State v. Ruffin
| Decision Date | 30 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 34640.,34640. |
| Citation | 144 Conn.App. 387,71 A.3d 695 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Roger RUFFIN. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Raymond L. Durelli, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Robin D. Krawczyk, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
DiPENTIMA, C.J., and BEACH and McDONALD, Js.
The defendant, Roger Ruffin, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–70 (a)(2), two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53–21(a)(2), risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53–21(a)(1) and sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–73a (a)(1)(A). On appeal, the defendant claims that his due process rights were violated when (1) the trial court considered pending charges against him in a separate case for similar offenses during sentencing, (2) the prosecutor improperly (a) used the testimony of a clinical child interview specialist to bolster the victim's credibility and (b) commented on the defendant's right to testify during her closing argument, and (3) the court refused to give an instruction regarding inconsistencies in the victim's testimony to the jury. We disagree that the defendant was denied due process on any of the claims. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In January, 2009, the victim was twelve years old.1 At that time, the defendant, although married to another woman, had been dating the victim's mother for ten years. During the course of his relationship with the victim's mother, the defendant spent time alone with the victim. The defendant has four children of his own, one of whom is a daughter similar in age to the victim. The defendant's daughter socialized with the victim and her mother occasionally.
The victim identified two separate instances of abuse. First, in January, 2009, the defendant picked up the victim in order to take her to his daughter's birthday party. Instead of going to the party, the defendant stopped his car in Keney Park in Hartford. The defendant then asked the victim whether she had any pubic hair. The victim replied that she did not, and the defendant asked to see. The defendant then “tugg[ed]” on the waist of the victim's shorts, pulled her shorts and her underwear down, and touched her vagina. The victim told the defendant to stop and that she felt uncomfortable, at which point the defendant stopped and drove the victim home. The defendant told the victim not to tell her mother, and when he parked the car to drop the victim off, he kissed her and put his tongue in her mouth; he also told the victim not to tell her mother about the kiss. A couple of weeks later,2 the defendant again drove the victim to Keney Park and stopped his car. He asked the victim to “suck his penis....” When the victim told him no, the defendant unzipped his pants, forced the victim's head down with his hand and put his penis into the victim's mouth.3 The defendant moved the victim's head “up and down” on his penis with his hand, until the victim told the defendant that she could not breathe and that she wanted to go home. The defendant took the victim home. The victim “eventually” told her mother about the first incident when the defendant touched her vagina, but she did not tell her mother about the defendant forcing her to perform oral sex.
On January 30, 2009, police Officer James Fierravanti was called to the victim's home on a sexual assault complaint. Fierravanti spoke with the victim for about twenty minutes, in which time the victim told Fierravanti that the defendant had taken her to the park, asked if she had pubic hair and “attempted to look”; she did not say there was any physical contact between the defendant and herself. Fierravanti left the victim's home and immediately filed a report with the detective division. In February, 2009, police Detective Edward Foster contacted the victim at her house. The victim confirmed the information she had given to Fierravanti and added information that was not in Fierravanti's original report. The victim told Foster that the defendant had touched her vagina on the first day in the park; she also disclosed that the defendant had forced her to perform oral sex. Foster arranged for the Aetna Foundation Children's Advocacy Center (Aetna) to interview the victim. 4
On March 31, 2009, the victim spoke with clinical child interview specialist Erin Byrne. Foster observed the interview with Byrne from behind one-way glass. With the information gathered from the victim's interviews with him and Byrne, Foster obtained and then executed an arrest warrant for the defendant.
In September, 2010, the defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges and proceeded to be tried by a jury. At trial, the state called the victim, the victim's mother, Fierravanti, Foster and Byrne. The defendant called an investigative social worker from the Department of Children and Families, Kareem Muhammad, and the defendant's wife. During the victim's testimony, she stated that she had told different people about the incidents with the defendant at different times.5 Further, she testified that she could not remember how many times the defendant had kissed her.
During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Byrne to explain her procedure in interviewing a child who complains of sexual abuse. Byrne described the “nationally recognized protocol” that she uses during interviews and noted that her style of interviewing depends on the age of the child with whom she is speaking. Further, Byrne explained to the jury about “delayed disclosure,” a situation in which a child, for various reasons, does not divulge incidents of sexual abuse. At the conclusion of her examination, the prosecutor asked Byrne what recommendations she makes for children after she has interviewed them.6 Byrne responded that she would make recommendations if a child needs counseling services; she also stated that she “typically” recommends a medical examination for a child after the interview. When the prosecutor asked if she made any recommendations for the victim, Byrne answered that she recommended “counseling services as well as a medical [examination].”
In her closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the victim's testimony. After discussing the details and timing of the victim's disclosures, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider the credibility of the victim's statements.7 In discussing the victim's testimony and the victim's mother's testimony, the prosecutor stated in relevant part:
Prior to closing arguments, defense counsel had requested an instruction on the purportedly inconsistent statements in the victim's testimony.8 The court indicated that it would charge on constancy of accusation and inconsistent statements concerning the testimony of the victim's mother.9 The court refused, however, to give an instruction on inconsistent statements made by the victim; 10 it distinguished the victim's mother's statements from the victim's, noting that the victim's were “incremental” and not in the nature of what case law defines as inconsistent testimony. A jury found the defendant guilty on all counts in September, 2010.
At the sentencing hearing in November, 2010, the prosecutor described her experience with sexual assault cases and noted her belief that the defendant was “working his way up” to more serious conduct with the victim.11 The prosecutor noted that there was another pending case against the defendant with charges similar to those in the present case and described discussions the prosecutor had had with the complainant in the pending case, and with that complainant's mother. The victim's mother also spoke at the sentencing hearing. After these statements, the court stated: The defendant's attorney spoke of the defendant's many positive qualities, and the defendant's wife spoke in his favor. The court noted that it did not doubt that the defendant had affected many people in a positive way and that his sentencing was particularly difficult due to the defendant's previously “unblemished” record. In light of the record, the testimony and the gravityof the crimes of which the defendant was found guilty, the court sentenced him to serve ten years in prison on the charge of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a–70 (a)(2) (); seven years on the charge of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53–21(a)(2) (); five years on...
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State v. Angel M.
...may consider any relevant information at sentencing, so long as it exhibits some "indicium of reliability." See State v. Ruffin , 144 Conn. App. 387, 395, 71 A.3d 695 (2013) ("[t]o arrive at a just sentence, a sentencing judge may consider ... evidence of crimes for which the defendant was ......
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State v. Elias V.
...its essential character than calling a bull a cow will change its gender." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruffin , 144 Conn.App. 387, 399, 71 A.3d 695 (2013), aff'd, 316 Conn. 20, 110 A.3d 1225 (2015). Here, the challenge to the cross-examination of the defendant by the prosec......
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State v. Elmer G.
...not in the present case rely on it as a basis on which to adjudicate a claim of prosecutorial impropriety. Cf. State v. Ruffin , 144 Conn. App. 387, 399, 71 A.3d 695 (2013) ("[r]obing garden variety claims [of an evidentiary nature] in the majestic garb of constitutional claims does not mak......
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State v. Terry
...pursuant to Golding ... because they are not of constitutional magnitude." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruffin, 144 Conn.App. 387, 398–99, 71 A.3d 695 (2013), aff'd, 316 Conn. 20, 110 A.3d 1225 (2015). Accordingly, in the absence of such constitutional or fundamental fairnes......