State v. Rotherham

• Decision Date: 31 May 1996
• Docket Number: 22462,22608 and 22650,Nos. 22059,22497,s. 22059
• Citation: 1996 NMSC 48,923 P.2d 1131,122 N.M. 246
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher ROTHERHAM, Defendant-Appellant. STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant. STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lucille EPPERSON, Defendant-Appellant. STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joe MARTINEZ, a/k/a Primitivo Ortega, Defendant-Appellee. STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Henry LUCAS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 1131

923 P.2d 1131

122 N.M. 246

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher ROTHERHAM, Defendant-Appellant.

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lucille EPPERSON, Defendant-Appellant.

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joe MARTINEZ, a/k/a Primitivo Ortega, Defendant-Appellee.

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Henry LUCAS, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 22059, 22462, 22497, 22608 and 22650.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

May 31, 1996.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 20, 1996.

[122 N.M. 248] T. Glenn Ellington, Chief Public Defender, Hollis Ann Whitson, Mental Health Unit Coordinator, Laurie A. Knight, Kari Converse, Assistant Public Defenders, Santa Fe, for Defendant-Appellant in No. 22059.

Tom Udall, Attorney General, Gail MacQuesten, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Plaintiff-Appellee in Nos. 22,059, 22,497 and 22,608.

Barbara E. Bergman, James W. Ellis, Albuquerque, for Amicus Curiae NMCCD in Nos. 22,059, 22,497 and 22,608.

Jones, Snead, Wertheim, Wentworth & Jaramillo, P.A., Jerry Todd Wertheim, Santa Fe, Ronald S. Honberg, Arlington, VA, for Amici Curiae NAMI & AMINM in No. 22,059 and 22,650.

Nancy Koenigsberg, Protection and Advocacy System, Albuquerque, for Amici Curiae NMPAS, NAPAS & ARC in Nos. 22,059, 22,462 and 22,608.

Adam G. Kurtz, Albuquerque, Lawrence J. Fleming, St. Louis, MO, Richard A. Winterbottom, Albuquerque, for Amici Curiae NACDL & NMCDLA in Nos. 22,059, 22,462, 22,497 and 22,650.

T. Glenn Ellington, Chief Public Defender, Hollis Ann Whitson, Mental Health Unit Coordinator, Laurie A. Knight, Assistant Public Defender, Ralph Odenwald, Second Judicial District Defender, Santa Fe, for Defendant-Appellant in No. 22,462.

Tom Udall, Attorney General, Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Plaintiff-Appellee in No. 22,462.

T. Glenn Ellington, Chief Public Defender, Hollis A. Whitson, Mental Health Unit Coordinator, Laurie A. Knight, Assistant Public

[122 N.M. 249] Defender, Santa Fe, for Defendant-Appellant in No. 22,497

T. Glenn Ellington, Chief Public Defender, Hollis Ann Whitson, Mental Health Unit Coordinator, Laurie A. Knight, Assistant Public Defender, John L. Walker, Metropolitan Court Supervisor, Santa Fe, for Plaintiff-Appellee in No. 22,608.

Tom Udall, Attorney General, Jennifer Stone, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Plaintiff-Appellee in No. 22,650.

OPINION

BACA, Justice.

At issue on appeal is the constitutionality of New Mexico's Mental Illness and Competency Code, NMSA1978, §§ 31-9-1 to -1.5 (Cum.Supp.1995) (hereinafter "the NMMIC"), which provides the procedure to be followed in cases where a criminal defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Appellants, Christopher Rotherham, Lucille Epperson, Richard Lopez, and Charles Lucas, are criminal defendants who are incompetent to stand trial. On appeal, they contend that the NMMIC is unconstitutional. Appellant, the State of New Mexico, appealing the dismissal of criminal commitment proceedings under Section 31-9-1.5 of the NMMIC against Joe Martinez (a/k/a Primitivo Ortega), also an incompetent criminal defendant, contends that the NMMIC is constitutional. We address the following issues: (1) whether the NMMIC deprives an incompetent criminal defendant of equal protection under the law; (2) whether the NMMIC deprives an incompetent defendant of substantive due process; and (3) whether the NMMIC deprives an incompetent criminal defendant of procedural due process. All five Appellants present identical constitutional issues, thus we deem their respective appeals proper for consolidation.¹ We note jurisdiction under NMSA1978, Section 34-5-14(C)(1) (Repl.Pamp.1990) (providing that Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in matters certified from Court of Appeals that involve significant questions of law under constitution of New Mexico or United States), and we hold the NMMIC to be constitutional.

I.

A.

On June 13, 1989, Christopher Rotherham was indicted on charges of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or manslaughter. The district court found Rotherham to be incompetent to stand trial on the charges and committed him to the Las Vegas Medical Center-Forensic Treatment Unit ("the LVMC-FTU") for treatment to attain competency to stand trial. The court ordered the hospital to file a report within 30 days assessing, among other items, the specific cause of Rotherham's disability and amenability to treatment to competency. The court set a hearing for September 18, 1989, to review Rotherham's competency. Over the next three years, the LVMC-FTU staff sent reports indicating that Rotherham was not competent to stand trial. On January 27, 1992, the LVMC-FTU staff indicated that he was not likely to attain competency to stand trial within a year. On April 27, 1992, the State filed a motion to determine Rotherham's competency and dangerousness. At the hearing on the motion held on August 3, 1992, the State and counsel for Rotherham agreed that he was incompetent to stand trial. The court heard expert testimony that it was unlikely Rotherham would become competent to stand trial. The expert further testified that if Rotherham were allowed to live independently without treatment and without a staff to administer his medication, he would likely cause great bodily harm to himself or to other people. A hospital staff psychiatrist who treated Rotherham testified that he observed Rotherham exhibit behavior that was "very close to physical violence."

On August 7, 1992, the court entered an order, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Rotherham was dangerous and that, if released, he would pose a danger to himself or the community.

On August 18, 1993, the State filed a motion to pursue criminal commitment pursuant to Section 31-9-1.4(A) and Section 31-9-1.5 and, on April 6, 1994, the district court granted that motion. Rotherham appealed to this Court before the district court proceeded under Section 31-9-1.5.

B.

On December 19, 1989, Richard Lopez was indicted on charges of depraved-mind murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, felony murder, and arson. On February 8, 1990, the district court found Lopez to be incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the care and custody of the Health and Environment Department for treatment to attain competency to stand trial. The court ordered the Health Department to submit a report to the court within 30 days assessing, among other items, the cause and nature of Lopez's disability and his amenability to treatment to attain competency. The court also ordered that a hearing be held May 10, 1990, to review Lopez's competency to stand trial. The Health Department designated the LVMC-FTU to provide appropriate evaluation and treatment.

On November 5, 1990, the district court determined that Lopez remained incompetent to stand trial and that there was no substantial probability that he would become competent within one year. The court further determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Lopez committed first-degree depraved-mind murder and that he was dangerous. The court reserved a ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence on the remaining counts. The court also ordered that Lopez remain committed at the LVMC-FTU. In March 1991, 1992, and 1993, the hospital provided the district court with written annual updates on Lopez's status. In each update, the hospital reported that Lopez was making essentially no progress toward competency to stand trial and was not likely to attain such status in the foreseeable future. On February 22, 1994, Lopez filed a motion for writ of habeas corpus and to dismiss the criminal cause against him, arguing that he had been held in pretrial detainment longer than a reasonable amount of time, that his confinement was not in accord with the least drastic means principle, that his confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and that his substantive due process rights were violated.

On October 3, 1994, the district court found that, although Lopez had made substantial progress toward competency to stand trial and there was a substantial probability he would obtain competency in the foreseeable future, he had not yet attained competency. The court also found that he had been confined for a reasonable amount of time, especially considering the seriousness of the charges against him, his disabilities, his history of substance abuse, and his dangerousness. The court also found that he was not entitled to the protection afforded under the civil commitment statutes. To the extent that the court found the least drastic means standard applied, the court determined that Lopez's treatment and confinement satisfied that standard. The court also found that Lopez was not denied equal protection of the law solely because of his pending criminal charges and incompetence, and that the conditions of his confinement did not violate his substantive due process rights to treatment and liberty under the United States or New Mexico constitutions. The court ordered that Lopez remain confined in a secure, locked facility. Lopez appeals from this order.

C.

On August 6, 1991, Lucille Epperson was charged with aggravated battery and first-degree murder. On December 2, the district court found her to be incompetent to stand trial and committed her to the LVMC-FTU for treatment. The court's final December 2 order stated that Epperson "presents a serious threat of inflicting great bodily harm on another and is therefore dangerous."² Epperson filed a motion to dismiss and release, arguing that, contrary to the requirements of the NMMIC, no ninety-day hearing was held, no one-year review hearing was held, and no resolution of the criminal case had been reached. Sections 31-9-1.3(A), -1.3(D), & -1.4. She also argued that her constitutional rights had been violated. On April 20, 1994, the court denied Epperson's motion...