State v. Ryerson

• Decision Date: 02 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 12698,12698
• Citation: 201 Conn. 333,514 A.2d 337
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Robert RYERSON.

Page 337

514 A.2d 337

201 Conn. 333

STATE of Connecticut v. Robert RYERSON.

No. 12698.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 11, 1986.

Decided Sept. 2, 1986.

Sue L. Wise, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

Roland D. Fasano, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Arnold Markle, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, DANNEHY, CALLAHAN and STOUGHTON, JJ.

DANNEHY, Associate Justice.

The defendant, after a jury trial, was found guilty of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134(a)(4). He was sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen years, with execution suspended after six years. On appeal the defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion to dismiss, and (2) in its instructions to the jury. We find no error.

On May 29, 1984, at approximately 4:40 p.m., the Bizarre Boutique Shop in West Haven was robbed. The owner of the boutique, Tina Nappi, testified that she was working in her store when a young man entered and asked for assistance in buying some clothes for his girlfriend. Nappi assisted the young man in selecting a pair of slacks and a shirt. As Nappi rang up the sale, the young man grabbed her, stating, "Open the drawer. I have a gun. I'll blow your head off." The young man took approximately forty dollars and departed.

As the perpetrator was leaving the store, Nappi according to a pre-arranged signal, banged on the wall behind her to alert an employee of the adjacent Postal Instant Press that she was being robbed. That employee, Dawn Chonko, looked out the front window and saw a small blue vehicle speeding out of the parking lot. Chonko informed investigating officers that the vehicle's license plate number was "4G1783," although she was unsure whether the first character was a "4," an "A" or a "V." Detective James McDonough of the West Haven police department, realizing that under the Connecticut vehicle registration system the first character would necessarily be a letter, submitted twenty-six different alphabet combinations to the department of motor vehicles. The combination "VG-1783" came back as the registration number assigned to a blue 1980 Toyota Corolla owned by Maureen Murphy of North Haven. At approximately 8:30 p.m. that same evening, McDonough interviewed Maureen Murphy, who stated that she had loaned her car to the defendant at approximately 12 p.m., and that she had been expecting it back by 3 p.m. The car had as yet not been returned, and Murphy had not heard from the defendant.

Nappi, who earlier that day had spent approximately fifteen minutes assisting the young man in the boutique before the robbery, gave McDonough a detailed physical description of the robber. ¹ McDonough compared Nappi's description of the defendant with that given by Murphy, and found the two to be "consistent." McDonough also acquired information that the defendant had been at his former place of employment, the Holistic Health Center, in Orange, at approximately 3 p.m. that day. The health center is located on the same road as the boutique, approximately two miles away. McDonough learned from Murphy that the defendant was presently employed as a door person at a nearby pub. McDonough called the pub, and the manager informed him that the defendant had not reported for work that evening. The defendant was supposed to have reported for work at 9 p.m. Finally, McDonough was informed by the New London police department that the defendant had recently completed a sentence of imprisonment for committing a number of convenience store robberies.

At 1:35 a.m. the following morning, police spotted Murphy's blue Toyota in the driveway of the defendant's residence in North Haven. McDonough at the time was in the process of typing a warrant for the defendant's arrest. McDonough testified that he decided to arrest the defendant without a warrant because "otherwise [he] would have to go find a prosecutor and a judge and everything." Nonetheless, McDonough testified that prior to leaving headquarters that morning he had determined that he would knock on the defendant's door and arrest him only if he answered it, but that if the defendant refused to answer the door, McDonough would have the house surrounded by fellow officers while he went to obtain a warrant.

Thus, with the intention of arresting the defendant without a warrant should the opportunity present itself, McDonough and a cadre of officers from both the West Haven and North Haven police departments went to the defendant's residence, at approximately 2 a.m. on the morning of May 30, 1984. The defendant's residence was a small converted farmhouse approximately 300 feet from the road. Police officers surrounded the house as McDonough drove up the driveway with his lights off. The front door to the house was unlocked, and McDonough, accompanied by two officers, walked in. Through the front door the officers entered a hallway, with two doors leading to the first floor apartment, and a staircase leading to the defendant's upstairs apartment, all of which McDonough knew from a previous visit several hours before. McDonough walked up the stairway to the defendant's apartment, leaving the other two officers at the base of the stairs. McDonough knocked on the door, identified himself, and said, "Bob, can you open the door?" The defendant responded, "Wait a minute, can I go to the bathroom first?" McDonough said, "No, could you open the door first, we would like to talk to you." When the defendant then opened the door, McDonough showed him his badge and asked him to identify himself. The defendant stated his name, and McDonough immediately placed him under arrest. The time was 2:30 a.m.

I

We first address the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. The defendant claimed in the trial court that his warrantless, predawn arrest in his apartment was unconstitutional, and that under State v. Licari, 153 Conn. 127, 214 A.2d 900 (1965), the charges against him should have been dismissed. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant renewed his claim under State v. Licari in his initial brief to this court. After that brief had been filed, we overruled Licari in State v. Fleming, 198 Conn. 255, 257-63, 502 A.2d 886 (1986). Thereafter, we permitted the parties to file supplemental briefs to address the application of Fleming to the circumstances of this case.

In State v. Fleming, supra, 263, 502 A.2d 886, we held that "[w]here the fairness of a subsequent prosecution has not been impaired by an illegal arrest, neither the federal nor the Connecticut constitution requires dismissal of the charges or a voiding of the resulting conviction." An illegal arrest may impair the fairness of a subsequent prosecution only where evidence obtained as a direct consequence of that arrest is admitted against the defendant at trial. Id., 262, 502 A.2d 886; State v. Federici, 179 Conn. 46, 425 A.2d 916 (1979). In the present case the defendant concedes that the police obtained no evidence as a direct consequence of his arrest, and thus, that no "fruits" of that arrest were admitted into evidence against him. It would therefore appear that under Fleming the defendant's motion to dismiss was properly denied, irrespective of the constitutionality of his arrest.

The defendant contends, however, that the methods employed by police to effectuate his arrest in this case require that his charges be dismissed. In urging an exception to our holding in Fleming, the defendant notes that the arrest was made at 2:30 a.m., in his apartment, and by a cadre of officers from two different police departments. He also notes the absence of exigent circumstances to justify the failure of the police to obtain a warrant: McDonough by his own admission would have gone to obtain a warrant had the defendant not answered his door. "It is these egregious circumstances," he contends, "which cry out for judicial intervention which will not leave our citizenry powerless in the face of unrestrained police power."

While we may not condone the methods employed by the arresting officers in this case, neither are we persuaded that the charges brought against the defendant should have been dismissed. The interests of justice demand that those accused of committing serious crimes at least be brought to trial. We do not believe that a bar against prosecution of this defendant would advance and not impair the legitimate state interest in bringing criminals to justice, and we must therefore reject the defendant's claim that the circumstances of this case warrant an exception to Fleming.

The defendant also claims that our decision in Fleming should not be applied retroactively. This claim is plainly without merit. "As a rule, judicial decisions apply 'retroactively.' Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507-508, 93 S.Ct. 876 , 35 L.Ed.2d 29 (1973). Indeed, a legal system based on precedent has a built-in presumption of retroactivity." Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1341, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984). " 'If a "new" constitutional doctrine is truly right, we should not reverse lower courts which have accepted it; nor should we affirm those which have rejected the very arguments we have embraced.' " United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 555, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 2590, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 1039, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

It is clear that "[c]omplete retroactive effect is most appropriate where a new constitutional principle is designed to enhance the accuracy of criminal trials." Solem v. Stumes, supra, 465 U.S. 642, 104 S.Ct. 1341, see Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 100 S.Ct. 2214, 65 L.Ed.2d 159 (1980); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 97 S.Ct. 2339, 53 L.Ed.2d 306 (1977). Indeed, the defendant notes that we refused to accord retroactive effect to our decision in State v....