State v. Ryan
Decision Date | 17 October 1900 |
Citation | 83 N.W. 865,9 N.D. 419 |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Sargent County; Lauder, J.
Andrew Ryan was convicted of forgery, and appeals.
Reversed.
T. A Curtis, E. W. Bowen, and Charles E. Wolfe, for Appellant.
The defendant is not charged with having made the instrument the basis of this accusation, but is charged simply with uttering an instrument which someone else had made, and which the indictment says was falsely made and forged, yet purported to be the act of the person whose name was signed thereto. The defendant could not be convicted in the absence of evidence showing that the instrument was not made by Harris, or if made by him was fraudulently and materially altered after it was made, and the defendant could not, from the language of this indictment, know which of these contingencies he was called upon to meet. The indictment in this regard is not sufficiently definite and certain. Peo. Merriam, 28 Mich 255; State v. Reibe, 7 N.W. 140. No forgery can be predicated upon an instrument which is void on its face. 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. 461, 2 East's P. C. 953. Every one is presumed to know the law governing the instrument, which law enters into and forms a part of such instrument, and if the law will render the instrument void, the false making of such instrument is not forgery. Johnson v. State, 23 Wis 504; Peo. v. Shawl, 9 Cow. 778; State v. Lytle, 64 N.C. 255; Peo. v. Harrison, 8 Barb. 560; Howell v. State, 37 Tex. 591; Peo. v. Mann, 75 N.Y. 484; Roode v. State, 5 Neb. 475; Peo. v. Galloway, 17 Wend. 540; Barnum v. State, 15 O. 717. An indictment for forgery must show on its face that the instrument is one which, if genuine, would establish or defeat some claim, impose some duty, create some liability, or work some prejudice to another in his rights. Peo. v. Tomlinson, 35 Cal. 503; Barnum v. State, 15 O. 717; Territory v. DeLena, 41 P. 618; Waterman v. People, 67 Ill. 91. The indictment for forgery must set forth an instrument which, on being described, on its face appears to be naturally calculated to have some legal effect, also extrinsic facts must be offered showing such legal effect. State v. Cook, 57 Ind. 574; State v. Wheeler, 19 Minn. 98; State v. Briggs, 34 Vt. 501; Rollins v. State, 22 Tex.App. 521; Murry v. State, 50 S.W. 521; Hendricks v. State, 26 Tex.App. 176. The commissioners had no authority to pass the resolution set forth in the indictment. The same is contrary to express law and void. § § 1974 and 1899, Rev. Codes. The certificates of officers not authorized or required by law have no more force or effect than the certificate of a private person. Smith v. Lawrence, 2 S.D. 202; Downing v. Brown, 3 Colo. 590; Wood v. Nissen, 2 N.D. 26; Goose River Bank v. Gillmore, 3 N.D. 188. The forgery of a certificate imposing no duty or conferring no right is no offense. Rembert v. State, 53 Ala. 467. There must be both the intention and the power to defraud or the offense is not committed. Dixon v. State, 81 Ala. 61, 1 So. Rep. 69; Williams v. State, 8 So. Rep. 825; Territory v. DeLena, 41 P. 618; Raymond v. Peo. 30 P. 504; Merkel v. Berks County, 81 Pa. 505; State v. Brett, 40 P. 873. The prosecution failed to prove the resolution set forth in the indictment, as laid, and the variance is fatal. Hazlitt v. State, 7 N.W. 115; State v. Fallon, 2 N.D. 510; Sharley v. State, 54 Ind. 188; Sutton v. State, 79 N.W. 154; Robinson v. State, 43 S.W. 526. The judgment should be reversed and the defendant discharged because no prosecution can be founded upon this certificate. Waterman v. Peo. 67 Ill. 91; State v. Wilson, 28 Minn. 52.
P. H. Rourke, S. M. Lockerby, and J. E. Bishop, for respondent.
A variance between the indictment and proof is not material unless it is such as might expose the defendant to the danger of being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Abbott's Tr. Bf. 411; Harris v. People, 64 N.Y. 148; Rice on. Crim. Ev. 170. To be the subject of forgery it is not necessary that the instrument should have actual, legal efficacy. It is sufficient that, if genuine, it may have such apparent efficacy, that although its invalidity may be established by extrinsic facts, nevertheless, it may be capable of effecting a fraud and therefore be a subject of forgery. State v. Van Auken, 68 N.W. 457; State v. Johnson, 96 Am. Dec. 158, 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2d Ed.) p. 1093; Rembert v. State, 25 Am. Rep. 693; State v. Vineyard, 40 P. 173. An instrument valid on its face may be the subject of felonious uttering, although collateral facts may exist that would render it absolutely void if genuine. Peo. v. Rathburne, 21 Wend. 509; Peo. v. Galloway, 17 Wend. 540; State v. Johnson, 96 Am. Dec. 158; State v. Hilton, 35 Kan. 339. An instrument void as being against public policy or ultra vires may be subject to forgery. People v. Monroe, 35 P. 326; People v. James, 110 Cal. 155.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of forgery in the fourth degree, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for a period of one year. The only question which we need to consider is the sufficiency of the indictment on which the defendant was tried and convicted. Counsel for defendant attacked it in the trial court on the ground that "it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense," and urges the same objection on this appeal as one of several grounds for asking a reversal. The indictment is as follows: etc.
The indictment is founded on § 7438 and subdivision 2 of § 7430 of the Revised Codes, which read:
§ 7438. Every person who, with intent to defraud, utters or publishes as true, any forged, altered or counterfeited instrument, or any counterfeit gold or silver coin, the forging, altering or counterfeiting of which is hereinbefore declared to be punishable, knowing such...
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