State v. Runck

Citation418 N.W.2d 262
Decision Date29 December 1987
Docket NumberCr. N
PartiesSTATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Clayton RUNCK, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. o. 1203.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Dakota

James F. Twomey, Asst. States Attorney, Fargo, for plaintiff and appellee; argued by James F. Twomey.

Warren C. Sogard, Fargo, for defendant and appellant; argued by Warren C. Sogard.

ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.

Defendant, Clayton Runck, Jr., appeals from a district court order denying his motion for dismissal of the criminal charges against him. On appeal and in his motion for dismissal, Runck contends his motion should have been granted because the State denied him a speedy trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Rule 48(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the order of the trial court.

By criminal complaint dated March 12, 1985, Clayton Runck, Jr., Clinton Kopp, and Terry Kopp were charged with conspiracy to commit arson and accomplice to arson. 1 Runck was ultimately found guilty of both counts in a separate trial on August 15, 1986. He was sentenced to serve eight years in the State Penitentiary on November 10, 1986. On June 26, 1986, the trial court heard a post-conviction motion filed by Runck which claimed denial of a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

As time is a crucial element in any claim based on denial of speedy trial, we shall examine the seventeen-month delay between the criminal complaint and trial, and the causes thereof. Following the complaints in March of 1985, all three of the defendants were bound over to district court on April 24, 1985. All defendants appeared for arraignment on May 14, 1985, before Lawrence A. Leclerc, Judge of the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. On May 30, 1985, the State demanded a change of judge. Judge Michael O. McGuire was appointed on June 5, 1985, but he recused himself. Presiding District Judge Norman J. Backes was then designated to preside in the case. Runck later demanded a change of judge on July 12, 1985. Pursuant to Runck's request, we appointed, on July 22, 1985, District Judge Robert L. Eckert of the Southeast Judicial District to hear the charges against Runck.

Defendant Runck pled not guilty to both counts of the information. Judge Leclerc had previously set June 3, 1985, as a deadline for pre-trial motions. On June 12, 1985, Runck filed a demand for speedy trial with the district court.

At the initial stage of the proceedings Runck was represented by Brian C. Southwell of Minneapolis, Minnesota. At a hearing on September 20, 1985, the court learned that Mr. Southwell's license would be suspended and therefore Runck would need another attorney to go forward with his defense. The court ordered Runck to employ another attorney and continued the motion hearing until October 10, 1985, by which time Runck had retained Benjamin S. Houge, also of Minneapolis, Minnesota.

At the October 10, 1985, hearing, attorney Houge demanded a change of venue. On November 6, 1985, the trial court granted the motion for a change of venue along with co-defendant Terry Kopp's motion for severance of her case. The next day, November 7, 1985, the trial court set Runck's trial for January 3, 1986.

At a December 30, 1985, hearing the parties presented a plea agreement to the court. The agreement provided in part:

"I) The Defendant will enter a plea of guilty to the charge of Conspiracy to Commit Arson as charged in count one of the Criminal Information.

* * *

* * *

"IV) The Defendant shall testify truthfully in any statement, hearing, or trial when such testimony is required by the State of North Dakota as to his involvement and any other person's involvement in the fire that destroyed the Clinton and Terry Kopp residence located in Pleasant View Township, Cass County, North Dakota, on April 17, 1983 and which is the subject of Count One and Count Two of the Criminal Information in this case.

"V) That sentencing of the Defendant Clayton Runck, Jr. shall be delayed by the Court until such times as the pending trials against the co-defendants Clinton Kopp and Terry Kopp which have been scheduled for trial have been disposed of before the Court."

The trial court did not expressly reject or accept the plea agreement at the hearing of December 30, 1985. The court in essence conditioned acceptance of the plea agreement signed by Runck and his attorney, as well as an assistant states attorney, upon Runck's truthful testimony at the trial of Terry Kopp. 2

During the trial of co-defendant, Terry Kopp, on March 3, 1986, the State called defendant Runck to testify. Runck refused to testify, asserting the right against self-incrimination under the United States and North Dakota Constitutions. The State moved for rejection of the plea agreement, citing Runck's refusal to testify as an express violation of paragraph "IV" of the plea agreement. The court rejected the plea agreement on July 9, 1986, and scheduled Runck's trial for August 12, 1986.

The parties disagree about the effect of the plea agreement on Runck's claim for a speedy trial. The State contends Runck waived his right to a speedy trial by entering a voluntary plea of guilty. Runck contends the agreement did not constitute a waiver because the trial court declined to accept or reject the plea agreement.

Runck concedes that he is not free from blame for the delay between May and December of 1985, but contends the State is responsible for the delay from the beginning of January up to his motion for dismissal on June 26, 1986. The basis of Runck's contention is that the trial court failed to accept or reject Runck's plea agreement during the December 30, 1985, plea agreement hearing, leaving Runck "in the 'twilight zone' while the Court took up the other defendants." 3 The trial court apparently conditioned acceptance of the plea agreement on Runck's truthful testimony at any trial of any person's involvement in the fire that destroyed the Clinton and Terry Kopp residence. By preconditioning acceptance, the trial court may have unintentionally deprived Runck of the certainty a plea agreement is expected to provide.

We acknowledge Runck's possible dilemma, but find that it is one he created and perpetuated. Runck contends he was not clear about the status of his plea agreement after the December 1985 hearing, yet, he did not clearly signal by motion or otherwise attempt to clarify the status until June 26, 1986. Runck now contends the trial court should have unequivocally accepted or rejected the plea agreement and delayed sentencing until the pre-sentence investigation was submitted. Runck's contention ignores the flexibility that Rule 11(d)(2), N.D.R.Crim.P., is intended to afford trial courts.

Rule 11(d)(2) provides in part: "[T]he [trial] court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to acceptance or rejection until receipt of a presentence report." The decision to accept, reject, or defer pending receipt and consideration of a presentence report is within the trial court's discretion. See Explanatory Note, Rule 11(d)(2), N.D.R.Crim.P. The fact that an additional condition upon acceptance of the plea bargain was imposed in this case, likely because the plea bargain itself contained a provision that the sentencing should be delayed pending Runck's truthful testimony, should not be the basis for dismissal of the charge and convictions in this case.

The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I of Section 12 of the North Dakota Constitution. 4 We have also recognized that the trial court may dismiss pursuant to Rule 48(b), N.D.R.Crim.P., "whenever there has been unnecessary delay without being required to decide whether the unnecessary delay was of such a nature as to deprive the defendant of a constitutional right." State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854, 859 (N.D.1976); See also State v. Wunderlich, 338 N.W.2d 658, 660 (N.D.1983). Rule 48(b) recognizes the trial court's inherent authority to dismiss for lack of timely prosecution. See Explanatory Note, Rule 48, N.D.R.Crim.P. Although Rule 48(b) is separate from the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the factors considered by the trial court in granting relief pursuant to Rule 48(b) parallel speedy trial factors under the United States Constitution. See State v. Presbuch, 366 N.W.2d 794, 795 (N.D.1985).

The United States Supreme Court delineated four factors that are relevant in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). These four factors are: length of delay; reason for delay; defendant's assertion of the right; and actual prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-33, 92 S.Ct. at 2192-93; State v. Erickson, supra, at 860. No single factor is controlling. Further, the court must consider all the factors in a "difficult and sensitive balancing process." State v. Wunderlich, 338 N.W.2d 658, 660 citing Barker, supra; Erickson, supra.

Applying these factors to the proceedings leading up to Runck's trial, we find that Runck was not deprived of a speedy trial under Rule 48(b) or the United States Constitution. While the length of delay (approximately seventeen months between criminal complaint and jury trial) is significant in the instant case, most of the delay is attributable to Runck's own actions or to actions in which he acquiesced.

The first attorney whom Runck selected was forced to withdraw after disclosing to the court that his license to practice law was subject to imminent suspension. 5 Furthermore the second attorney whom Runck selected was not licensed in North Dakota. The delays occasioned by the changes in representation must be attributed to Runck.

The record also...

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9 cases
  • State v. Ochoa, No. 20030132
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • 25 février 2004
    ...showing the changes are reasonably attributable to him. New counsel requests are relevant to a speedy trial claim. See State v. Runck, 418 N.W.2d 262, 265-66 (N.D. 1987). Although the appointments were not necessarily requested by Ochoa, there is reason to believe Ochoa's actions contribute......
  • Runck v. State, 910259
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • 23 février 1993
    ...Runck was returned to the federal correctional institution at Oxford on October 27, 1986. We affirmed his convictions in State v. Runck, 418 N.W.2d 262 (N.D.1987). Runck thereafter sought post-conviction relief, asserting several alleged violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers A......
  • State v. Connery, Cr. N
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • 6 juin 1989
    ...N.W.2d 143, 145 (N.D.1987). The evaluation process requires balancing and weighing, and no single factor is controlling. State v. Runck, 418 N.W.2d 262, 265 (N.D.1987). The criminal complaint against Connery was filed on December 18, 1987. He was served with the arrest warrant on February 3......
  • State v. Hamre, 20180055
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • 18 mars 2019
    ...explains that it is a codification of the inherent power of the court to dismiss a case for want of prosecution. See State v. Runck , 418 N.W.2d 262, 265 (N.D. 1987).[¶13] We have also recognized that under federal law, "a defendant’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial was......
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