State v. Rossbach
| Citation | 501 P.3d 914 |
| Decision Date | 04 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | DA 20-0301 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. William G. ROSSBACH, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Moses Okeyo, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Steven Eschenbacher, Lake County Attorney, Polson, Montana
¶1 William George Rossbach was arrested and charged with assault on a peace officer in violation of § 45-5-201(a), MCA, after an altercation with Officer T.J. Haynes in May 2019. The District Court declared a mistrial in Rossbach's first trial after the jury failed to reach a verdict. At his second trial, a Lake County jury found him guilty. Rossbach appeals, challenging the District Court's denial of his motions to reschedule the second trial and to allow a jailed defense witness to wear street clothing during his testimony. Rossbach also appeals his persistent felony offender sentence. We affirm the conviction and the sentence.
¶2 We consider the following restated issues on appeal.
¶3 On May 15, 2019, Officer Haynes saw Rossbach riding a bike that matched the description of one that had been reported stolen and tried to stop him. Rossbach did not stop for Officer Haynes, and Officer Haynes ran after him. The two ended up in a physical altercation when Rossbach would not comply with Officer Haynes's orders, and these charges resulted.
¶4 The Office of the Public Defender (OPD) appointed Liam Gallagher and Dianne Rice to represent Rossbach. The State filed notice that it would seek persistent felony offender (PFO) status.
¶5 The case went to trial in early December 2019, and a Lake County Jury found Rossbach guilty of resisting arrest but could not reach a verdict on the assault charge.
Judge Manley declared a mistrial and scheduled a new trial date for December 16, 2019. On December 9, 2019, Rossbach filed a late notice, naming 20 new witnesses. The District Court held a hearing regarding the new witnesses two days later, and Rossbach moved for a continuance after it became clear that the court was not inclined to allow the late-noticed witnesses. The District Court granted the continuance, setting the trial date for February 3, 2020.
¶6 After the District Court set the new trial date, Rossbach filed a second unopposed motion to continue the trial because both of his attorneys had a previously planned, pre-paid vacation to Morocco. The District Court denied the motion; Gallagher and Rice withdrew from the case, and OPD appointed Alisha Backus to represent Rossbach.
¶7 At the second trial, Rossbach called Matthew Friedlander as a witness. Friedlander, like Rossbach, had a previous relationship with Officer Haynes's wife. Both Friedlander and Rossbach had been arrested by Officer Haynes, and they both alleged that Officer Haynes had used excessive force against them. At the time of the second trial, Friedlander was incarcerated on charges unrelated to this case or to his incidents with Officer Haynes. In anticipation of trial, Backus arranged for Friedlander to have civilian clothes to wear while testifying. When she brought the clothing to the jail the morning of trial, the jail staff told her that because Friedlander was a violent offender and had threatened to escape, court security required him to wear his orange jail jumpsuit, shackles, and handcuffs while testifying. When court convened, Backus requested that the District Court allow Friedlander to wear civilian clothes. After hearing from both parties, the court refused the request based on the determination of court security.
¶8 Following a two-day trial, a Lake County Jury found Rossbach guilty of Assault on a Peace Officer. The District Court designated Rossbach a PFO and sentenced him to the Montana State Prison for fourteen years, with none suspended.
¶9 We review matters of trial administration for abuse of discretion. Estate of Frazier v. Miller , 2021 MT 85, ¶ 12, 404 Mont. 1, 484 P.3d 912 (citation omitted). We review criminal sentences for legality. State v. Gallagher , 2005 MT 336, ¶ 16, 330 Mont. 65, 125 P.3d 1141 (citation omitted).
¶10 1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it denied Rossbach's motion for continuance after setting the trial during his counsel's pre-planned vacation.
¶11 Rossbach contends that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance because a vacation is a "valid basis for granting a continuance." He asserts that he was prejudiced by the court's denial because he lost his lawyers and subsequently was convicted of assault on a peace officer by a unanimous jury. The District Court, he argues, improperly gave his interest in having the same lawyers defend him in the second trial less import than it gave to speedy trial concerns and crowded dockets. He alleges that the denial violated his right to a fair trial because his replacement counsel did not have the experience of trying his case in the first trial, at which Rice and Gallagher had nearly secured his acquittal.
¶12 Ruling on a motion to continue a trial "is left to the discretion of the trial court." State v. Molder , 2007 MT 41, ¶ 23, 336 Mont. 91, 152 P.3d 722. "This Court will not overturn a district court's decision to deny a continuance ‘unless the district court abused its discretion and the ruling prejudices the defendant.’ " State v. Duncan , 2008 MT 148, ¶ 37, 343 Mont. 220, 183 P.3d 111 (quoting State v. Ibarra-Salas , 2007 MT 173, ¶ 13, 338 Mont. 191, 164 P.3d 898 ). "A district court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice." State v. Kaarma , 2017 MT 24, ¶ 6, 386 Mont. 243, 390 P.3d 609 (citation and quotation omitted).
¶13 A district court may grant a continuance "if the interests of justice so require." Section 46-13-202(2), MCA. When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for a continuance, we consider factors such as:
the length of the requested delay, whether there was a showing that the State's case would be prejudiced, the reasons for the requested continuance, whether defense counsel was diligent in preparation for trial, whether the defendant's right to a speedy trial would be violated, and the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
Molder , ¶ 23 (citing State v. Sotelo , 209 Mont. 86, 91, 679 P.2d 779, 782 (1984) ).
¶14 In denying Rossbach's motion, the District Court weighed the competing interests at play. It explained that a continuance would lead to an additional thirty-one days of incarceration for Rossbach, on top of the forty-nine days of delay caused by the mistrial and first continuance. The court observed that the first continuance was caused by Gallagher's untimely notice of witnesses and failure to make a showing of good cause to the court why it should consider his request. Further, the court explained that on Rossbach's "ideal" date for the trial, five felony trials were scheduled, and if any one of those cases went to trial, Rossbach could face additional delays. The District Court expressed concern whether Rossbach "was consulted or consented to these additional delays while he remain[ed] incarcerated." Defense counsel did not file a written speedy trial waiver signed by Rossbach. Finally, the court considered the State's prejudice, concluding that the cost of a continuance would be between $2,550 and $5,100. On balance, the court determined that Rossbach's counsel's pre-planned vacation was a "minimal" justification given the prejudice such a delay would cause.
¶15 Public defenders and prosecutors are without doubt entitled to responsibly scheduled vacations. But the District Court did not refuse the requested continuance on this basis alone. It discussed each of the considerations we noted in Molder , including Rossbach's right to a speedy trial, the defense's diligence in preparing for trial, and prejudice to the State. The court concluded that the additional delay because of Gallagher and Rice's travel plans was not a sufficient justification to continue the trial for a second time when new counsel was available.
¶16 Rossbach has been unable to demonstrate how the court's denial prejudiced him. Although his counsel for the second trial, Backus, had only 46 days to take the case to trial, his previous counsel, Gallagher and Rice, had only 44—and Backus had the benefit of their work. Rossbach has not shown or argued that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel but only speculates that because the first jury deadlocked, he should have fared at least as well in the second trial. The District Court, though, praised Backus for her thorough trial preparation. Rossbach's theory that he may have had "a better chance of acquittal" had the same counsel tried his case a second time is not enough to show prejudice. See State v. Hocevar , 2000 MT 157, ¶ 63, 300 Mont. 167, 7 P.2d 329. Rossbach has not established that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing the continuance.
¶17 2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it denied Rossbach's motion to allow his witness to testify...
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