State v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 01 February 1909
• Docket Number: 17,387
• Citation: 48 So. 537,122 La. 1095
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. RYAN

48 So. 537

122 La. 1095

STATE v. RYAN

No. 17,387

Supreme Court of Louisiana

February 1, 1909

Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu Edmund Dennis Miller, Judge.

Kaye Ryan was convicted of receiving stolen money, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Mitchell & Rosenthal, for appellant.

Walter Guion, Atty. Gen., and Joseph Moore, Dist. Atty. (Leland Hugh Moss and Ruffin Golson Pleasant, of counsel), for the State.

OPINION

NICHOLLS J.

Statement of the Case.

The indictment in this case charged that Kaye Ryan $ 50, in lawful money of the United States of America, of the value of $ 50 in said lawful money, of the property of George Look then lately before feloniously stolen, taken, carried away, he, the said Kaye Ryan, then and there well knowing said money so to have been feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away, did then and there feloniously receive, conceal, and have, contrary to the form of the statute of the state of Louisiana in such cases made and provided, in contempt of the authority of the state, and against the peace and dignity of the same.

The prosecution in this case was based upon section 832 of the Revised Statutes of 1870, as amended by Act No. 72, p. 95, of the Acts of 1898. As so amended the section reads:

"Whoever shall receive, have or buy any goods, chattels, money or things of value, that shall have been feloniously taken, stolen, embezzled or by false pretenses obtained, from any other person, knowing the same to have been taken, stolen, embezzled or by false pretenses obtained shall suffer imprisonment with or without hard labor not exceeding two years. Whoever shall receive, harbor, or conceal any thief knowing him or her to be a thief, shall suffer imprisonment not exceeding one year."

Appellant's complaints of error are embodied in five bills of exceptions. From the first bill it appears that the state was permitted to establish by several witnesses that on the night when he is alleged to have made certain denials to the sheriff he was in apparent normal condition, and not, as he had testified to, that he was drunk and under the influence of dope at the time when he made such denials, and that counsel of accused objected to the testimony of said witnesses on the ground that they were not qualified either as physicians or experts, and could not testify, therefore, as to the mental condition of the accused. The court overruled the objection, assigned as a reason that it was permissible to allow witnesses, even though not experts or physicians, to testify as to the conduct and conditions of the mind and body of an accused at the time of his arrest as well as before an act; that in this case Ryan had made a confession, which had been admitted in evidence. As a witness in his own behalf he had testified that he had no recollection of having made such a confession, and that at the time he was drunk, or under the influence of "dope," and this testimony was to show that his mind was clear, and as a matter of fact that he was not drunk and had not been "doped." That it was a well-established rule that nonexpert witnesses may testify as to whether a man is drunk or sober. From bill of exception No. 2, it appears the district attorney in his argument to the jury stated --

"that it was common knowledge that in many parts of the country, particularly in New York, there were many criminals, high in social and public life, being tried and convicted of crime, and that no doubt thousands of men could be produced to testify that previous to that time these men had spotless reputations,"

-- to which objection was made by defendant's counsel, on the ground that these remarks were improper and calculated to bias and prejudice the minds of jurors and affect their verdict in a manner prejudicial to defendant. He asked the court, therefore, to discharge the jury. The court refused so to do, assigning as his reason that no possible injury could have been suffered by the accused on account of the language employed by the district attorney in making his illustration. Accused had offered evidence of his previous good character, and the district attorney was arguing as to the weight and effect to be given to proof of good character when met with convincing proof of guilt. The court instructed the jury to disregard the remarks of the district attorney. It did this, not because it thought the remarks prejudicial, but simply out of abundance of caution.

From the third bill of exception it appears that the court refused to give the following special charges to the jury:

"(1) Unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the person from whom the goods are alleged to have been received was the thief, it is your duty to acquit.

"(2) Unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew at the time he received the goods that the goods were stolen, it is your duty to acquit.

"(3) Receiving goods from one who himself had guiltily received goods from the thief is not receiving stolen goods.

"(4) One who receives goods though knowing them to be stolen is not guilty if his purpose is to return them to the owner, or merely to detect a thief.

"(5) In all cases, in order for the jury to convict, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew at the time he received the goods that they were stolen, and that he knew that the person from whom he received the goods was the thief."

The court refused to give the special charges because the special charges contained many paragraphs which are contrary to law and cannot be sustained by sound reason or authority. The charge by the court was given orally, and was taken down by a stenographer at the instance of counsel for the accused, and, although it was perhaps not as concise as if specially prepared in writing, it was not at all complained of, the only complaint being that the court refused to give the special charges.

Bill of exception No. 4, was taken to the refusal of the court to gram a new trial for the reason stated in the application for the same, which was on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the law and the evidence. Appellant alleged in that application that he was tried and convicted on the 11th November, 1908, on the charge of receiving stolen money, knowing the same to be stolen, and it was proved and was a conceded fact that the defendant received the money from one Lee Carrier, and that the said Lee Carrier was subsequently tried and found not guilty; further, for the reason that the newly discovered evidence referred to was as follows:

"That Mrs. Warren Lovelace received one of the alleged stolen bills from either the Lake Charles National Bank of Lake Charles or the First National Bank of Lake Charles, and that the said Mrs. Lovelace gave the money to her niece, Miss Fanny Lovelace, who in turn gave it to Mr. Arthur Vatter, who in turn gave it to Mr. Fred McLeod, who in turn gave it to the First National Bank of Lake Charles, president of said bank being Capt. George Look, who is the same George Look from whom the money is alleged to have been stolen, and that the cashier of the First National...