State v. Rowell, 24641

Citation487 S.E.2d 185,326 S.C. 313
Decision Date22 January 1997
Docket NumberNo. 24641,24641
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
PartiesThe STATE, Petitioner, v. Karen ROWELL, Respondent. . Heard

Attorney General Charles Molony Condon, Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Attorney General William Edgar Salter, III, Columbia; and Solicitor Ralph J. Wilson, Conway, for Petitioner.

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

FINNEY, Chief Justice.

Respondent was convicted of two counts of reckless homicide and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of three years' imprisonment and two years' probation. In State v. Rowell, 321 S.C. 114, 467 S.E.2d 247 (Ct.App.1995), the Court of Appeals reversed by a vote of 2-1 with Judge Cureton dissenting. The majority held that respondent was entitled to a directed verdict on each count because there was no evidence that she acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others. We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari, and now reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the convictions.

Respondent was tried on two counts of reckless homicide following a 1992 automobile-pedestrian accident in which two children were killed. At the close of the State's case and at the close of all the evidence, respondent moved for a directed verdict arguing that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to establish that she was driving her vehicle recklessly at the time of the accident. The trial court denied the motions and respondent was subsequently convicted on both counts. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of respondent's motion for directed verdicts, holding that although respondent's actions were "clearly negligent," the State failed to present sufficient evidence that her actions were reckless. The State argues this was error. We agree.

In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State, and if there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find that the case was properly submitted to the jury. State v. Venters, 300 S.C. 260, 387 S.E.2d 270 (1990); State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 379 S.E.2d 888, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 895, 110 S.Ct. 246, 107 L.Ed.2d 196 (1989). The criminal law ordinarily requires that the defendant possess both "an evil meaning mind [and] an evil doing hand" before liability is imposed. State v. Jefferies, 316 S.C. 13, 446 S.E.2d 427 (1994). To convict an individual of reckless homicide, the State must prove the individual was driving a vehicle "in reckless disregard of the safety of others." See S.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-2910 (Supp.1996). Reckless disregard for the safety of others signifies an indifference to the consequences of one's acts. It denotes a conscious failure to exercise due care or ordinary care or a conscious indifference to the rights and safety of others or a reckless disregard thereof. See State v. Tucker, 273 S.C. 736, 259 S.E.2d 414 (1979).

At trial, the State presented the testimony of several individuals who witnessed the accident. Randi Slaughter testified that after leaving a grocery store, she and several other children were walking north on Wiley Drive, a two-way street, at approximately 7:30 p.m. on October 24, 1992. Randi and two other individuals, Jennifer Tomlinson and Randi's sister Sarah, who was carrying Jennifer's infant daughter, were walking on one side of the road (with the traffic) while another individual, Erica Spon, was walking on the other side of the road (against the traffic) pushing a baby carriage containing Jennifer's son Hank. After a car passed the group, Erica and Hank moved to the same side of the street as Randi and the others. When they observed a second car turn onto Wiley Drive and approach them from the front, the group moved into the road's grassy shoulder. Randi testified she then saw the car, driven by respondent, cross the center of the road and head towards the group. Randi stated it appeared the car was speeding up. The group then tried to get out of the path of respondent's car by moving further into the grassy area, however, the car struck four members of the group (including Randi), killing Erica and Hank. Sarah and Jennifer gave similar testimony.

Alberta Kissell, who drove past Randi and the rest of the group just prior to the accident, also testified for the State. Kissell stated that although it was dark, she had no trouble seeing the individuals as she approached them from the rear. Kissell stated that after she passed the group, she saw respondent's car turn onto Wiley Drive. According to Kissell, respondent was traveling at a normal rate of speed and the headlights on respondent's car were illuminated. When Kissell stopped at a stop sign on Wiley...

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16 cases
  • State v. Kelsey
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • June 8, 1998
    ...to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find that the case was properly submitted to the jury. State v. Rowell, 326 S.C. 313, 487 S.E.2d 185 (1997); State v. Venters, 300 S.C. 260, 387 S.E.2d 270 (1990); State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 379 S.E.2d 888 (1989). In ruling on ......
  • State v. Needs, 24856.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 23, 1998
    ...which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly or logically deduced); State v. Rowell, 326 S.C. 313, 487 S.E.2d 185 (in reviewing denial of directed verdict motion, appellate court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the S......
  • State v. Wilds, 3668.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • July 21, 2003
    ...on the terms' civil concepts; instead the State must look to the meaning of the words as defined in criminal law. State v. Rowell, 326 S.C. 313, 317, 487 S.E.2d 185, 187 (1997). Malice may be either express or implied. "The words `express or implied' add nothing to the meaning of the word `......
  • State v. Osborne
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 3, 1999
    ...impaired. Cf. In the Matter of Stacy Ray A., 303 S.C. 291, 400 S.E.2d 141 (1991) overruled in part on other grounds State v. Rowell, 326 S.C. 313, 487 S.E.2d 185 (1997) (fact that fatal collision occurred insufficient to show reckless I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 1. ......
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