State v. Rowan
Decision Date | 01 December 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 20150599,No. 20150598,20150598 |
Citation | 416 P.3d 566 |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Utah, Appellant, v. Michael ROWAN and Rebecca George, Appellees. |
Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellant
Richard P. Gale, Provo, for appellee Michael Rowan
Douglas J. Thompson, Provo, for appellee Rebecca George
Paul G. Cassell, Salt Lake City, James M. Swink, Logan, for amici Utah Council on Victims of Crime
¶ 1 In this case we consider a magistrate's determination of probable cause supporting a search warrant. A confidential informant (CI) told a police officer that he had bought marijuana from a man he knew only as "Mike" in Mike's house. In exchange for leniency on pending criminal charges, the CI agreed to make a controlled buy. After the CI completed the controlled buy, the officer submitted an affidavit to establish probable cause for a warrant to search Mike's house. The warrant was signed by a magistrate and executed by police. Mike's house was occupied by defendants Michael Rowan and Rebecca George. The police found drugs, drug paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, firearms, and a large amount of cash.
¶ 2 Mr. Rowan and Ms. George moved under the state and federal constitutions to suppress the result of the search, challenging the magistrate's probable cause determination. The district court found that there was no probable cause, but it also determined that the federal good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Defendants moved again to suppress the evidence, this time arguing that it should be excluded under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The court suppressed the evidence under the state constitution, concluding that the state constitution contains an exclusionary rule, but does not include a good faith exception. The State dismissed the charges due to lack of evidence and appealed.
¶ 3 On appeal, we are asked to consider (1) whether there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's probable cause determination; (2) whether this court recognized an exclusionary rule under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution in State v. Thompson1 and State v. Larocco ;2 and (3) if we did recognize an exclusionary rule under the Utah Constitution, whether there should be a good faith exception. Because we conclude that there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's probable cause determination and that therefore the evidence should not have been suppressed, we do not reach the questions of whether we have recognized an exclusionary rule under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution or whether there should be a good faith exception to such a rule. We therefore reverse the district court.
¶ 4 A confidential informant (CI) reported to a Springville City police officer that a man whom the CI knew only as "Mike" was in possession of marijuana and would sell it to the CI. The CI told the officer that he had been in Mike's home and purchased drugs from Mike before. The CI also told the officer that Mike sold marijuana in bulk and "his product [was] vacuum sealed"; that Mike traveled to California to obtain marijuana to sell in Utah; that Mike kept the marijuana inside his house, although the CI did not know where; that Mike was a master of martial arts; and that the CI had heard Mike talking about firearms and he believed Mike had a firearm in the house.
¶ 5 The police officer tried to determine Mike's identity, but record checks on the residence, registration checks on vehicles, and inquiries to other agencies were unsuccessful. He then proposed that the CI assist in a controlled buy of marijuana from Mike, in exchange for leniency on the CI's pending criminal charges. The CI agreed to participate.
¶ 6 Before the controlled buy, police searched the CI and found no illegal items. Then, in the presence of the police, the CI called Mike and arranged to buy a specific amount of marijuana for a specific amount of money. After receiving the money for the buy from the police, the CI drove in his own car to Mike's residence. The police did not search the CI's car, but kept the car and the CI in "visual sight at all times." The CI drove directly to Mike's house and went inside.
¶ 7 After a short time had passed, the CI left the residence and drove to a predetermined location to meet with the affiant police officer. The CI reported that after he entered Mike's house, he used the money given to him by the police to buy marijuana from Mike. The police searched the CI and found the agreed-upon amount of marijuana.
¶ 8 The police officer prepared an affidavit, which presented both the information about "Mike" conveyed to him by the CI and the details of the controlled buy. Relying on the police officer's affidavit, a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the search of a Provo residence, the home of defendants Michael Rowan and Rebecca George.
¶ 9 After securing the warrant, police searched the defendants' home and found over four pounds of marijuana, psilocybin mushrooms, drug paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, more than $3,600 in cash, an assault rifle, and a handgun. The drugs and related paraphernalia were found throughout the home and were easily accessible to the defendants' minor child, who was living in the home and present when the police entered the home.
¶ 10 Mr. Rowan was charged with (1) distributing marijuana in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony; (2) possessing marijuana with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone while having a prior drug-related conviction, a first degree felony; (3) possessing or using psilocybin mushrooms in a drug-free zone while having a prior drug-related conviction, a first degree felony; (4) possessing a firearm as a restricted person, a third degree felony; (5) possessing drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor; and (6) endangering a child, a third degree felony. Ms. George was charged with endangering a child, a third degree felony.
¶ 11 At the district court, Defendants argued under the Fourth Amendment that the warrant was not supported by probable cause and moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search of their home. In response, the State argued that the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause, but even if he did not, that the evidence should not be suppressed under the federal good faith exception, which allows for admission of evidence when police reasonably rely on a magistrate's incorrect finding of probable cause. The district court concluded that the magistrate incorrectly determined that the warrant was supported by probable cause, but the court applied the federal good faith exception and did not suppress the evidence.
¶ 12 Defendants filed a "motion to address [the] good faith exception under [the] Utah Constitution," arguing that the federal good faith exception "is prohibited by the Utah State Constitution." The State argued in response that there is no basis for an exclusionary rule under the Utah Constitution and, even if there were, a state exclusionary rule should include a good faith exception analogous to the federal exception. Relying on this court's decision in State v. Thompson ,3 the district court concluded that a state exclusionary rule is required under the state constitution, but that "there is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 14" of the Utah Constitution. The court granted Defendants' motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search of their home.
¶ 13 On the State's motion, the district court dismissed the charges against Defendants on the ground that the suppression of evidence substantially impaired the State's cases. The State timely appealed both cases. This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(i) in Mr. Rowan's case and Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(b) in Ms. George's case.4
¶ 14 We review a district court's assessment of a magistrate's probable cause determination for correctness and ask whether the court erred in concluding that the magistrate did not have a substantial basis for a determination of probable cause.5
¶ 15 The State argues that the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause and that the district court did not afford the magistrate's probable cause determination "great deference," but "reviewed the probable cause affidavit de novo." Defendants argue that the district court correctly concluded that the affidavit did not establish a substantial basis for probable cause, pointing to the court's consideration of the "CI's lack of credibility, the officer's failure to corroborate any of [the CI's] claims, and the complete lack of control over the buy." We agree with the State that the district court did not give the magistrate appropriate deference and that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate's determination of probable cause.
¶ 16 "Where a search warrant supported by an affidavit is challenged as having been issued without an adequate showing of probable cause, our review focuses on the magistrate's probable cause determination."6 "We afford the magistrate's decision ‘great deference’ and consider the affidavit relied upon by the magistrate ‘in its entirety and in a common[ ]sense fashion.’ "7 This court has "consistently employed" the totality of the circumstances analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates to evaluate probable cause:8
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given...
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