State v. Ruppert, No. 77-1022
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
| Writing for the Court | Also, prior to trial; SWEENEY; C. WILLIAM O'NEILL; CELEBREZZE; STEPHENSON, Judge, of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for WILLIAM B. BROWN |
| Citation | 375 N.E.2d 1250,54 Ohio St.2d 263 |
| Parties | , 8 O.O.3d 232 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. RUPPERT, Appellee and Cross-Appellant. |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1022 |
| Decision Date | 17 May 1978 |
Page 263
v.
RUPPERT, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where an accused, charged with a capital offense, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to a trial by jury pursuant to R.C. 2945.05 and Crim.R. 23(A), and is subsequently tried before a three-judge panel, the panel may render a verdict upon a majority vote of its members pursuant to R.C. 2945.06.
2. An accused, charged with a capital offense, has not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a trial by jury where, prior to waiving this right, he is misinformed that the three-judge panel may render a verdict pursuant to R.C. 2945.06 only by unanimous vote.
James U. Ruppert, (defendant herein), was indicted by the Butler County grand jury on March 30, 1975, in 11 counts for purposely, and with prior calculation and design, causing the deaths of Charity Ruppert, Teresa Lee Ruppert, Carol Diane Ruppert, Michael James Ruppert, David Scott Ruppert, John Anthony Ruppert, Alma Ruppert, Ann Delores Ruppert, Leonard Ruppert, Jr., Leonard Ruppert, III, and Thomas Frank Ruppert, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), with the specification to each count that the offense was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of two or more persons contrary to R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).
Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to each of the counts and specifications.
Page 264
On May 13, 1975, the trial court determined that defendant was sane and of sufficient soundness of mind to stand trial.Accompanied by his co-counsel, Hugh Holbrock and H. J. Bressler, defendant waived his right to a jury trial in open court on June 6, 1975.
Trial commenced before a three-judge panel on June 16, 1975, and on July 3, 1975, a majority of the court found defendant guilty of each of the 11 counts of aggravated murder and specifications. The majority found further that defendant was sane at the time he committed the offense.
Unable to unanimously find that none of the mitigating circumstances set forth in R.C. 2929.04(B) was established by a preponderance of the evidence at the mitigation hearing, the court sentenced defendant [375 N.E.2d 1252] to life imprisonment for each of the 11 counts, the sentences to run consecutively.
Defendant subsequently filed a motion for new trial, later amended, in which he contended, in part, that because he was misinformed about the number of judges necessary to render a verdict on a three-judge panel, his waiver of a jury trial was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made. In the alternative, defendant contended that he was denied a fair trial since the verdict was reached by a majority vote of the panel rather than by a unanimous vote.
On July 22, 1975, the three-judge panel conducted a hearing on defendant's motion for new trial based on the testimony and affidavits of James U. Ruppert and defense attorney Hugh D. Holbrock, and on the submitted affidavits of Judge Cramer (the judge who originally accepted appellee's jury waiver and who also sat on the three-judge panel which tried the cause), prosecutor John F. Holcomb, and defense attorney H. J. Bressler. The testimony and affidavits reflect that prior to the date of the trial, defense counsel informed their client that if his case were tried to a three-judge panel, a unanimous verdict would be required to find him guilty as charged.
Page 265
Also, prior to trial, Judge Cramer indicated to the defense counsel that he agreed with this interpretation of the law.
When, on June 6, 1975, Ruppert appeared in open court before Judge Cramer to waive his right to trial by jury, the following colloquy took place between Ruppert and the judge:
"Q. (J. Cramer) Now, you understand that when you are tried by a jury which you are waiving, before you can be found guilty or not guilty of any one or all of the 11 counts, all 12 of the jurors must agree?
"A. (Ruppert) Yes, sir.
"Q. But where three judges hear the case as you have consented and asked to be done, just all three have to agree?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. You understand that?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. You also understand, do you, that if you have a jury that before they can find in accordance with your defense that you were sane or insane at the time of the alleged commission of said offenses, all 12 of the jurors must agree. However, if three judges hear your case as you have requested to be done before the three judges can find that you were sane or insane at the time of the alleged commission of the offenses, all three must agree on that?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. I'm pointing this out to you, the difference between when the jury hears a case and three judges.
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And you wish to without any question, to waive your trial by jury is that right?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Is there anything you want to ask the Court in reference to this? Anything you don't understand about the jury waiver?
"A. No, sir."
On June 16, 1975, immediately prior to commencement of the trial before the three-judge panel, a conference
Page 266
took place among all the counsel and judges participating in the cause. The subject of the three-judge panel and the number of judges necessary to render a verdict was discussed. Although there was disagreement among the members of the conference concerning the matter, a decision as to the proper rule of law was not made at that time. Apparently, Ruppert was never told that there were serious questions concerning the number of votes necessary to convict under a three-judge panel. *[375 N.E.2d 1253] After hearing the testimony and reviewing the affidavits and evidence of record concerning the events surrounding the jury waiver, a majority of the trial court overruled defendant's motion for new trial on the basis that he must have decided to waive a jury trial not only because of his reliance on information furnished by defense counsel and the court concerning the unanimity of
Page 267
the three-judge panel in rendering a guilty verdict, but also because of several other important tactical considerations. The majority reasoned, inter alia, that defendant must have been informed by his counsel that in the sentencing stage of an aggravated murder trial tried by a three-judge panel a sentence of death requires the unanimity of three judges as compared with the decision of one judge in a jury trial.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and sentence of the trial court and remanded the cause for a new trial on the basis that defendant could not have knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial where he was misinformed about the number of judges necessary...
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...waiving his right to jury trial. We disagree.A jury waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. State v.Page 10Ruppert (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 263, 271, 375 N.E.2d 1250, 1255.R.C. 2945.05 provides:"In all criminal cases pending in courts of record in this state, the defendant may......
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...misinformed and consequently his plea was not intelligent, voluntary, and knowing. Baston cites in support State v. Ruppert (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 263, 8 O.O.3d 232, 375 N.E.2d 1250 (jury waiver held inadequate because the appellant was told that the three-judge Page 422 panel's verdict had ......
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Smith v. Anderson, No. C-1-95-320.
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Smith v. Anderson, No. C-1-95-320.
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