State v. S.R.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-66,91-66
• Citation: 589 N.E.2d 1319,63 Ohio St.3d 590
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. S.R., Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 590

63 Ohio St.3d 590

589 N.E.2d 1319

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. S.R., Appellee.

No. 91-66.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 8, 1992.

Decided May 6, 1992.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

Records of a county children services board investigation made pursuant to R.C. 5153.17 and 2151.141 are "official records" within the ambit of the sealing provisions of R.C. 2953.52. The trial court should weigh the privacy interests of the person seeking to seal the official records against the legitimate needs of the agency in maintaining those records.

Appellee, S.R., was found not guilty by a jury in the Juvenile Division of the Lucas County Common Pleas Court, of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. S.R. then filed a motion in the juvenile division for an order sealing the records of his case pursuant to R.C. 2953.52(A). Counsel certified that he served a copy of the motion upon the assistant prosecuting attorney.

Eleven days later the trial court found that pursuant to R.C. 2953.52(B)(2), the interests of the defendant in having the records pertaining to his case sealed were not outweighed by any legitimate government needs to maintain such records. Thus, the court ordered all records of any public office or agency which had a record of the case to be sealed.

Pursuant to the order, S.R.'s attorney sent John B. Mattingly, the Executive Director of the Lucas County Children Services Board (hereinafter "CSB"), a copy of the court's order and requested that he acknowledge that the board had sealed its records. He also requested that Mattingly inform the Ohio Central Registry that S.R. had been acquitted and that the records of the registry be sealed as well.

Mattingly replied to S.R.'s counsel that his agency could not comply with the request to seal because it was not made a party to the proceedings and because the court's order did not apply to records kept by CSB pursuant to its independent duty to investigate child abuse under R.C. 2151.421. S.R. then filed a motion to show cause why CSB should not be held in contempt of the court's order.

The trial court entered a judgment denying the motion to show cause and held that the records of CSB were not within the purview of R.C. 2953.52 because R.C. 2151.421 was enacted specifically to protect children from perpetrators of child abuse. The court concluded that as a matter of public policy the protection of a child was more important than the slight chance of harm which might result to the acquitted accused because his or her name is to be found in the CSB file or the Central Registry. From that judgment, S.R. appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed the judgment of the trial court.

The court of appeals held that the plain language of the expungement statute, R.C. 2953.52, applied to the investigatory records of CSB. The court of appeals noted that CSB has never denied that it is a public office or agency possessing investigatory records involving S.R., but that its sole contention was that its investigatory records were not included under the statute. The court of appeals concluded that the juvenile court's sole duty was to interpret R.C. 2953.52 and that it had erred in relitigating the issue of whether expungement was warranted. The court of appeals noted that the juvenile court's discretionary power to deny sealing did not extend to disputes arising after the order to seal the official records had been issued.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Anthony G. Pizza, Pros. Atty., Lynn Balshone-Jacobs and Mark E. Lupe; Marilyn Loch Parker and Linda S. Markowiak, for appellant.

John J. Callahan and Susan M. Cairl, for appellee.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Alan P. Schwepe, for amicus curiae Ohio Department of Human Services.

JAMES A. BROGAN, Judge.

The issue presented for our review is whether the sealing provisions of R.C. 2953.52 extend to the investigatory files kept by the county department of human services or children services board pursuant to R.C. 2151.421.

The provisions of R.C. 2953.52 pertinent to this issue are:

"(A)(1) Any person, who is found not guilty of an offense by a jury or a court * * * may apply to the court for an order to seal his official records in the case. * * *

" * * *

"(B)(1) Upon the filing of an application * * *, the court shall set a date for a hearing and shall notify the prosecutor in the case of the hearing on the application. The prosecutor may object to the granting of the application by filing an objection with the court prior to the date set for the hearing. The prosecutor shall specify in the objection the reasons he believes justify a denial of the application.

"(2) The court shall do each of the following:

"(a) Determine whether the person was found not guilty in the case * * *;

"(b) Determine whether criminal proceedings are pending against the person;

"(c) If the prosecutor has filed an objection in accordance with division (B)(1) of this section, consider the reasons against granting the application specified by the prosecutor in the objection;

"(d) Weigh the interests of the person in having the official records pertaining to the case sealed against the legitimate needs, if any, of the government, to maintain those records.

"(3) If the court determines, after complying with division (B)(2) of this section, that the person was found not guilty in the case, that the complaint, indictment, or information in the case was dismissed, or that a no bill was returned in the case and that the appropriate period of time has expired from the date of the report to the court of the no bill by the foreman or deputy foreman of the grand jury; that no criminal proceedings are pending against the person; and the interests of the person in having the records pertaining to the case sealed are not outweighed by any legitimate governmental needs to maintain such records, the court shall issue an order directing that all official records pertaining to the case be sealed and that, except as provided in section 2953.53 of the Revised Code, the proceedings in the case be deemed not to have occurred."

"Official records" means the following:

" 'Official records' means all records that are possessed by any public office or agency that relate to a criminal case, including, but not limited to: the notation to the case in the criminal docket; all subpoenas issued in the case; all papers and documents filed by the defendant or the prosecutor in the case; all records of all testimony and evidence presented in all proceedings in the case; all court files, papers, documents, folders, entries, affidavits, or writs that pertain to the case; all computer, microfilm, microfiche, or microdot records, indices, or references to the case; all index references to the case; all fingerprints and photographs; all records and investigative reports pertaining to the case that are possessed by any law enforcement officer or agency, except that any records or reports that are the specific investigatory work product of a law enforcement officer or agency are not and shall not be considered to be official records when they are in the possession of that officer or agency; and all investigative records and reports other than those possessed by a law enforcement officer or agency pertaining to the case." R.C. 2953.51(D).

An order to seal official records applies to every public office or agency that has a record of the case that is the subject of the order, regardless of whether it receives notice of the hearing on the application for the order to seal the official records or receives a copy of the order. R.C. 2953.53(C).

A law enforcement agency which possesses records or reports pertaining to the case that are its specific investigatory work product and that are excepted from the definition of "official records" contained in division (D) of R.C. 2953.51 may permit another law enforcement agency to use the records or reports in the investigation of another offense, if the facts incident to the offense being investigated by the other law enforcement agency and the facts in the subject case are reasonably similar. The agency that provides the records and reports may provide the other agency with the name of the person who is the subject of the case, if it believes that the name of the person is necessary to the conduct of the investigation by the other agency. R.C. 2953.54(A)(3).

The state of Ohio has set forth a number of arguments in support of its position herein:

1. The state contends that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to issue the sealing order to CSB because it did not participate in the criminal proceedings nor was it made a party to them in the trial court.

2. The state asserts CSB does not possess official records of the defendant's case because CSB's records are not indexed or compiled in the name of the alleged abuser, but are filed under the victim's name.

3. The state also argues that it would be inappropriate to have the sealing order apply to CSB investigatory records because it has a statutory duty under R.C. 2151.421 to investigate child abuse or neglect wholly independent of that of the prosecuting attorney in investigating and pursuing criminal charges against child abusers.

4. The state further asserts that CSB will not be able to perform its statutory duty to protect abused and neglected children if it must comply with an order made pursuant to R.C. 2953.52. The state argues that a critically important consideration is the possibility that "substantiated" child abuse charges frequently result from a CSB investigation even when no culpability is found under criminal statutes.

5. The state also argues that the legislature could not have intended to apply the sealing provisions of R.C. 2953.52 to CSB investigatory records because there already exist stringent confidentiality provisions for child abuse investigation records...