State v. Rozajewski
| Citation | 945 P.2d 1390,130 Idaho 644 |
| Decision Date | 28 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 23038,23038 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Stephen ROZAJEWSKI, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Idaho |
John M. Adams, Kootenai County Chief Public Defender; J. Bradford Chapman, Deputy Public Defender (argued), Coeur d'Alene, for defendant-appellant.
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General (argued), Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
Stephen Rozajewski was found guilty by a jury of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). On appeal, Rozajewski claims that the district court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged crimes and in instructing the jury. Rozajewski also argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. We affirm.
Rozajewski was stopped by police in Coeur d'Alene and arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). Police officers conducted a search of Rozajewski's vehicle and found methamphetamine inside a bag located in the vehicle's glove compartment. Rozajewski was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance. Rozajewski went to trial, and a jury found him guilty of the possession charge. The district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Rozajewski to a unified term of incarceration of five years, with one year fixed. Rozajewski appealed.
Rozajewski claims the district court committed fundamental error by allowing evidence of uncharged crimes to be admitted during the trial. The state argues that because Rozajewski did not object to this evidence during trial, he is precluded from raising this issue on appeal.
This Court will not address an issue not preserved for appeal by an objection in the trial court. State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d 125, 129 (1995); State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989). However, we may consider fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made at trial. Johnson, 126 Idaho at 896, 894 P.2d at 129; Bingham, 116 Idaho at 423, 776 P.2d at 432. A fundamental error is one that so profoundly distorts the proceedings that it produces manifest injustice, depriving the criminal defendant of the fundamental right to due process. State v. Hadley, 122 Idaho 728, 731, 838 P.2d 331, 334 (Ct.App.1992). Fundamental error has been defined as error which goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights, goes to the foundation of the case or takes from the defendant a right which was essential to his or her defense and which no court could or ought to permit to be waived. State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 940, 877 P.2d 905, 911 (1994).
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed this issue in Johnson and held that the district court's admission of the evidence, if the defendant fails to object at trial under I.R.E. 404(b), does not rise to the level of fundamental error. Under Johnson, we conclude that the district court's alleged error in admitting the evidence of uncharged crimes in this case does not rise to level of fundamental error. See also Bingham, 116 Idaho at 423, 776 P.2d at 432 (). Therefore, because Rozajewski failed to object under Rule 404(b) to the challenged evidence, we will not consider this issue for the first time on appeal.
Rozajewski asserts that the trial court erred by giving a constructive possession YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that there are two (2) kinds of possession: actual possession and constructive possession.
instruction that reduced the state's burden of proof, created an impermissible presumption and deprived Rozajewski of his right to a unanimous verdict. Rozajewski's challenge is focused on Instruction 9, which provided:
"Actual possession" requires that a person have direct physical control over a thing.
"Constructive possession" does not require actual possession but does require that a person knowingly have [sic] the right of control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons.
Rozajewski argues that under Instruction 9, he could have been found guilty for "having a possessory interest in the car, because the 'right of control' could be understood to extend to anything found in the vehicle, whether or not a defendant had knowledge of the same." Rozajewski further argues that Instruction 9 operated to create a presumption of guilt as to the possession charge. He asserts that by instructing the jury that he could be found guilty for merely owning the vehicle, the burden was shifted to him to rebut the presumption created by the ownership of the car.
The question whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691, 694 (1992). When reviewing jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct.App.1993).
In reviewing the jury instructions as a whole, we note that Instruction 8 informed the jury:
[T]he state must prove each of the following:
....
3. the defendant possessed Methamphetamine, and;
4. the defendant knew or should have known it was Methamphetamine.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty.
Additionally, Instruction 11 indicated that the state In view of Instructions 8 and 11, in combination with the challenged instruction, we are unpersuaded that the jury would have found Rozajewski guilty merely because he had a possessory interest in the vehicle or that the instruction created a presumption of his guilt as to the charged offense. Accordingly, we conclude that, as a whole, the instructions fairly and accurately reflected the applicable law, and the district court did not err in instructing the jury.
Rozajewski asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict. Rozajewski alleges that there was no evidence presented of any other association or nexus between himself and the illegal substance. Rozajewski also argues that there is "at least a reasonable probability that this mis-instructed jury returned its verdict merely on the evidence that showed Rozajewski in possession of an automobile in which the drugs were found." Rozajewski also asserts that a "jury cannot infer constructive possession from the mere fact that a defendant occupied a vehicle in which drugs were seized."
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A...
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