State v. Saathoff
| Citation | 29 P.3d 236 |
| Decision Date | 17 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. S-9457.,S-9457. |
| Parties | STATE of Alaska, Petitioner, v. Greg SAATHOFF, Respondent. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Alaska (US) |
Marcelle K. McDannel, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Petitioner.
Paul E. Malin, Assistant Public Defender, and Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Respondent.
Before FABE, Chief Justice, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, BRYNER, and CARPENETI, Justices.
During the summer of 1988 Greg Saathoff purchased a rifle that he suspected and later confirmed to be stolen property. Saathoff kept the stolen rifle for nine years until August 1997—when police discovered the stolen rifle in Saathoff's possession. Saathoff was charged with theft by receiving. He appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that theft by receiving is not a continuing offense and that therefore the five-year statute of limitations applied and barred Saathoff's indictment and conviction. The State has challenged this ruling. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
In the summer of 1988 Greg Saathoff was working as a cab driver in Anchorage.1 Sometime during that summer, a man he did not know approached him and offered to sell him an antique .22 caliber rifle for $100.2 Saathoff initially refused, but after the price was lowered to $35, Saathoff accepted.3
At the time that he bought the rifle, Saathoff apparently suspected that it was stolen property.4 This suspicion was reinforced when an appraiser valued the rifle at $500 and informed Saathoff that the rifle was a valuable antique.5 Nine years later, on August 15, 1997, Saathoff used the rifle to shoot a neighbor's dog.6 When the neighbor responded by trying to shoot Saathoff, Saathoff summoned the police. The police arrived and secured all the weapons at the scene—including the antique rifle.7 The officers at the scene checked the serial number of the rifle and found that the weapon had been reported stolen in a 1988 burglary.8
After Saathoff disclosed the circumstances of his 1988 purchase, he was charged and indicted on November 14, 1997 by a Kenai grand jury for second-degree theft under AS 11.46.130(a)(2).
In February 1998 Saathoff moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the five-year statute of limitations applied to bar the indictment.9 The superior court denied Saathoff's motion on March 26, 1998.
In July 1998 Saathoff entered a Cooksey plea, preserving for appeal the question of the applicability of the statute of limitations.10 Saathoff was sentenced to a term of incarceration of fifteen months, with twelve months suspended, and placed on probation for three years.
Saathoff appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations applied to bar the conviction because the offense occurred in 1988 and the limitations period ended in 1993.11 The State petitioned for review of this decision, and we granted the petition for hearing.
The application of a statute of limitations is a question of law that we review de novo.12 This appeal requires us to decide the meaning of AS 11.46.100 and AS 11.46.190(a). These are questions of statutory construction, which are also reviewed de novo.13
Saathoff was convicted under AS 11.46.130(a)(2) of theft in the second degree. However, Saathoff's crime is defined by three statutes, AS 11.46.130(a)(2), AS 11.46.100, and AS 11.46.190.
Alaska Statute 11.46.130(a)(2) defines "theft in the second degree" to include theft of a firearm, and declares that "theft" is defined by AS 11.46.100.14
Alaska Statute 11.46.100 is Alaska's consolidated theft statute, which defines the crime of "theft." It provides for several alternative ways that one may commit theft, including the one applicable to this appeal, "theft by receiving."15 Alaska Statute 11.46.100(4) states that "theft by receiving" is defined by AS 11.46.190.
Alaska Statute 11.46.190 specifically defines "theft by receiving":
(a) A person commits theft by receiving if the person buys, receives, retains, conceals, or disposes of stolen property with reckless disregard that the property was stolen.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the statute of limitations, AS 12.10.010, applies to bar Saathoff's conviction.16 The limitations period under AS 12.10.010 is five years, the stolen rifle was purchased by Saathoff in 1988, and prosecution was commenced in 1997. Therefore, it would at first blush appear that the limitations period expired in this case before prosecution was commenced.
However, if Saathoff's offense was a "continuing" offense, the statute of limitations would not have expired in this case. Alaska Statute 12.10.030 provides that the statute of limitations may be tolled for certain "continuing" offenses. If theft by receiving is a "continuing" offense, Saathoff's offense may have continued until 1997, allowing his prosecution and conviction under AS 12.10.010. The State claims that theft by receiving is a "continuing" offense and that in Saathoff's case it continued as long as Saathoff retained the stolen property, through 1997. Saathoff argues that theft by receiving is not a "continuing" offense, and that therefore the statute of limitations should bar the conviction.
In order to answer this question, we must address three issues: (1) the applicability of AS 12.10.030; (2) the language, structure, and legislative history of AS 11.46.100 and 11.46.190; and (3) public policy considerations. Upon analysis of these issues, we conclude that the opinion of the court of appeals should be affirmed: Theft by receiving is not a continuing offense and the statute of limitations therefore bars Saathoff's conviction.
Our analysis is guided by AS 12.10.030, which provides that an offense is continuing only if the legislature plainly intended it to be so:
When period of limitation runs. (a) An offense is committed either when every element occurs, or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated.
Therefore, theft by receiving is only a continuing offense if a legislative purpose to make it a continuing offense "plainly appears" in the language, structure, or legislative history of AS 11.46.100 and 11.46.190(a).
To begin our analysis, we will focus on the language of AS 11.46.100 and 11.46.190(a).17 Under our "sliding scale" analysis, we will normally follow plain and unambiguous statutory language unless there is very strong contrary legislative history.18
The court of appeals concluded, based on legislative history, precedent, and the text of other statutes, that the structure of AS 11.46.100 indicates that the legislature intended to consolidate old common laws into one crime of theft.19 The court held that AS 11.46.100 does not define six separate crimes, but instead defines broadly one crime of theft in subsection (1)—obtaining the property of another with intent to deprive or appropriate.20 Alaska Statute 11.46.100's five other subsections are merely examples that are included with the broad definition—including (4) "theft by receiving."21 Therefore, because "theft by receiving" is not a separate offense, and is instead simply a subset of the general crime of theft, the court of appeals concluded that "theft by receiving" cannot be a continuing offense, because this would make it distinct from the other varieties of theft mentioned in AS 11.46.100.22
The court of appeals reasoned that its conclusion was consistent with the inclusion of the word "retain" in AS 11.46.190, the theft by receiving statute. The court of appeals held that "retain" under AS 11.46.190 describes "a defendant's action at a particular point in time—the time when the defendant acquires the culpable mental state required for theft (awareness that the property is probably stolen)."23 This is consistent with the conclusion that "theft by receiving" is not a continuing offense.
However, the State asks us to reject the analysis of the court of appeals. The State claims that the specific language used in AS 11.46.100 and AS 11.46.190(a), and particularly the word "retain" in AS 11.46.190(a), plainly indicates that theft by receiving ("retaining") is a continuing offense.24 Specifically, the State argues that "retain" is defined by dictionaries as an "ongoing activity."25
But as Saathoff points out, the meaning of "retain" in AS 11.46.190 is indeed ambiguous because there are two possible meanings: "retain" could mean (1) continuing control for the duration of the defendant's possession of the stolen item, or it could mean (2) momentary control at the time that the defendant receives the item or finds out that it is stolen. If continuing control is the correct meaning, a defendant continues to commit the crime of theft by receiving for as long as the defendant keeps the property. If momentary control is correct, a defendant commits the crime of retaining stolen property at the time that he has reason to believe that the property is stolen and decides to "retain" the property.
Guidance from other courts does not resolve the question of the plain meaning of AS 11.46.100 and AS 11.46.190(a). Other jurisdictions are almost evenly split on the question of the meaning of similar statutes from other jurisdictions. Seven jurisdictions have concluded, based at least partly on the plain language of state statutes, that theft by receiving is...
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