State v. Rowe
| Decision Date | 30 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2021 KA 0626 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Qwandarious ROWE |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Warren LeDoux Montgomery, District Attorney, Matthew Caplan, Assistant District Attorney, Covington, Louisiana, David Albert Weilbaecher, Assistant District Attorney, Franklinton, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellee, State of Louisiana
Lieu T. Vo Clark, Mandeville, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendant-Appellant, Qwandarious Rowe
BEFORE: GUIDRY, HOLDRIDGE, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
The defendant, Qwandarious Rowe, was charged by bill of information with possession of methamphetamine (less than two grams), a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C).1 He pled not guilty. Following a hearing on a motion to quash the bill of information, wherein the motion was denied, the defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea pursuant to Crosby. See State v. Crosby , 338 So.2d 584, 588 (La. 1976). He was sentenced to two years at hard labor. The sentence was suspended and the defendant was placed on three years of probation. The defendant now appeals, designating one assignment of error. We affirm the conviction and sentence.
The following facts were established at the motion to quash hearing. On October 16, 2019, Sergeant Michael Thomas, with the Washington Parish Sheriff's Office, was on duty at the Washington Parish Fair. A person at the fair alerted Sergeant Thomas that someone was in a public bathroom stall, sitting on the floor with his pants around his ankles. Sergeant Thomas went to the bathroom and identified the person on the floor as the defendant, whom Sergeant Thomas knew from prior encounters. Sergeant Thomas spoke to the defendant who could not speak coherently, but only mumbled. Sergeant Thomas helped the defendant to his feet and, as he pulled the defendant's pants up, he felt a syringe in the defendant's pocket, which he seized. The defendant was taken out of the bathroom and placed on the back of a golf cart, driven by Northshore EMS personnel, for observation. Sergeant Thomas felt the defendant needed to be evaluated further, so an ambulance was called. While the defendant was still sitting on the back of the golf cart, Sergeant Thomas saw something sticking out of the defendant's sock. Sergeant Thomas rolled down the defendant's sock and found what he believed to be methamphetamine wrapped in a $5 dollar bill.
The defendant was transported to Riverside Medical Center where he underwent observation, then was released later that same day. Sergeant Thomas testified at the motion to quash hearing that he did not think the defendant had overdosed, but felt he should be brought to the hospital to be checked out.
In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the motion to quash the bill of information.
When a trial court denies a motion to quash, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion. See State v. Odom, 2002-2698 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/27/03), 861 So.2d 187, 191, writ denied, 2003-2142 (La. 10/17/03), 855 So.2d 765. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501, 504.
A motion to quash is, essentially, a mechanism whereby pretrial pleas are urged, i.e., pleas which do not go to the merits of the charge. At a hearing on such a motion, evidence is limited to procedural matters and the question of factual guilt or innocence is not before the court. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 531 - 538 ; State v. Byrd, 96-2302 (La. 3/13/98), 708 So.2d 401, 411, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 876, 119 S.Ct. 179, 142 L.Ed.2d 146 (1998).
In considering a motion to quash, a court must accept as true the facts contained in the bills of information and in the bill of particulars, and determine as a matter of law and from the face of the pleadings, whether a crime has been charged; while evidence may be adduced, such may not include a defense on the merits. Byrd, 708 So.2d at 411, citing State v. Masino, 214 La. 744, 748-49, 38 So.2d 622, 623 (1949) ().
The defendant argues herein that his motion to quash the bill of information should have been granted, based on La. R.S. 14:403.10(B), which provides:
A person who experiences a drug-related overdose and is in need of medical assistance shall not be charged, prosecuted, or penalized for possession of a controlled dangerous substance under the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law if the evidence for possession of a controlled substance was obtained as a result of the overdose and the need for medical assistance.
To date, only the fifth circuit has addressed the meaning of overdose in La. R.S. 14:403.10(B). In State v. Brooks , 2016-345 (La. App. 5th Cir. 12/28/16), 210 So.3d 514, 519, and State v. Jago, 2016-346 (La. App. 5th Cir. 12/28/16), 209 So.3d 1078, 1082, writ denied, 2017-0183 (La. 11/17/17), 228 So.3d 1218 (per curiam) both decided the same day, the fifth circuit opined:
As written, La. R.S. 14:403.10B establishes a three-prong test for determining whether the immunity it establishes applies. The person in possession of the controlled dangerous substance must be experiencing an "overdose"; the person must be in need of medical assistance; and the evidence of the controlled dangerous substance must have been obtained as a result of the overdose and the need for medical assistance. This statute does not define "overdose," and there is no jurisprudence interpreting this statute.
In determining whether the defendant experienced an overdose as intended by the statute, the fifth circuit in Jago looked to the definition of overdose. The court noted:
"Overdose" is defined by the Merriam—Webster Dictionary as "too great a dose (as of a therapeutic agent); also : a lethal or toxic amount (as of a drug)." "Toxic," is uniformly defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary and by other dictionaries and internet sources as poisonous, deadly, and capable of causing death or serious injury.
The fifth circuit found that for the purposes of La. R.S. 14:403.10(B) :
an "overdose" must be of a lethal, toxic, or poisonous amount that is capable of causing death or serious injury, rather than one which is merely dangerous, "too great a dose," or causing a lower level of consciousness. Illegal possession or use of any amount of a Controlled Dangerous Substance [CDS] is, by its nature and by legal prohibition, dangerous and "too great a dose." Therefore, to define "overdose" merely as one which is dangerous or is "too great a dose" would lead to the absurd result of allowing any amount of a CDS to satisfy this prong of the test for immunity granted by La. R.S. 14:403.10B.
Given the defendant's argument that the purpose of La. R.S. 14:403.10(B) was to save lives, the court in Jago found that such an argument necessarily contemplated that "overdose" in the statute meant "the use of a lethal, toxic, or poisonous amount which has created a life-threatening condition, or one which is capable of causing death or serious injury." 209 So.3d at 1083. The court noted that while the defendant obviously showed signs of drug impairment, such as slobbering on himself and unconsciousness, there was no evidence of use of a lethal, toxic, or poisonous life-threatening amount; there were no medical tests performed at the scene and no treatment for an overdose at the correctional facility; and "no expert medical testimony was offered at the hearing to indicate whether defendant ingested an amount of heroin likely to result in an overdose." Id. Accordingly, the fifth circuit found the trial court abused its discretion in its grant of the motion to quash, concluding that the defendant was entitled to immunity under the statute, and dismissal of the bill of information. See Jago, 209 So.3d at 1083.
In denying the defendant's writ application in Jago, the supreme court in a per curiam opinion found:
The court of appeal erred in finding that defendant must have injected a lethal quantity of heroin before he can be shielded from prosecution by operation of La. R.S. 14:403.10(B). Requiring a drug user to have experienced a life-threatening overdose—and requiring a lay person before seeking help to determine whether a drug user has experienced a life-threatening overdose—would frustrate the purpose of the statute, which is to encourage persons to seek help for those they reasonably believe have overdosed. However, under the circumstances here, in which the unconscious defendant was quickly roused and required no medical attention of any kind, La. R.S. 14:403.10(B) does not shield defendant from prosecution because it is only triggered when (emphasis added), "A person ... experiences a drug-related overdose and is in need of medical assistance ..." Therefore, notwithstanding the court of appeal's erroneous statement of law, the court of appeal reached the correct result and defendant is not entitled to have the charge against him quashed.
At the motion to quash hearing herein, the defendant argued that all three prongs of the test for determining prosecutorial immunity under La. R.S. 14:403.10(B), as set out by the fifth circuit, had been met, requiring dismissal of his case. The State agreed two prongs had been met, but argued that the defendant failed to prove that he had overdosed.
In denying the motion to quash, the trial court found the following:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Rowe
...A split panel in the First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling. State v. Rowe, 21-0626 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/30/21), 340 So.3d 1052 (Guidry, J., dissenting) (Holdridge, J., concurring).[4] The court of appeal first acknowledged that this Court, while ultimately denying wr......