State v. Ruess
| Decision Date | 02 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 17344,17344 |
| Citation | 118 Idaho 707,800 P.2d 103 |
| Parties | The STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Timothy W. RUESS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Charles Sheroke, Coeur d'Alene, for defendant-appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen. by Michael A. Henderson, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
In this appeal we examine issues relating to the issuance and execution of a search warrant, and we consider the scope of a judge's discretion in fashioning conditions of probation. The appeal comes to us from a judgment convicting Timothy Ruess of manufacturing and possessing marijuana. Ruess argues (1) that a search warrant was issued without probable cause; (2) that the issuing magistrate was misled by police officers; (3) that the officers later failed to comply with I.C. § 19-4409, the knock-and-announce statute; and (4) that the sentencing judge impermissibly imposed a condition of probation requiring Ruess to disclose the names of other persons with whom he was dealing in controlled substances. For reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment.
The underlying facts may be summarized briefly. While being arrested on a battery charge, an individual named Jerry Daniels showed police officers some marijuana and told them that his girlfriend had obtained it from Timothy Ruess. The officers applied for a search warrant and took Daniels before a magistrate to establish probable cause. Daniels reiterated what he had told the officers, adding that he had seen and smelled marijuana growing in Ruess' home. The magistrate issued a warrant. The ensuing search resulted in seizure of more than one hundred marijuana plants, together with harvested and dried marijuana material.
Ruess was charged with manufacturing and possessing a controlled substance. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause and that it was executed in violation of the knock-and-announce statute. The motion was denied. Ruess later moved for an evidentiary hearing, asserting that the police had misled the magistrate at the probable cause hearing. This motion also was denied. Ruess then entered a conditional plea of guilty to both charges. The judge considered withholding judgment and granting probation; but when Ruess said he would not comply with a condition requiring disclosure of other persons involved in marijuana transactions, the judge imposed concurrent sentences of confinement for six months in jail. This appeal followed.
We first examine Ruess' contention that the search warrant was issued without probable cause. When the issuance of a warrant is challenged, the function of an appellate court is limited to determining whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 672 P.2d 561 (1983). Our inquiry encompasses the totality of circumstances disclosed by the record. Id.
Here, the magistrate received in-person testimony from a citizen informant, Daniels, who said he had seen and smelled marijuana growing in Ruess' home. Daniels testified that he had made the observation within the previous eight days. This evidence plainly was sufficient to establish a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed. Nonetheless, Ruess argues that Daniels' testimony should have been discounted because he was upset by a relationship between his girlfriend and Ruess. We acknowledge that there may be instances where, due to a witness' suspicious motives, a magistrate would be well advised to seek corroboration. See e.g., State v. Johnson, 108 Idaho 619, 701 P.2d 239 (Ct.App.1985), aff'd 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288 (1986). However, we decline to pronounce a bright-line rule mandating corroboration in all such instances. Moreover, such a rule would be superfluous here because, in fact, there was some corroboration consisting of the marijuana shown to the police by Daniels during his arrest. In addition, the magistrate was apprised of Daniels' possible motive and was able to make an informed determination of Daniels' credibility as a witness in open court. Therefore, we uphold the magistrate's determination of probable cause.
Ruess next argues that the magistrate was misled by the police, who failed to tell him that Daniels was drunk while testifying at the probable cause hearing. According to Ruess, if the magistrate had known of Daniels' intoxicated condition, a search warrant would not have issued. This contention embraces two intertwined issues: a factual question of intoxication, and a procedural question as to whether Ruess should have been granted an evidentiary hearing on his allegation that the magistrate had been misled.
It is well settled that evidence seized under warrant must be suppressed if the police knowingly, intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth present false information to the issuing magistrate. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Moreover, Franks has been extended to require suppression when an officer misleads the magistrate by deliberately or recklessly concealing material facts. See, e.g., United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957 (8th Cir.1986). However, a defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his challenge to the veracity of statements made at a probable cause hearing. Rather, Franks requires the defendant to make a substantial preliminary showing that the magistrate was misinformed and that the false or misleading information was necessary to a finding of probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. at 2676-77. This showing must be grounded in "allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth," accompanied by an offer of proof in the form of affidavits or other reliable statements of witnesses. Id. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684.
When Ruess made his motion for an evidentiary hearing, he presented no testimony by Daniels. Instead, he relied upon a letter written by the girlfriend, stating that Daniels had been drinking prior to his arrest, and upon a letter purportedly written by Daniels himself, describing events surrounding the probable cause hearing. Neither of these letters was sworn as an affidavit. Accordingly, the district judge correctly refused to accord them evidentiary weight under Franks.
The state, on the other hand, offered evidence that Daniels had been in police custody, with no opportunity to drink, for more than seven hours before the probable cause hearing took place. The state also submitted three affidavits of officers indicating they did not believe Daniels was drunk at the hearing. In addition, the magistrate had a full opportunity to observe Daniels in person while he testified. Upon this record, we conclude that Ruess failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that the police intentionally or recklessly misled the magistrate. Therefore, he was not erroneously denied a Franks hearing.
Ruess next argues that all evidence seized under the search warrant should have been suppressed because the police did not comply with the knock-and-announce statute before they entered his home. 1 The state argues that the officers substantially complied and, in any event, that exigent circumstances excused literal compliance with the statute. These arguments frame a mixed issue of fact and law. On such an issue, we defer to the district court's factual findings, if they are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely apply legal principles to the facts found. Cf. State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 716 P.2d 1328 (Ct.App.1986) ().
Here, the district court accepted the testimony of the two officers who entered Ruess' home. The first officer testified that he approached the house in daylight while in uniform. The main door of Ruess' house was open, but the screen door was closed. The officer stated that he could see through the screen, and that he observed someone, later identified as Ruess, dart from the front room as the officer came to the door. The officer knocked and then entered...
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