alleging that Ross violated his probation by committing the crimes of petit theft and injury to child. Ross denied both alleged violations, and the district court held an evidentiary hearing.
The district court found that both allegations had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court revoked Ross's probation and ordered execution of his previously suspended sentence. Ross timely appeals.
State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710, 390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017) (citations omitted).
State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted). The State bears the burden of providing satisfactory proof of a violation, though proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. State v. Edelblute, 91 Idaho 469, 480, 424 P.2d 739, 750 (1967).
Ross argues the district court erred in finding that he violated his probation in two ways. First, Ross asserts the court erred in finding that Ross committed the crime of petit theft despite Ross's acquittal of the crime following a jury trial. Second, Ross contends the court erred in finding he committed the crime of injury to child because the State did not present any evidencethat Ross acted willfully in causing or permitting his children to be placed in a dangerous situation. Ross has failed to show the district court erred.
The terms of Ross's probation included the following provision: "you shall commit no violations of any law of the United States of America, or of any law of any other country, or of any law of any state, county, city, or other political subdivision." Ross was charged with petit theft but was acquitted after a jury trial. Despite the judgment of acquittal, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Ross violated the above term of his probation by committing petit theft. Ross argues he did not violate the term of probation because he was acquitted of the crime that constitutes the basis for the probation violation allegation. In response, the State argues that the judgment of acquittal is irrelevant, both as a matter of fact and law, and that the district court correctly found that Ross committed petit theft by a preponderance of the evidence. Ross and the State agree that the Idaho appellate courts have not addressed the issue of whether an acquittal of a criminal offense precludes a later finding of a probation violation based on the same underlying conduct.
The United States Supreme Court has held an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof. For example, in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984), a gun owner had been acquitted on a charge of dealing firearms without a license. The Court held that the gun owner was still subject to a subsequent civil forfeiture proceeding involving those firearms as neither collateral estoppel nor the Double Jeopardy Clause provided a basis for precluding the civil proceeding. Id. at 366. The Court reasoned:
[The acquittal did] not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt . . . . [T]he jury verdict in the criminal action did not negate the possibility that a preponderance of the evidence could show that [the defendant] was engaged in an unlicensed firearms business.
Id. at 361-62. See also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972) ().
A decisive majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have held or acknowledged that an acquittal in a criminal prosecution does not bar finding a probation violationbased on the same underlying conduct.1 Generally speaking, the various opinions reason that a criminal trial is a different type of hearing than a probation violation hearing and different burdens of proof and evidentiary requirements apply to each hearing. The holdings of the majority of cases are consistent with the opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals:
[The defendant] errs in asserting that his earlier acquittal on criminal charges precludes revocation. A verdict of not-guilty is hardly tantamount to a finding that no wrong was done. [The defendant's] acquittal does not necessarily prove his innocence; rather, it reflects the State's inability to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Gibson v. State, 616 A.2d 877, 881 (Md. 1992).
Because the burdens of proof differ, collateral estoppel does not apply. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 361-62; see also Gibson, 616 A.2d at 881. Similarly, various courts have held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to probation violation proceedings because the defendant is not being tried twice for the same offense. In re Coughlin, 545 P.2d 249, 260-61 (Cal. 1976); Knecht v. State, 85 N.E.3d 829, 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); Johnson v. State, 235 S.E.2d 550, 552 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); People v. Colon, 866 N.E.2d 207, 222-23 (Ill. 2007). Consequently, there are no constitutional prohibitions on finding a probation violation based on a preponderance of the evidence for the same conduct for which there is an acquittal in a criminal case. As a result, even when the defendant is acquitted of the underlying crime leading to the probation revocation proceeding, probation may still be revoked based on a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the act. State v. Benjamin, 9 A.3d 338, 345 (Conn. 2010).
Like other jurisdictions, Idaho has recognized the difference between a criminal trial and a probation revocation hearing. In State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 171 P.3d 253 (2007), the IdahoSupreme Court noted that probationers do not enjoy the full panoply of constitutional rights granted to criminal defendants, a probation revocation hearing is not a criminal prosecution, and that neither the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause nor the Idaho Rules of Evidence apply to probation revocation proceedings. Id. at 765-66, 171 P.3d at 256-57.
Only one jurisdiction--Pennsylvania--has concluded that an acquittal of the charges that served as the basis for a probation violation precludes finding a violation. Commonwealth v. Giliam, 233 A.3d 863, 867 (Pa. 2020). In Pennsylvania, a defendant's probation can be revoked only upon finding a defendant violated a specific term of probation or committed a new crime. Id. at 867. There, the Court held that "because Giliam's violation of probation was based solely on allegations of new criminal charges for which he was later acquitted, ultimately, no violation of probation occurred." Id. at 868.
Notwithstanding Pennsylvania's position on the issue, we agree with the reasoning adopted by the majority of jurisdictions and hold that an acquittal in a criminal proceeding does not bar revocation of probation based on the same conduct. Having determined that the judgment of acquittal did not prohibit ...
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