State v. S. P. M. (In re S. P. M.), A177592

CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Writing for the CourtEGAN, J.
Citation322 Or.App. 768
PartiesIn the Matter of S. P. M., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. v. S. P. M., Appellant. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent,
Docket NumberA177592
Decision Date23 November 2022

322 Or.App. 768

In the Matter of S. P. M., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.

STATE OF OREGON, Respondent,
v.

S. P. M., Appellant.

A177592

Court of Appeals of Oregon

November 23, 2022


This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

Submitted October 26, 2022

Deschutes County Circuit Court 21CC06846; A177592 Owyhee Weikel-Magden, Judge pro tempore.

Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., fled the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney General, fled the brief for respondent.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Kamins, Judge.

1

[322 Or.App. 769] EGAN, J.

In this involuntary commitment case, appellant seeks reversal of a judgment committing her to the custody of the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days and an order prohibiting the purchase or possession of firearms. On appeal, appellant contends that the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that, due to a mental disorder, appellant was a danger to others. ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A). As we explain below, the record supports the court's determination that appellant was a danger to others. Accordingly, we affirm.

The trial court may involuntarily commit someone if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a "person with a mental illness." ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C). A "person with a mental illness" is someone who suffers from a "mental disorder," and is "dangerous to self or others" as a result of that disorder. ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A). A person is "dangerous to others" if the person's "mental disorder makes [her] highly likely to engage in future violence toward others, absent commitment." State v. E. J. J., 308 Or.App. 603, 612, 479 P.3d 1073 (2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).[1] Threatening statements can justify a finding that a person is dangerous to others, but in that case, the court "require[s] that evidence of threats be accompanied by evidence of an overt act directed toward fulfilling the threats, or evidence that those threats are made under circumstances making future harmful acts highly likely." State v. K. L., 220 Or.App. 647, 653, 188 P.3d 395 (2008); see also State v. C. J., 322 Or.App. 760, __ P.3d __ (2022).

With regard to our standard of review, "[u]nless we exercise our discretion to review an order of civil commitment de novo (which we do not here), we view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative

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[322 Or.App. 770] inferences, in the light most favorable to the trial court's disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit that outcome." State v. M. J. F., 306 Or.App. 544, 545, 473 P.3d 1141 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Ultimately, in view of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof that applies in civil commitment proceedings, the question for *** the reviewing court is whether a rational factfinder could have found that it was highly probable that appellant was a danger to herself or others because of a mental disorder." State v. S. A. R., 308 Or.App. 365, 366, 479 P.3d 618 (2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In summary, at the commitment hearing in this case, the state...

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