State v. Ruffin
Decision Date | 13 February 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 1,No. 44755,44755,1 |
Citation | 286 S.W.2d 743 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ralph Strickland RUFFIN, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Charles M. Shaw, Clayton, for appellant.
John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., Donal D. Guffey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Upon trial by jury in the Circuit Court of the County of St. Louis, defendant was found guilty of second degree burglary of a building occupied by Glaser Drug Stores, a corporation. His punishment was assessed at imprisonment in the State penitentiary for a term of two years and he was accordingly so sentenced, from which he has appealed. No brief has been filed in his behalf. We therefore examine such of the assignments of error as are set forth in detail and with particularity in his motion for new trial in accordance with 42 V.A.M.S. S.Ct. Rule 27.20 and those portions of the record required by S.Ct. Rule 28.02.
At the time herein mentioned, Glaser Drug Stores owned and operated a drugstore in a building located at the northeast corner of the intersection of Hanley Road and Wydown Boulevard in the City of Clayton. The store was on the first floor and merchandise was stored in a walled-off compartment of the basement, which was reached from a stairway leading from the first floor. There was a door at the head of the stairway. A metal door, secured against opening from the outside by means of an iron bar, was situate in the brick wall separating the portion of the basement occupied by Glaser from the general basement. A door with glass panes in the upper half thereof led from the general basement to an alley on the north side of the building.
In the store proper was kept merchandise common to retail drugstores. Four cash registers were in use. A metal safe was underneath the wrapping department at the rear of the store. At the closing of the store at 11:00 p. m., on the night of July 7, 1954, a known and recorded amount of money was left in each of the cash registers and in the safe, and the above mentioned doors and the front door were locked. At approximately the hour of 4:00 a. m., on July 8, 1954, an occupant of an apartment above the store heard and felt the shock of a terrific 'pounding' that seemed to originate in the basement of the Glaser Store. After a wait of about thirty or more minutes, she called the police. Two police officers came promptly to the building, Officer Kelly going to the front door and Officer McHale to the rear. Looking through the front glass of the building, Kelly saw two colored men crouching behind the 'liquor counter', both of whom ran down the rear stairs. When McHale reached the rear basement door, he heard footsteps of more than one person running toward him from the inside, shouted 'Halt', saw an object immediately inside the door, fired two shots in that direction, and called Officer Kelly. Kelly heard shouts and two pistol shots emanating from the rear of the building and went there.
Upon entry into the basement, Kelly and McHale found a Negro man lying near the door, fatally wounded by one of the pistol shots fired by McHale. Nearby they found defendant, also a Negro man, sprawled upon the floor, uninjured. Further investigation revealed that a hole approximately 12"' by 12"' had been broken through the brick wall that separated the portion of the basement occupied by Glaser from the remaining portion thereof; the doors leading from the general basement into the walled-off compartment and into the store were broken open, and the money left in each of the cash registers was gone; the safe had been removed from its place of storage and pounded with some sort of heavy instrument until the metal surface was broken and the insulating concrete-like substance had escaped through the broken metal. No fingerprints were found. None of the money missing from the cash registers or any of the instrumentalities used in breaking the brick wall or in mauling the safe were found.
Later, during the day of July 8th, defendant made two written statements to the officers as to his participation in the matter. These statements were introduced into evidence and shown to the jury, but are not contained in the transcript. It seems clear, however, that the statements are not substantially different from his testimony at the trial.
Defendant testified: He was thirty years old. He had been convicted in 1951 of receiving the earnings of a prostitute. On the night of July 7, 1954, he was at home with his wife and children. At about four o'clock on the morning of the 8th, Clarence Jackson (the man shot and killed by Officer McHale) came to his home and 'asked me to get up and go help him lift up an object of some kind, he didn't say what the object was, he said, 'I want you to help me lift something.'' He said it was 'right downstairs'. The defendant and Clarence got into a car driven by a 'white fellow', who concealed his features from defendant. When the car arrived at the rear of the drugstore, defendant said, "You going to break into some place?' He said, 'No, I ain't going to break into no place, the door is open,' and I said, 'What's in there?' This white fellow said, 'Well, I'll be right back, Clarence, I'm going to drive around the block and I'll park here.' Well, I'm still in the dark, I don't know what's happening, I goes on in with Clarence and he takes me on upstairs there and there's the safe sitting in the middle of the floor there all beat up and battered, and he says, 'I want you to help me lift this safe,' and I took--and I said, 'No, I can't help you lift that safe,' I said, 'I want to get out of here,' so I said, 'I don't want to take no chances.' He said, 'Well, you can give me a hand with it;' I said, 'No, I'm not going to help you lift it, I don't have no gloves or anything, I ain't going to touch anything in this place, I'm going to get out of here.' And the few moments we were there debating whether I help him lift the safe or not, I started on down the stairs, and we got to the door and two shots--the first shot went off and I just fell to the floor, and I just rolled to the corner and then Clarence, he just slowly fell, he fell down beside me with his head toward my feet.' Defendant denied any knowledge as to how, when or by whom any of the above described depredations had been committed.
Burglary in the second degree may be committed by the breaking and entering of any building, the breaking and entering of which is not declared to be burglary in the first degree, in which valuable chattels are kept or deposited, with the intent to steal or commit any crime therein. Section 560.070 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. (All statutory references herein are to such statutes.) The information charges defendant with the violation of each of the aforesaid elements of said statute by 'forcibly breaking a hole in the basement wall' and by 'forcibly prying a lock off an inner basement door' of the building herein above described, thus and thereby gaining entrance into the aforesaid premises. It is in due form. State v. Tipton, 307 Mo. 500, 271 S.W. 55, 57.
The record also shows that defendant, represented by competent counsel, was duly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and was present throughout the trial and the after-trial proceedings; that the verdict finding defendant guilty of burglary in the second degree, as charged in the information, and assessing his punishment at imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for a term of two years is in proper form and within the punishment prescribed for burglary in the second degree by Sec. 560.095; that defendant was granted allocution, and that thereafter judgment in due form was rendered and sentence pronounced upon him, in conformity with S.Ct. Rules 27.08 and 27.09.
Several of defendant's assignments of error are based upon his contention that there is no evidence whereby he can be found guilty of the burglary of said building by forcibly breaking a hole in the basement wall and by forcibly prying a lock off of an inner basement door and thereby gaining an entrance therein, as charged in the information. The law is well settled that a person who conspires with another to commit a burglary may be convicted of such burglary as...
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