State v. Rutledge

• Decision Date: 31 December 1957
• Docket Number: No. 17373,17373
• Citation: 232 S.C. 223,101 S.E.2d 289
• Parties: , 67 A.L.R.2d 747 The STATE, Respondent, v. Harold RUTLEDGE, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 289

101 S.E.2d 289

232 S.C. 223, 67 A.L.R.2d 747

The STATE, Respondent, v. Harold RUTLEDGE, Appellant.

No. 17373.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 31, 1957.

George L. Grantham, Easley, Price & Poag, Greenville, for appellant.

James R. Mann, Sol., Greenville, for respondent.

OXNER, Justice.

Three indictments were returned against appellant. In one he was charged with receiving on August 7, 1955, cigarettes stolen from the Edewald Grocery Store, knowing the same to have been stolen. In another he was charged with receiving on August 8, 1955, cigarettes stolen from Charlie Gibbs Store, knowing the same to have been stolen. The remaining indictment contained two counts. In the first count appellant was charged with conspiring with William Hoyt Mathis, Bobby Joe Masters and Mike Horton, on August 22, 1955, to commit the crime of larceny, and in the second count with receiving cigarettes and money stolen from the store of George H. Senn by Mathis, Masters and Horton, knowing the same to have been stolen. By agreement, the three cases were tried together. A motion by counsel for appellant for a directed verdict was refused. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three indictments and found that the value of the property in each of the two indictments first above mentioned was less than $20. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years on the indictment charging conspiracy and receiving stolen goods and was sentenced to serve thirty days or pay a fine of $100 on each of the other cases, the sentences to run concurrently.

At the time of the trial appellant was engaged in the business of operating two cafes in Pickens County, one a drive-in near the town of Pickens and the other in the town of Central. He also formerly operated a cafe at Brevard, North Carolina. To support a conviction on each indictment, the State relied largely, if not altogether, on the testimony of Mathis, Masters and Horton. It appears from their testimony that shortly after Mathis, who was then about 24 years of age, lost his job at Brevard, North Carolina, and was greatly in need of money, he was told by appellant whom he had known for some time that he (appellant) could 'handle some cigarettes and canned meats.' Mathis replied that he 'didn't want to fool with it' as he had been in trouble before. A few days later he was again approached by appellant and told that he would be given a good price for some cigarettes and meat. Shortly thereafter Mathis ran across Horton, then about 18 years of age, and the two of them broke into a store in North Carolina and stole cigarettes and other property. Later they induced Masters, a 17 year old boy, to join them. These three broke into numerous stores, some located in North Carolina and others in South Carolina. On at least four different occasions the stolen property was brought to appellant who bought same at a price considerably less than the wholesale market.

The testimony fully sustains the conspiracy charge and also clearly justifies the inference that appellant knew he was receiving stolen property.

The first question raised is that a conviction cannot stand upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Such is not the law in South Carolina. The weight to be given the testimony of an accomplice is for the fact finding body and if his uncorroborated evidence satisfies the jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a conviction is warranted. State v. Green, 48 S.C. 136, 26 S.E. 234; State v. Sowell, 85 S.C. 278, 67 S.E. 316; State v. Whaley, 113 S.C. 103, 101 S.E. 568; State v. Johnson, 156 S.C. 63, 152 S.E. 825; State v. Fleming, 228 S.C. 129, 89 S.E.2d 104.

The next question is whether a defendant who receives with guilty knowledge in South Carolina property stolen in North Carolina may be prosecuted in this State under Section 16-362 of the 1952 Code which reads in part as follows: 'In all cases whatever when any goods or chattels or other property of which larceny may be committed shall have been feloniously taken or stolen by any person every person who shall buy or receive any such goods or chattels or other property knowing the same to have been stolen shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment, although the principal felon be not previously convicted and whether he is amenable to justice or not; * * *.'

It appears from the testimony that the Edewald Grocery Store and the Charles Gibbs Store are located in North Carolina. In each of these cases the property was stolen in North Carolina and brought to South Carolina where it was received by appellant.

It is generally agreed among the authorities that in those jurisdictions where it is held to be larceny to bring property into the State which has been stolen in another State, one who there receives such property knowing it to have been stolen is guilty of receiving stolen goods. Annotation 28 L.R.A., N.S., 750. This doctrine is recognized in Golden v. State, 2 Ga.App. 440, 58 S.E. 557, the case principally relied on by appellant. It is true that it was there held that where goods were stolen in South Carolina and brought by the thief to Georgia where they were received by the defendants with guilty knowledge, the defendants could not be convicted of receiving stolen goods. However, this conclusion was based upon the fact that under the law of Georgia bringing into that State goods stolen in another State did not constitute larceny. But it is well settled in South Carolina that one who steals property in another State and brings it into this State is subject to prosecution for larceny here. State v. Hill, 19 S.C. 435; State v. McCann, 167 S.C. 393, 166 S.E. 411; State v. Vareen, 223 S.C. 34, 74 S.E.2d 223. See annotation 156 A.L.R. 862. In State v. Hill, supra, the Court said: 'Where one takes goods from another in any place, under circumstances which make the taking felonious, the possession of the owner, in contemplation of law, continues, and where the goods so taken...