State v. Row
| Decision Date | 18 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 21018,22918,s. 21018 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robin Lee ROW, Defendant-Appellant. Robin Lee ROW, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. Boise, January 1998 Term |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Kehne Law Office, Boise, for appellant. Rolf M. Kehne argued.
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Kenneth M. Robins, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth M. Robins argued.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Robin Lee Row appeals from the judgment of conviction and death sentence imposed by the district court after a jury found her guilty of three counts of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated arson. Row also appeals from the district court's order denying her petition for post-conviction relief. In addition, this case is subject to mandatory review as required by Idaho Code § 19-2827(c). We affirm.
During the early morning hours of February 10, 1992, a fire broke out at Robin Row's two-story apartment in a duplex at 10489 Seneca, in Boise, Idaho, and local fire trucks were dispatched to the scene. Due to recent problems in her relationship with her husband, Row was not living at the residence at that time. Instead, she was staying with a friend, Joan McHugh. After the fire was sufficiently under control, fire crews entered the apartment and found the bodies of Row's husband, Randy Row, and her two children, Joshua (age 10) and Tabitha (age 8). All three had died from carbon monoxide poisoning as a result of the fire.
Fire investigators found that the fire primarily started where the apartment joined the garage and that a second fire was started in some clothes piled in the living room. The investigators determined that a flammable, liquid accelerant was used to ignite the fire, and found that the smoke detector in the residence had been disabled before the fire when the power to the upstairs was cut off at the circuit breaker. As a result of the disconnected smoke alarm, the victims were not alerted to the fire which caused their deaths.
An investigation by the police ensued. The police discovered Row had lost a daughter to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome in 1977, and that her son, Keith, had died in a house fire in California in 1980. A warrant was obtained to search Row's burned apartment, Joan McHugh's residence where Row was staying on the night of the fire, Row's automobile, and Row's storage unit located in Meridian, Idaho.
During the search, the police discovered six insurance policies carried by Row on the lives of the deceased members of the Row family. These policies named Robin Row as the beneficiary and provided a total of $276,500 in death benefits. The most recent policy had been obtained by Row on January 24, 1992, just seventeen days before the fatal fire. In addition, at the storage unit in Meridian, police discovered evidence tending to prove that Row had been stealing from the bingo operation run by the YWCA where Row worked. This discovery resulted in Row's arrest on February 13, 1992, for grand theft by unauthorized control of funds belonging to the YWCA. She was placed in the Ada County Jail, and bail was set at $100,000.
While the arson and multiple-death investigation continued, Detective Raney prevailed upon Joan McHugh to put a tape recorder on her telephone to record conversations between herself and Row, if Row happened to call. Around 1:00 on the afternoon of March 20, 1992, Row telephoned McHugh from the jail. As suggested by Detective Raney, McHugh told Row that she had awakened during the night of the fire and had gone downstairs, but could not find Row in the residence. In response, Row told McHugh that she had left the residence that night, but stated that she was outside the house talking to her psychiatrist.
At about the same time on March 20, police and the prosecutor were holding a press conference to announce that a criminal complaint for three counts of murder had been filed against Row. The following Monday, March 23, Row was arrested while still in the Ada County Jail. She made her initial appearance before the magistrate that same day. The complaint was subsequently amended to include the charge of aggravated arson. Row's counsel filed a series of pretrial motions seeking to suppress statements Row had made to McHugh while she was incarcerated on the theft charge. The district court denied these motions. On March 5, 1993, following a jury trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on the murder and arson charges. A sentencing hearing was held, and on December 16, 1993, the district court imposed the death sentence. Row filed a notice of appeal on January 26, 1994.
On March 17, 1994, Row filed an application for post-conviction relief. Row challenged her trial counsel's handling of pretrial motions and presentation of mitigation evidence in the capital sentencing proceedings. In addition, Row asked for the appointment of a "money judge" to rule on Row's requests for expert assistance. Row also moved for a continuance to develop additional evidence in support of the petition for post-conviction relief. The district court denied Row's motion for a continuance and went forward with the post-conviction proceedings. Thereafter, on March 11, 1996, the district court entered a decision and order dismissing the post-conviction application. Row appealed from that order, and the two appeals were consolidated for review.
Row presents the following issues:
1. Whether the district court erred in finding the statutory aggravating circumstance in its decision to impose the death penalty.
2. Whether the district court correctly weighed all mitigating circumstances against the statutory aggravator found to support the imposition of the death penalty.
3. Whether the court's instruction given to the jury at trial correctly defined the concept of reasonable doubt.
4. Whether the district court erred in denying Row's request for an ex parte procedure for the approval of expert assistance in the post-conviction action.
5. Whether the district court erred in denying Row's request for a continuance of her postconviction hearing.
6. Whether Row's trial counsel was deficient in the presentation and argument of a motion to suppress statements made by Row to Joan McHugh.
7. Whether Row's trial counsel was deficient in the preparation and presentation of mitigation evidence in the capital sentencing proceedings.
Row contends that the district court erred in finding the statutory aggravating circumstance in its decision to impose the death penalty. We conclude that the district court did not err by sentencing Row to death because the court found the "multiple murders" statutory aggravator pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2515(g)(2) 1, and did not need to find any other statutory aggravating circumstances.
In its decision to impose the death sentence the district court opined that the separate verdicts finding Row guilty of each of the three counts of first-degree murder established, as a matter of law, the statutory aggravating circumstances under I.C. § 19-2515(g). Idaho Code § 19-2515(g)(2) provided for a statutory aggravating circumstance when "[a]t the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another murder." Applying this statute, the district court held that because Row had "obviously committed three first degree murders which the jury found to be wilful, deliberate and premeditated," the statutory aggravator existed. We agree with the district court that the facts and supporting jury verdicts objectively establish, as a matter of law, the "multiple murders" statutory aggravator. The district court's finding of the statutory aggravating circumstance is amply supported by the record.
The district court also considered the fact that Row was found guilty of arson, which established the statutory aggravating circumstance found in Idaho Code § 19-2515(g)(7)--a murder committed in the perpetration of arson. Furthermore, the district court concluded that "two additional statutory aggravating circumstances have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." In this regard, the district court found that Row's anticipation of insurance proceeds established that the murders were committed for remuneration or the promise of remuneration pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515(g)(4), and that the nature of the murders established that Row exhibited utter disregard for human life, establishing the aggravating circumstance found in I.C. § 19-2515(g)(6).
Row takes issue with the district court's finding about the "remuneration" and "utter disregard" statutory aggravating circumstances. She also claims the district court erred by not weighing the mitigating circumstances against each of the aggravators so found by the court.
Idaho Code § 19-2515(c) provides:
(c) Where a person is convicted of an offense which may be punishable by death, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court finds at least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance. Where the court finds a statutory aggravating circumstance the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court finds that mitigating circumstances which may be presented are sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, while the district court considered other factors that could have served as statutory aggravators, the district court was not required, and did not undertake, to engage in a weighing process with regard to any aggravators other than the one specifically relied upon for imposition of the death penalty. We reject Row's claim that the district court committed any error by failing to measure the mitigating circumstances against the "remuneration" and "utter disregard" circums...
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