State v. Sabins

Decision Date10 March 1964
Docket NumberNo. 51196,51196
Citation127 N.W.2d 107,256 Iowa 295
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Richard SABINS, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Harold D. Vietor, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Evan A. Hultman, Atty. Gen., John H. Allen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jack M. Fulton, Linn County Atty., for appellee.

STUART, Justice.

This defendant accomplished the rare feat of outselling an automobile salesman. By inflating the salesman's ego and falsely representing his finances and condition of employment, he obtained delivery of a 1957 Buick in return for a check on a non-existing bank account to be exchanged the following morning for a cash bonus from Quaker Oats where he was not even employed. When defendant failed to show up the next morning, the salesman made inquiries which disclosed the falsity of defendant's representations. Defendant had signed the application for a certificate of title, but the owner took no action to complete the transfer of the title certificate and a new certificate was never received by defendant. The automobile was never returned. Defendant was tried and convicted of obtaining property by false pretenses, section 713.1 Code of Iowa, I.C.A., and has appealed assigning three errors.

I. We find it necessary to consider only defendant's first assignment of error in which he claims the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence since the state failed to prove defendant obtained title to the automobile, an essential element of the crime of false pretenses. Defendant argues that title to an automobile can be transferred only by a certificate of title executed and delivered in accordance with the provisions of sections 321.45(2) and (3) of the Code, I.C.A., and cites as authority our recent decisions in Varvaris v. Varvaris, Iowa, 124 N.W.2d 163, 165 and Calhoun v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., Iowa, 125 N.W.2d 121. This proposition was raised by a motion for directed verdict, a requested instruction, exceptions to the court's instructions and a motion for new trial. We agree with defendant's contentions.

While it seems obvious that this evidence should be sufficient to support a conviction of some crime, it is a basic rule of criminal law that statutes are to be strictly construed against the state and the burden is upon the state to prove every element of the specific crime charged. State v. Burns, 181 Iowa 1098, 165 N.W. 346; State v. Hansen, 244 Iowa 145, 147, 55 [256 Iowa 298] N.W.2d 923. The evidence would support a conviction of larceny by trick but failure to prove the transfer of title to defendant is fatal to a conviction of obtaining property by false pretenses.

Larceny by trick and false pretenses have long been separate crimes. Larceny is one of the oldest crimes known to common law. It was founded upon a trespass against the possessory rights of the victim. When a person was persuaded by fraud to part with the possession of personal property, the fraud vitiated his consent and the offender could be convicted of larceny by trick. At common law a fraud, no matter how gross, in which the offender obtained title as well as possession, could not be punished as a crime when it was calculated to mislead only the individual defrauded. To fill this gap in the common law, a statute was enacted in England in 1757 which has given us the main structure for our modern law of false pretenses. Since trespass against possessory rights only was already a crime at common law, false pretenses applied only to acts in which title as well as possession was obtained. Perkins on Criminal Law 249-250; 9 Iowa Law Bulletin, 204-210. This distinction has existed ever since and is preserved in our criminal code which defines larceny in section 709.1 and false pretenses in section 713.1.

The Iowa cases have consistently recognized this distinction. In State v. Dobbins, 152 Iowa 632, 637, 132 N.W. 805, 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 735 defendant, charged with larceny, contended the victim 'in passing his money to the stakeholder intended to part with his title thereto, and that, if such be the case, there was no larceny, but the offense, if any, was that of cheating by false pretenses.' We did not challenge the accuracy of his proposition, but held there was evidence to support a finding he did intend to part with title. We recognized the two distinct crimes saying: 'It is true that larceny and cheating by false pretenses are disltinct offenses, and that under a charge of one of these crimes the accused cannot rightfully be convicted upon proof of the other. State v. Loser, 132 Iowa 429, 104 N.W. 337.'

In State v. Chamberlain, 215 Iowa 273, 245 N.W. 277, 278, we said: 'ONE OF THE MAJOR PROPOSITIONS INVOLVED In tHis appeal is whether or not, under a record of this kind, the defendant is guilty of larceny. While the crime of larceny and obtaining property by false pretenses lie very close together, they are distinguishable, and more so under the statutes of the State of Iowa, which provide a separate punishment for each; * * *.

'As applied to the fact situation before us, it is evident beyond peradventure that, when this $3,500 was paid by Larsen to the defendant, it was his intention and he did in fact part not only with possession of the property, but also the title thereto, and it was his intention so to do. This being true, if defendant was guilty of any crime, it was that of obtaining this money by false pretense and not larceny. It is apparent, therefore, that the defendant was wrongfully convicted of the charge of larceny, and therefore his motion for a directed verdict should have been sustained.'

The state concedes transfer of title is an essential element in the crime of false pretenses but contends the test of whether title was transferred is a subjective test based upon the intent of the victim. Cases are cited which so state. State v. Loser, supra; State v. Reysa, 198 Iowa 496, 505, 199 N.W. 1000, 1004; State v. Quinn, 245 Iowa 846, 64 N.W.2d 323, 43 A.L.R.2d 1240; State v. Chamberlain, 215 Iowa 273, 245 N.W. 277.

We say in State v. Reysa, 198 Iowa 496, 504, 199 N.W. 1000: 'Counsel for appellant urge that the offense committed, if any, as shown by the evidence, was not the offense defined by Code, § 5041, but was larceny or embezzlement, because in 'cheating', the offense defined by section 5041, the accused must obtain not only possession of, but must also obtain ownership and title to, the property involved, even though the title so obtained is voidable. 'The distinction drawn by counsel between the offenses mentioned is undoubtedly correct. State v. Dobbins, 152 Iowa, 632, 132 N.W. 805, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 735; State v. Loser, 132 Iowa, 419, 104 N.W. 337. It is also the rule that the intention and understanding of the prosecutor is the governing factor as to whether both title and possession, or possession only, passes under the transaction involved. State v. Dobbins, supra; State v. Loser, supra.'

In State v. Loser, 132 Iowa 419, 427, 104...

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  • Bohling v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 25 Enero 2017
    ...344 P.3d at 768 ; see also People v. Williams , 57 Cal.4th 776, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 305 P.3d 1241, 1246 (2013) ; State v. Sabins , 256 Iowa 295,127 N.W.2d 107, 108 (1964). Back then, while a person who obtained possession but not title to another's property by false representations was guil......
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    • 20 Abril 1977
    ...under the 'collision clause' of his policy with defendant. To hold otherwise would nullify the statute. * * *." In State v. Sabins, 256 Iowa 295, 127 N.W.2d 107 (1964) we reversed a criminal conviction for the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses where defendant obtained possessio......
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    • Iowa Supreme Court
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