State v. Rutledge
Decision Date | 11 August 1999 |
Citation | 986 P.2d 99,162 Or. App. 301 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Tracy Dale RUTLEDGE, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
David C. Degner, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was David Groom, Public Defender.
Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before EDMONDS, Presiding Judge, and DEITS, Chief Judge, and ARMSTRONG, Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a controlled substance. ORS 475.992(4)(b) (1995). He assigns error to the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of controlled substances seized from a container found in the vehicle that he was driving at the time of his arrest. We affirm.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, Officers Shaw and Van Blokland testified about the circumstances leading up to and including defendant's arrest. Defendant drove out of a motel parking lot onto a street without stopping as required by ORS 811.505. The officers stopped defendant and asked him to produce his driver's license, registration and insurance.1 When defendant did not comply with the request, the officers arrested him for failure to present a license. ORS 807.570. After handcuffing defendant, the officers conducted an inventory of the vehicle's contents preparatory to towing the vehicle.2
During the inventory process, Shaw found what appeared to him to be "a black leather coin purse between the front passenger seat and the center console." He showed the container to a passenger who had been in the vehicle and asked if it belonged to her. She denied ownership of it and said that she did not know to whom it belonged. Shaw "felt what [he] believed to be a wallet inside" the container. He opened the container, "looking for identification and found a black pocket scale." In addition, he found a plastic bag that held several small unused plastic bindles, a plastic bindle containing a substance later determined to be methamphetamine, a pink plastic straw, and razor blades. Shaw also opened the pocket scale and found three more full bindles.
Shaw advised defendant of his Miranda rights and asked him about the "coin purse." Shaw testified that defendant said When asked about the contents that Shaw had discovered in the container, defendant said that they were not his and that he did not think his passenger had placed them in the container. The discovery of the contents of the container led to the prosecution from which this appeal arises.
Defendant assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the section of the Portland City Code (PCC) authorizing inventories of towed vehicles did not provide authorization for Shaw to open the closed container under the circumstances.3 The state responds that defendant failed to preserve that argument in the trial court because there he argued only that the state constitution prohibited the opening of the container.4 An inventory may be conducted of possessions, including the opening of a wallet or a purse, without violating Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, if it is made pursuant to "a properly authorized administrative program, designed and systematically administered so that the inventory involves no exercise of discretion." State v. Atkinson, 298 Or. 1, 8-10, 688 P.2d 832 (1984). If the inventory here was constitutionally sufficient, then it is also sufficient under the ordinance unless the ordinance imposes additional requirements. Defendant does not contend that the ordinance contains requirements in addition to the constitutional requirements. In fact, the ordinance contains requirements similar to the inventory procedure that we considered and upheld in State v. Mundt/Fincher, 98 Or.App. 407, 412, 780 P.2d 234, rev. den. 308 Or. 660, 784 P.2d 1102 (1989). We conclude that by challenging the validity of the inventory under Article 1, section 9, below, defendant preserved his argument on appeal that the ordinance does not authorize the inventory.
PCC 14.10.030 provides, in part:
PCC 14.10.040(C)(3) provides, in part:
Thus, under the language of PCC 14.10.030(C)(3) and PCC 14.10.040(C)(3)(c), the officers were authorized to open the container if the container was "designed for carrying money and/or small valuables on or about the person," even though it was found between the seat and the console.
The physical characteristics of a container and the circumstances under which a container is found constitute historical facts for purposes of appellate review. See Mundt/Fincher, 98 Or. at 415, 194 P. 178. Historical facts, as found by a trial court, are binding on review if there is evidence in the record to support them. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 487, 443 P.2d 621 (1968). If findings are not made on all such issues, and there is evidence from which such facts could be decided in more than one way, we will presume that the facts were decided in a manner consistent with the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. Id. Whether the facts support a determination that the officers' inventory was conducted pursuant to the ordinance and ultimately satisfy the constitutional requirements for a warrantless search is a question of law. Id.
At the hearing, only Shaw testified about the physical characteristics of the container. He said that the container was "[a]pproximately five inches long, four inches high, made of soft leather and a zipper top." While holding the container, he described it in the following manner:
After defense counsel requested that Shaw look at the upper-left hand corner of the container, Shaw acknowledged that the word "Norelco" appeared on the container. Then, the trial court looked at the container and said:
The trial court indicated that the word "Norelco" was so small that a magnifying glass would be helpful in reading it.
After the evidentiary portion of the hearing was completed, the trial court ruled that "even though [the container] may not have been specifically designed to be a coin purse," a reasonable officer looking at it "could make the determination that it was likely to contain money or valuables." On appeal, defendant argues:
"To affirm the trial court in the present case this court would have to find that the shaving kit searched in this case was `specifically designed to carry money or small valuables' when the evidence is clear that the container was specifically designed to carry an electric razor."
Defendant's argument proves too much. The word "design" can mean to "have in mind as a purpose," as well as "to create." Webster's...
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...(1998), we held that the Gresham policy authorized the opening and inventorying of the contents of a fanny pack. In State v. Rutledge, 162 Or. App. 301, 986 P.2d 99 (1999), we held that the Portland policy authorized the opening and inventorying of the contents of a container that appeared ......
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...far the more difficult issue in this case concerns the red purse accessory. The standard of review is set out in State v. Rutledge, 162 Or.App. 301, 305-06, 986 P.2d 99 (1999): "The physical characteristics of a container and the circumstances under which a container is found constitute his......
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State v. Connally
...the court had reached a different result under Washington County's virtually identical inventory policy. Compare State v. Rutledge, 162 Or.App. 301, 986 P.2d 99 (1999) (holding that officers could open small leather container found next to driver's seat), with State v. Ray, 179 Or.App. 397,......
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State v. Tschantre
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