State v. Rossiter
Decision Date | 03 June 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 1892,1892 |
Citation | 623 N.E.2d 645,88 Ohio App.3d 162 |
Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. ROSSITER, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Scott W. Nusbaum, Chillicothe, for appellant.
Daniel L. Silcott, Chillicothe, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Ross County Common Pleas Court. The state of Ohio, plaintiff below and appellant herein, appeals the trial court's judgment granting a motion to suppress filed by Gary Rossiter, defendant below and appellee herein.
Appellant assigns the following errors:
On March 13, 1992, the grand jury indicted appellee on two counts of arson in violation of R.C. 2909.03.
On June 11, 1992, appellee filed a motion to suppress any statements he made to law enforcement officers. Appellee argued he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights prior to the time the law enforcement officers elicited a statement from him.
On July 2, 1992, appellant filed a memorandum contra appellee's motion to suppress. Appellant argued that although the detective who questioned appellee thought he was "slow," the detective had no indication that appellee could not understand his constitutional rights. Appellant further argued that appellee remained free to leave the police cruiser at any time during the questioning.
On July 8, 1992, the court sustained appellee's motion to suppress. The court wrote in its decision:
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal with the required Crim.R. 12(J) certification.
In its first assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred by finding that the detective questioned appellee in a custodial setting.
During proceedings on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court generally assumes the role of trier of facts. See State v. Simmons (Aug. 25, 1992), Pike App. No. 473, unreported, 1992 WL 208958; State v. Kingery (Mar. 18, 1992), Ross App. No. 1792, unreported, at 5, 1992 WL 56769; State v. Cramblit (Mar. 4, 1992), Hocking App. No. 91CA7, unreported, at 5, 1992 WL 42783. The trial court must determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence presented at hearings on motions to suppress evidence. State v. Smith (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 284, 288, 574 N.E.2d 510, 515; State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 1 OBR 57, 437 N.E.2d 583, 584. As a reviewing court, we should defer to the trier of fact who had an opportunity to view the witnesses and observe their demeanors, gestures, and voice inflections. A reviewing court should not disturb the trial court's findings on the issue of credibility. Id. Accordingly, in our review we are bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. DePalma (Jan. 18, 1991), Ross App. No. 1633, unreported, 1991 WL 13824. Accepting these facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether they meet the appropriate legal standard. See State v. Shelpman (May 23, 1991), Ross App. No. 1632, unreported, 1991 WL 87312; State v. Simmons (Aug. 30, 1990), Washington App. No. 89CA18, unreported, 1990 WL 127065.
In the case sub judice, we find the record contains sufficient credible evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that a custodial interrogation occurred. We note that the only relevant inquiry in determining whether an interrogation is custodial is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood the situation. Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317. A suspect is considered to be "in custody" when the suspect's freedom of action is limited to a "degree associated with formal arrest." Id. See, also, In re Smalley (1989), 62 Ohio App.3d 435, 575 N.E.2d 1198; State v. Warrell (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 286, 534 N.E.2d 1237; California v. Beheler 1983), 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275; State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768.
A review of the record reveals that Detective Ron Nichols asked appellee to enter a police cruiser for questioning. Detective Nichols called a second officer into the cruiser for assistance with the questioning. Detective Nichols testified he advised appellee of his Miranda rights "since he was sitting in my car." Detective Nichols asked appellee many questions implicating his guilt. We find sufficient credible evidence in the record to support a determination that a reasonable person being questioned under the circumstances of this case would have understood that his or her freedom of action was limited to a "degree associated with formal arrest."
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant's first assignment of error.
In its second assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred by failing to apply the totality of the circumstances test to determine whether appellant voluntarily confessed to the commission of the crimes. See State v. Brewer (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 50, 549 N.E.2d 491. In Brewer, at 58, 549 N.E.2d at 499, the court wrote:
In the instant case, we find no evidence in the record that the trial court failed to apply the totality of the circumstances test. Although appellant contends the trial court based its decision solely on appellee's IQ, the trial court's decision mentions additional factors that influenced the decision. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must presume the trial court correctly decided the case. See State v. Coombs (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 123, 18 OBR 153, 480 N.E.2d 414.
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant's second assignment of error.
In its third assignment of error, appellant asserts the evidence proves appellee voluntarily and freely waived his constitutional rights prior to making his statement. Appellee disagrees.
In State v. Simmons (Aug. 25, 1992), Pike App. No. 473, unreported, 1992 WL 208958, we commented:
* * * "
In Colorado v. Spring (1987), 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 857, 93 L.Ed.2d 954, 965, the court wrote:
"Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." (Emphasis added.) See, also, Moran v. Burbine (1986), 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1140, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 420.
In the case sub judice, the trial court suppressed appellee's confession based upon its finding that appellant did not have an awareness both of the nature of his rights and of the consequences of waiving those rights. The court wrote that appellee "in all likelihood did not understand his constitutional rights and clearly did not waive those rights." Our review of the record uncovers sufficient evidence to sustain that...
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