State v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 01 January 1868
• Citation: 13 Minn. 343
• Parties: STATE OF MINNESOTA v. JOHN RYAN.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

13 Minn. 343

STATE OF MINNESOTAv.

JOHN RYAN.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal from a judgment of the district court, Steele county.

W. A. Gorman and G. E. Cole, for appellant, cited:

F. R. E. Cornell, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

WILSON, C. J.

The indictment on which the defendant was tried is in the following language:

"John Ryan, the defendant herein, is accused by the grand jury of the county of Steele and state of Minnesota, by this indictment, of the crime of murder in the first degreee, committed as follows: The said John Ryan, on the fourth day of July, 1867, at the city of Owatonna, in said county of Steele, without the authority of law, and with malice and aforethought, with a premeditated design to effect the death of one Thomas Dorsey, killed him, the said Thomas Dorsey, by then and there, feloniously, with force and arms, assaulting, beating, striking, and stabbing him, the said Thomas Dorsey, with a deadly weapon, to-wit, a knife, then and there in the possession of the said John Ryan, and inflicting on him, the said Thomas Dorsey, then and there, with said weapon, divers injuries and mortal wounds, of which the said Thomas Dorsey died, contrary to the statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Minnesota."

The jury, after hearing the evidence and charge of the court, returned this verdict: "We, the jury in the case of the state of Minnesota against John Ryan, do find a verdict of murder in the first degree."

The defendant's counsel thereupon moved the court for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment, which motion was denied, and judgment having been pronounced and rendered on the verdict, the defendant removed the cause into this court by appeal.

The homicide with which the defendant is charged was committed in July, 1867, and the indictment was found and the trial below had in April, 1868. By our law the penalty for murder in the first degree was death, until March 5, 1868, when the legislature, by an act approved that day, abolished the death penalty as a punishment for crime, except in cases where the jury recommend such punishment; but by section 4 of that act it is provided that "the provisions of this act shall not apply nor extend to any act done, nor offence committed prior to the passage hereof, but the provisions of law now in force, and applicable to the crime of murder in the first degree, as well in respect to the penalty affixed to the commission of such crime, as in all other respects, shall be and remain in full force and effect as to such offence heretofore committed." Laws 1868, c. 88.

By another act, approved March 5, 1868, the state is allowed seven peremptory challenges to individual petit jurors, when the offence charged is punishable with death or imprisonment in the state prison for life. Laws 1868, c. 86. Prior to that the state had the right of challenge only for cause. On this trial the state peremptorily challenged one of the petit jurors, and the challenge was allowed by the court, to which the defendant excepted.

The defendant urges, among other objections to the proceedings and judgment, that the indictment and verdict are insufficient; that chapter 86 of the Laws of 1868 is applicable to the trial of crimes committed before its passage, is an ex post facto law, and therefore repugnant to the constitution; and that if the last-mentioned law is applicable so also is chapter 88, and therefore the death penalty cannot be inflicted, the jury not having so recommended.

The indictment I think is good. It is substantially in the form given in the General Statutes, which this court has decided and the statutes declare to be sufficient. The particular objections urged to it are: (1) That it does not charge the offence of murder in the first degree; (2) that it does not show that the offence was committed before the indictment was found. Our statutes declare the killing of a human being without the authority of law, — when perpetrated with a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being, — murder in the first degree. Such a killing is by the indictment clearly charged, which is sufficient. Gen. St. c. 108, §§ 1, 10.

The statute also declares the allegation of time sufficient if it can be understood therefrom "that the offence was committed at some time prior to the time of finding the indictment." This indictment not only comes up to this requirement, but I think it shows clearly that the offence was committed on the fourth day of July, 1867. The charge that the defendant on the fourth of July, 1867, killed the deceased, implies, ex vi termini, that the latter died on that day. No merely formal error can be considered, for our statute declares that "no indictment is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form, which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits. Chapter 108, § 11.

2. As to the verdict, its form is not to be approved, but there is no set form of words in which a verdict is required to be rendered, and therefore, the only rational general rule that can be adopted by which to measure its sufficiency, is, does it show clearly, and without any doubt, the intention of the jury and their finding on the issues presented to them? If it does, it cannot be declared bad without sacrificing substance and justice to form. No error that is not a violation of some positive rule of law, or which may not possibly prejudice the defendant, can be a ground for reversal on appeal. I think the language of the verdict leaves no doubt as to its meaning, or as to the intention of the jury. Its informality does not tend to render it obscure or ambiguous, or to prejudice the rights of the defendant, and therefore does not affect the judgment. See Singleton v. Sodusky, 7 J. J. Marsh. 341; 10 Bacon, Abb. "Verdict," 2.

3. We next come to inquire whether the law of 1868, giving the state the right to peremptorily challenge seven petit jurors is an ex post facto law. It is not, I think, to be doubted but that the legislature meant by this law to establish a rule for the government of all trials thereafter to be had, whether for crimes committed or to be committed. This being admitted, is this law opposed to that clause in the constitution forbidding the enactment of ex post facto laws? Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, says: "An ex post facto law is one which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed." Which definition Chancellor Kent says is distinguishable for its comprehensive brevity and precision. 1 Kent, Comm. 409. See, also, to the same effect, the definition or explanation of an ex post facto law given (by Mr. Hamilton) in the Federalist, No. 84; in the opinions of Paterson and Iredell, JJ., in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas, 395-398; in 1 Bl. Comm. 46; in Sheppard v. People, 25 N. Y. 415; and in Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110.

Section 24 of the declaration of rights of the constitution of Massachusetts, which was adopted in 1780, is in these words: "Laws made to punish for actions done before the existence of such laws, and which have not been declared crimes by preceding laws, are unjust, oppressive, and inconsistent with the fundamental principles of a free government." This accords with the definition of an ex post facto law given by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, and shows clearly the class of laws which the framers of that constitution thought should not be enacted ex post facto. To the same effect are the provisions on this subject in the constitutions of...