State v. Ruffin

Decision Date26 May 2022
Docket Number2019AP1046-CR
Citation401 Wis.2d 619,974 N.W.2d 432,2022 WI 34
Parties STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Theophilous RUFFIN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs filed by Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by Jennifer L. Vandermeuse.

For the defendant-appellant there was a brief filed by Nicole M. Masnica and Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin & Brown LLP. There was an oral argument by Nicole M. Masnica.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.

¶1 The petitioner, the State of Wisconsin, seeks review of a decision of the court of appeals that reversed the circuit court in part and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.1 Specifically, the court of appeals determined that Theophilous Ruffin alleged sufficient facts so as to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing a request for a self-defense instruction.

¶2 The State contends that the court of appeals failed to apply the correct legal framework and that Ruffin is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the record conclusively demonstrates that he is not entitled to relief. Ruffin, on the other hand, argues that the court of appeals applied the proper framework, and that he is entitled to a Machner 2 hearing on his ineffective assistance claim.

¶3 We determine that the court of appeals applied an incorrect legal framework. In reaching our determination we emphasize that even if the motion alleges sufficient facts, an evidentiary hearing is not mandatory if the motion presents only conclusory allegations or if the record as a whole conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief.

¶4 We conclude that the record here conclusively demonstrates that Ruffin is not entitled to relief on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing a request for a self-defense instruction. As a result, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by denying Ruffin's motion without an evidentiary hearing.

¶5 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

I

¶6 Ruffin was charged with one count of second degree sexual assault3 and one count of mayhem,4 both as acts of domestic abuse.5 The charges stemmed from a physical altercation between Ruffin and his partner, A.B.6 At the time of the altercation, A.B. and Ruffin were in a relationship and lived together, along with several children that each partner had from previous relationships and their six-month-old son. A.B. was pregnant with the couple's second child.

¶7 According to A.B.’s testimony at trial, she and Ruffin had a "couple of beers" earlier in the day, and A.B. also consumed a "couple lines of cocaine." Ruffin went to bed around 10:00 or 11:00 p.m., and A.B. stayed up later, going to bed around 3:00 a.m. A.B. awoke to Ruffin kicking her and telling her that the baby was crying.

¶8 Ruffin and A.B. began to argue, and A.B. got up to prepare a bottle for the baby. They continued to exchange words, which eventually escalated to a physical altercation. A.B. testified that Ruffin pulled her by her hair, hit her, and punched the back of her head. She recounted that she hit Ruffin with an open hand, and he responded by again hitting her.

¶9 A.B. testified next that she told Ruffin that she was going to leave, and Ruffin responded by telling her that he was not going to let her leave. When A.B. tried to get past Ruffin, she testified that he picked her up by her hair and inner thigh and threw her on the bed. She landed on her back with Ruffin kneeling over her.

¶10 Ruffin put his left arm across her face, pinning her on the bed. A.B. testified that with his right hand, Ruffin "just shoves right into my vagina, rips and pulls out." Ruffin did this at least three times. A.B. felt "all this pressure" and instantly felt wet. She thought that Ruffin was trying to kill her unborn child.

¶11 A.B. ran downstairs and discovered blood dripping down her legs. She also noticed a piece of vaginal tissue "just hanging" from her body. A.B. required surgery to repair and reattach two to two-and-a-half inches of separated vaginal tissue.

¶12 The treating doctor testified that "[r]oughly half of the right labia minora ha[d] been torn off" and that she "had never seen anything quite like it." Further, the doctor testified that A.B. told her that "she fell down the stairs, and it caught on her underwear and tore it off." This explanation was suspect, in the doctor's estimation, because she "couldn't imagine any way underwear could tear [it] off" because the tissue that makes up the labia is "not easily torn." Due to the nature of the tissue and the extent of the injury, the doctor thus did not believe A.B.’s initial explanation that she fell down the stairs and instead suspected intimate partner violence.

¶13 Ruffin also testified at trial, and offered a different version of events. According to Ruffin, when he nudged A.B. with his foot to wake her up, she was upset and angry, "cussing" at him. He noticed that three of his beers and his cocaine were missing, and he "threatened to call the social workers" to report A.B.’s drug and alcohol use. Ruffin then testified that A.B. "started to come towards me hitting me, punching me, try to push me down the stairs."

¶14 According to Ruffin, as A.B. hit him, he tried to push her onto the bed. As he pushed her, she tripped and grabbed Ruffin's collar, and both fell on the bed. In an effort to avoid falling on A.B.’s pregnant belly, Ruffin testified that he held himself up with his hand. In Ruffin's telling, A.B. then put her legs around Ruffin's waist.

¶15 Ruffin indicated that he tried to free himself from A.B.’s grasp. He used his left hand to try to push her legs off of him. When asked on cross-examination how A.B.’s labia was injured, Ruffin acknowledged that he "was pushing in that area" but later stated that he "didn't never think [he] was pushing her labia.... All I was trying to do was just push her legs off of me so I can go." He further testified that he wasn't trying to use force and was "gently" trying to remove A.B.’s legs from around him so he could leave.

¶16 Ruffin acknowledged the size disparity between him and A.B. He stated that he was a "big man," six feet, four inches tall, who weighed 300 pounds at the time of the altercation and that A.B. was "small" and five months pregnant.

¶17 After the close of evidence, Ruffin's counsel asked the circuit court to give the jury instruction on self-defense and defense of others.7 Counsel explained that Ruffin testified that "he didn't know what she was going to do to him and that he was trying to get away and he was also trying to prevent himself from falling on the unborn child so the actions he undertook were designed to protect himself, the unborn child, quite frankly [A.B.]." However, soon after making this request, Ruffin's counsel withdrew it. He reasoned: "After reading through it I don't think it can be worded the way I think it needs to be worded. Therefore, I'm going to withdraw the request. I'm not sure it really fits this situation."

¶18 In its stead, Ruffin's counsel asked the circuit court to give the jury the instruction on an accident defense.8 Ultimately, the circuit court read the accident instruction with respect to the mayhem charge, but not the sexual assault charge. The jury convicted Ruffin of second-degree sexual assault (sexual intercourse9 without consent causing injury), and acquitted him of mayhem.

¶19 After some additional proceedings not relevant to the issue before us,10 Ruffin filed a postconviction motion. In his motion, he asserted three claims: (1) that the circuit court's error in giving a wrong jury instruction on the sexual assault count was not harmless, (2) that the circuit court erred by not giving the jury the accident instruction for the sexual assault count, and (3) that his counsel was ineffective for withdrawing the request for a self-defense instruction.

¶20 The circuit court denied Ruffin's motion without a hearing, rejecting each of Ruffin's claims. With regard to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for withdrawing the request for a self-defense instruction, the circuit court determined that withdrawing the request did not constitute ineffective assistance "based on the facts of this case." It further stated that "even if a self-defense instruction had been given, there is not a reasonable probability the jury would have bought it based on the amount of force that was used." The circuit court further commented on the extent of A.B.’s injuries: "Almost entirely ripping off the woman's labia—she testified it was just hanging there—that required 28 stitches to reattach it? When she was laying on the bed face up? There is not a reasonable probability he would have obtained an acquittal."

¶21 Ruffin appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. State v. Ruffin, No. 2019AP1046-CR, unpublished slip op., 2021 WL 870593 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2021). It affirmed the circuit court's rejection of Ruffin's first two arguments, but reversed the circuit court's denial of Ruffin's postconviction motion on the basis that Ruffin's trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing the request for a self-defense instruction and remanded to the circuit court for a Machner hearing.

¶22 Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that "Ruffin has alleged sufficient facts in his postconviction motion that his trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing his request for the self-defense instruction and is, therefore, entitled to a Machner hearing addressing his claim." Id., ¶42. In arriving at this conclusion, the court of appeals noted that Ruffin had alleged in his postconviction motion...

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8 cases
  • State v. Jackson
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • 20 Enero 2023
    ...alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and the record fails to conclusively demonstrate that he is not entitled to relief. See State v. Ruffin, 2022 WI 34, ¶37, 401 Wis. 2d 619, 974 N.W.2d 432. Although one of Larry Jackson's three postconviction claims met both of these requirements, th......
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    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • 3 Junio 2022
  • State v. Kimble
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • 29 Noviembre 2022
    ...demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing." State v. Ruffin , 2022 WI 34, ¶35, 401 Wis. 2d 619, 974 N.W.2d 432.¶36 The circuit court determined that Kimble failed to allege sufficient material facts to demonstr......
  • State v. Zocco
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • 31 Octubre 2023
    ...determine "whether the motion on its face alleges sufficient material facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief." State v. Ruffin, 2022 WI 34, ¶27, 401 Wis.2d 619, 974 N.W.2d 432. "Whether the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is entitled to no relief is a......
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