State v. Ruiz-Vidal
| Decision Date | 22 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-4708-18T1 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JULIO R. RUIZ-VIDAL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Alvarez and Sumners.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 02-06-0095.
Mitchell E. Ignatoff, attorney for appellant.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Sarah D. Brigham, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
Defendant Julio R. Ruiz-Vidal's post-conviction relief (PCR) petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel was denied in part and granted in part without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant contends the PCR court erred in finding that his petition was time- and procedurally barred. He asserted he was denied an opportunity to seek admission into the pretrial intervention program (PTI) because counsel failed to: move for dismissal of second-degree charges against him that would have made it easier to gain entry into PTI; advise him he could apply to PTI despite the prosecutor's refusal to consent to his admission; and advise him he could appeal the prosecutor's refusal. We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
In late 2000, Detective Stephen Jones, New Jersey State Police, and Special State Investigator Mario Estrada, New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety Division of Criminal Justice, began an investigation into reports by the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) that there were criminal operations engaged in the illegal acquisition of driver's licenses at DMV agencies throughout the state, including the Edison Tano Mall DMV agency. A confidential informant advised them that "brokers" were obtaining driver's licenses for non-citizens without proper documentation. In exchange for money,a broker would take individuals through the licensing process at a DMV facility, where an agency employee working with the broker would illegally provide them state-issued driver's licenses.
In early February 2001, three men, including defendant, went to Karla Andree-Quesada's home. They each paid Andree-Quesada, the broker, $1700 and were told to return with any identification documents they had. When they returned several days later, defendant brought his Guatemalan passport and driver's license, and an identification card that he obtained in California when he first arrived in the United States. Andree-Quesada then gave the men answers to the written driver's test. Rafael Cordero, Andree-Quesada's housemate, drove the men to the Edison Tano Mall DMV agency, which was under surveillance.
Once at the agency, Cordero directed the men to a counter to take the written driver's test. Defendant showed DMV clerk Raymond Hagenson his documents and took the test. Hagenson, who was involved in the scheme and admitted to being paid between $50 and $100 for hundreds of similar transactions, then told defendant to sign a driver's permit. After defendant and the other men obtained the illegal driver's permits, Cordero drove them back to Andree-Quesada's house. The plan was for Andree-Quesada to collect and safeguard their driver's permits until the next steps could be taken to process thepermits into driver's licenses. However, they never got to Andree-Quesada's house because they were stopped by police and arrested.
Defendant, a Guatemalan national, waived his rights to remain silent and to an attorney and confessed to paying $1700 to obtain a driver's license without having the proper documentation. Defendant did not indicate he was involved in Andree-Quesada's operations outside of going to her to get a license. Fourteen months later, defendant and five co-defendants were indicted for second-degree conspiracy, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; second-degree bribery, N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(c) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6; second-degree official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6; third-degree forgery, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-1(a)(2)-(3), and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6; fourth-degree falsifying records N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6; and third-degree tampering with public records, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-7(a)(1)-(2) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6.
Defendant failed to appear for a pre-arraignment conference on August 2, 2002, resulting in the issuance of a bench warrant for his arrest. He was arrested in Illinois almost two-and-half years later on March 8, 2005 and was extradited to New Jersey.
On May 6, 2005, defendant reached an agreement with the State and pled guilty to third-degree tampering with public records or information. During hisplea colloquy, defendant stated he paid someone to obtain a driver's license and presented false information to obtain the license. He gave no indication that he was aware of Hagenson's involvement with Andree-Quesada or Cordero or had any knowledge or connection with the scheme other than learning he could get a license from Andree-Quesada. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts against defendant and to recommend a non-custodial sentence of probation with time-served (sixty-seven days). In addition, the State agreed to release defendant on his own recognizance pending sentencing but reserved the right to ask the court to impose any lawful sentence if he failed to appear for sentencing.
On July 22, 2005, in accordance the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to time-served and two years of probation conditioned on maintaining employment and paying the mandatory fines. The sentencing court also ordered defendant to notify Immigration and Naturalization Services1 of his conviction. Defendant did not file a direct appeal.
Almost eleven years later, on May 18, 2016, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his plea's factual basis was inadequate.The motion was denied.2 Defendant renewed the motion about ten months later, on March 7, 2017, again alleging he provided an inadequate factual basis for his plea. This motion was also denied.3 Defendant appealed the denial but withdrew it five months later.
Continuing to seek relief from his conviction, defendant filed a PCR petition on January 23, 2019, alleging trial counsel was ineffective for not advising him of his rights pertaining to PTI. Defendant asserted that within a year of filing his petition he learned he had the right to apply to PTI and to appeal the prosecutor's refusal of his counsel's request to consent to his admission into PTI. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 to -22; R. 3:28. To support his claim, defendant submitted his trial counsel's certification stating that the prosecutor denied counsel's request to allow defendant's admission into PTI and that he did not tell defendant of the refusal or that defendant had a right to appeal the refusal. Defendant also asserted the requirement that he notify ICE of his conviction was contrary to public policy.
Defendant later amended his petition, adding the claim that counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the second-degree conspiracy chargesagainst him on the basis that he was not a party to or engaged in Andree-Quesada's scheme to obtain illegal driver's licenses for undocumented individuals. He argued that if the charges were dismissed, he would not have had to show a compelling reason—a requirement for a defendant charged with a second-degree offense—to be admitted into PTI.
In a May 15, 2019 order, the PCR court ruled that defendant's judgment of conviction be amended to remove the ICE notification requirement,4 but denied the rest of his claims without an evidentiary hearing. The court's reasoning was set forth in a written opinion, which we detail below.
When petitioning for PCR, the defendant must establish, "by a preponderance of the credible evidence," entitlement to the requested relief. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). To sustain that burden, the defendant must allege and articulate specific facts that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).
A PCR claim is not a substitute for a direct appeal, id. at 583, and must hurdle some time and procedural bars. A PCR petition must be filed within five years after the entry of the judgment of conviction. R. 3:22-12(a)(1). A defendant seeking relief from the time bar under the rule must show "excusable neglect" and that a "fundamental injustice" will result. R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A). To relax the five-year time bar, there must be a showing of "compelling, extenuating circumstances," State v. Milne, 178 N.J. 486, 492 (2004) (quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 52 (1997)) , or alternatively, "exceptional circumstances," State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 594 (2002) (quoting Afanador, 151 N.J. at 52).
The mere raising of a PCR claim does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing as the defendant "must do more than make bald assertions that" ineffective assistance counsel was provided. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). The PCR court should grant an evidentiary hearing and determine the merits of the claim only if...
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