State v. S. S. (In re S. S.)
Jurisdiction | Oregon |
Parties | In the MATTER OF S. S., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. State of Oregon, Respondent, v. S. S., Appellant. |
Citation | 480 P.3d 321,309 Or.App. 131 |
Docket Number | A172146 |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Decision Date | 03 February 2021 |
Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and Kamins, Judge.
Appellant seeks reversal of an order involuntarily committing him to the Oregon Health Authority for up to 180 days. Because the record was legally sufficient to allow a rational factfinder to conclude that he suffered from a mental disorder that makes him dangerous to himself, we affirm.
Absent de novo review, "we view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the trial court's disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit that outcome." State v. M. J. F ., 306 Or. App. 544, 545, 473 P.3d 1141 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accepting those inferences in favor of the trial court's decision, we must determine "whether a rational factfinder could have found that it was highly probable" that appellant was a danger to himself or others because of a mental disorder. Id . at 549, 473 P.3d 1141 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). "[W]hether the evidence is sufficient to support a determination that appellant is a danger to [self] is a question we review as a matter of law." State v. T. Y ., 285 Or. App. 21, 24, 396 P.3d 986 (2017). We state the facts in light of that standard of review.
Appellant suffers from bipolar disorder marked by paranoia, impulsivity, and aggression. One of the manifestations of this disorder is that appellant frequently, repeatedly, and belligerently threatens those around him. When appellant acts this way, he presents as "out of control" and he appears to be "very meaningful" in the threats that he makes. A few examples of the many instances of this behavior in the record include racist slurs, sexist insults including threats to rape women and children, and specific and credible death threats against a behavioral health clinician and a judge with whom he attended Alcoholics Anonymous. When police came to his house following the death threats, appellant ran into his home and then emerged wielding a baseball bat, threatening to blow up his house by cutting the gas line. One of the officers drew his gun, but the other officer, who was familiar with appellant and his mental disorder, was able to defuse the situation. It took police several days to take appellant into custody because of his aggressiveness and a fear that they could not do so without causing him injury. When police finally took him into custody, appellant broke his foot in the subsequent altercation, requiring surgery.
In the same time frame, appellant engaged in several other physical encounters. He threatened a mental health clinician repeatedly, eventually lunging at her and cutting himself on the fence that separated them. Appellant also repeatedly threatened to kill his neighbor and rape his neighbor's wife and the neighborhood children. On one occasion, he made as if he was going to punch his neighbor, which caused the neighbor to put his own fists up in preparation for a fight. Appellant then left, but he returned shortly thereafter to spit coffee on the neighbor's car, window, and screen door. While in the hospital, appellant's behavior continued in this manner, including multiple instances of using racist, sexist, and homophobic epithets to hospital staff and in voicemails he left for his neighbor, the police, and other individuals in the community. He required seclusion and several summons to hospital security, including the night before the hearing.
Recognizing that appellant was unable to control this behavior and "almost got shot" when officers visited his home, the trial court determined that appellant is likely "to put [himself] in harm's way" and is therefore a danger to self. Appellant acknowledges that he suffers from bipolar disorder but he contends—and the state disputes—that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he poses a danger to himself.
Under Oregon law, a person may be involuntarily committed if the person is determined to be a "person with mental illness." ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C). A "person with mental illness" is someone who suffers from a "mental disorder" and, as a result of that disorder, is "[d]angerous to self * * *." ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A). For purposes of ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A), a person is dangerous to self if "the person's mental disorder would cause him or her to engage in behavior that is likely to result in physical harm to [self] in the near term." State v. B. B ., 240 Or. App. 75, 82, 245 P.3d 697 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The threat...
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...insight into that behavior, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that appellant presents a danger to himself. See State v. S. S ., 309 Or App 131, 134, 480 P.3d 321 (2021) (appellant's past behavior can demonstrate a highly probable future risk of harm if "(1) the behavior * * * caused or......
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