State v. Ruiz
| Decision Date | 20 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 15292,15292 |
| Citation | 1995 NMCA 7,892 P.2d 962,119 N.M. 515 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick RUIZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Defendant appeals his conviction for first degree child abuse (resulting in death) of his child Patrick. Defendant raises issues concerning (1) the consolidation of the child abuse charge with charges for bribery of a witness; (2) the admission of evidence of other bad acts, specifically the events surrounding the bribery and other acts of Defendant directed toward family members; (3) the exclusion of testimony of another child regarding the events occurring on the day Patrick died; (4) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (5) cumulative error. We affirm.
Defendant was at home with Patrick, who was his son by a previous marriage; Paul Corona, who is the son of Defendant's then current wife, Della, by her previous marriage; and Devonne Ruiz, who is Defendant and Della's child by their current marriage. According to Defendant, Patrick was playing outside and had fallen. When Patrick came in from outside, he had a little blood on his lip. Defendant wiped off the blood, gave Patrick some water, and put him to bed. When Defendant checked on Patrick a few minutes later, his lips were blue and he was cold. Defendant then took Patrick to the hospital. On the way to the hospital, Defendant flagged down paramedics. Notwithstanding the efforts of the paramedics and others who arrived at the scene, Patrick was unable to be revived and was later pronounced dead.
Several experts testified that Patrick's injuries were inconsistent with an accidental fall and were consistent with child abuse. A defense expert testified to the contrary--that Patrick's injuries were consistent with having fallen or with efforts at resuscitation and inconsistent with child abuse. According to the paramedics, Defendant was standing by his vehicle with his arms crossed during their attempt to revive Patrick; Defendant provided them with information only in response to direct questions.
Based on the events on the day Patrick died, Defendant was charged with child abuse by torturing, confining, or punishing (NMSA 1978, Sec. 30-6-1(C)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1994)) and, in the alternative, child abuse by permitting Patrick to be in a dangerous situation (Sec. 30-6-1(C)(1)). He was also charged with two counts of child abandonment for leaving Paul and Devonne alone when he took Patrick to the hospital. The district court directed a verdict on these two charges.
Prior to trial on the child abuse and abandonment charges, Defendant and his wife, Della, were in the office of Defendant's attorney. According to Della's first statement, she was in an inner office with the attorney talking about Defendant's past abuse of other children when Defendant, who had been listening at the door, barged in with fists raised, calling Della a liar. When this incident was investigated, it turned out that Defendant had several times earlier threatened Della that he would kill her or that she should "watch it" if she testified against him in this child abuse case. Della separated from Defendant because of the physical abuse Defendant inflicted on her surrounding his threats that she not testify against him.
Based on the events prior to the event in the attorney's office and the event in the attorney's office, Defendant was charged with two counts of bribery of a witness by intimidation or threats. The State moved to consolidate the charges, arguing that the evidence of the threats and intimidation would be admissible in any event in the child abuse case. Over Defendant's objection, the district court ordered consolidation.
During trial, the district court admitted evidence of not only (a) the threats and intimidation but also (b) the evidence Defendant was attempting to suppress by threatening Della--his prior acts of violence or abuse toward children--and (c) evidence of Defendant's prior battering of Della. The jury found Defendant guilty of the alternative count of child abuse, that involving placing the child in a dangerous situation, but the jury was unable to agree on a verdict on the main count of child abuse or the two counts of bribery of a witness.
We first address the issue of consolidation and, in doing so, we rely on the showing presented to the district court at the time that it ruled on the issue. When the district court ruled on the issue, the showing was that the threats and intimidation related to Defendant's attempt to intimidate Della from testifying about Defendant's behavior with other children. Defendant contends that the charges should not have been consolidated into one trial because he was prejudiced in his defense of the child abuse charges by the evidence relating to the bribery. Defendant relies on State v. Gallegos, 109 N.M. 55, 64, 781 P.2d 783, 792 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 771, 779 P.2d 549 (1989), for the proposition that severance should be ordered when prejudicial testimony, inadmissible in a separate trial, is admitted in the joint trial. We thus determine whether the evidence of the bribery would have been admissible in a trial of the child abuse charges alone.
We hold that the evidence of the threats and physical intimidation that were related to Defendant's attempt to dissuade Della from testifying was admissible. In State v. Altgilbers, 109 N.M. 453, 471, 786 P.2d 680, 698 (Ct.App.1989), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 419, 785 P.2d 1038 (1990), we held that one reason a defendant's acts of violence toward family members were admissible was that one could infer that the defendant's acts were attempts to dissuade the family from reporting his offenses. The reason for our holding was that attempts to suppress evidence are admissible to prove intent. Id. This holding is nothing more than a specific application of the rule that evidence showing consciousness of guilt is admissible. See State v. Trujillo, 95 N.M. 535, 541, 624 P.2d 44, 50 (1981) (); State v. Kenny, 112 N.M. 642, 646, 818 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct.App.) (evidence of flight is admissible even if ambiguous, and prejudice does not outweigh probative value even if defendant has other explanation for flight), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 499, 816 P.2d 1121 (1991).
In evaluating this issue, we are cognizant of the fact that the trial evidence was not entirely clear as to the reason for Defendant's outburst in his attorney's office. We acknowledge that Della testified that the outburst, including striking her, was based not on her conversation with the attorney but rather on a conversation Defendant overheard at the reception area during which Della was talking about a new boyfriend. However, there was also evidence that, during the trial, Della was being intimidated by members of Defendant's family.
The district court recognized that the evidence of other bad acts included (a) the battering of Della that formed the basis of the charges of bribery, (b) battering and other abuse of Paul Corona about which Defendant did not want Della to testify, and (c) battering of Della that occurred prior to Patrick's death. The district court expressly ruled that the bribery of Della was directly relevant in the child abuse case. The battery and other abuse of Paul appeared to be considered relevant to provide context for the bribery charges and also probative in its own right on the child abuse charge. The earlier batteries on Della were considered relevant to the bribery charge, specifically as to whether Della believed that Defendant would carry out the threats and thus was capable of being bribed, and were also relevant to Della's credibility and her willingness to testify. In accordance with SCRA 1986, 14-5028 (Recomp.1986) and its trial rulings on the admission of the other-bad-acts evidence, the district court instructed the jury that
We had occasion to rule on the admissibility of evidence of other bad acts in a child abuse case in State v. Aguayo, 114 N.M. 124, 835 P.2d 840 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 744, 832 P.2d 1223 (1992). Recognizing the large potential for prejudice of other bad acts in that type of case, we held that district courts must be careful in admitting such evidence, must admit it only to prove some permissible factor under SCRA 1986, 11-404(B) (Repl.1994) other than propensity, and then must balance the probative value against the potential for prejudice. Aguayo, 114 N.M. at 128-32, 835 P.2d at 844-48. In an earlier case, State v. Hogervorst, 90 N.M. 580, 588, 566 P.2d 828, 836 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977), we pointed out that the fact that evidence is prejudicial is not grounds for excluding it; exclusion is required only when the danger of "unfair" prejudice, see SCRA 1986, 11-403 (Repl.1994), outweighs the legitimate prejudice that is otherwise known as probative value. We recently applied this principle in State v. Jordan, 116 N.M. 76, 80, 860 P.2d 206, 210 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 795, 858 P.2d 1274 (1993). The teaching of these cases is that the prejudice is unfair when the tendered evidence goes only to character or propensity. However, when the tendered evidence serves a legitimate purpose other than character or propensity, then that...
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