State v. Saint

Citation284 S.W.3d 340
Decision Date09 September 2008
Docket NumberNo. M2007-00424-CCA-R3-CD.,M2007-00424-CCA-R3-CD.
PartiesSTATE of Tennessee v. James H. SAINT, Jr.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee. Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee

Ross E. Alderman, District Public Defender, and Emma Rae Tennent (on appeal) and J. Michael Engle and Willow Fort (at trial), Assistant Public Defenders, for the appellant, James H. Saint, Jr.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Elizabeth B. Marney, Senior Counsel; Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and Brian Keith Holmgren, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

JOSEPH M. TIPTON, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and JERRY L. SMITH, JJ., joined.

The defendant, James H. Saint, Jr., appeals his convictions of six counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to eleven years for each conviction, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixty-six years. On appeal, he claims (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and (2) that the trial court erred in determining the length of his individual sentences and in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the defendant's convictions but reverse the sentences and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.

The defendant's convictions relate to inappropriate touching of his daughter on various occasions between January 2000 and September 2004, during which time the victim was between four and eight years of age. At trial, the state's evidence included the victim's testimony regarding the incidents and the defendant's videotaped statements, in which he initially denied inappropriate contact, then said he did not remember it, but later admitted having the victim lie on top of him when he was lying in her bed for a bedtime "prayer session" and touching her. The defendant admitted that he would become slightly aroused and stated that he wanted to touch and hug the victim more and wanted to show his love for the victim. He also admitted that the victim had touched his genitals. The defendant testified at trial that he did not intentionally touch the victim. He said he had attempted to explain during the last interview that he might have rolled over to hug his daughter and accidentally touched her. He claimed he had no memory of touching the victim, but he acknowledged it might have occurred. He admitted he assisted the victim with bathing and undressing when she requested help, but he denied the victim's allegation that he had fondled her while she was bathing. He said a note he wrote to the victim during the third interview in which he apologized to the victim was an apology for accidental, not intentional, touching and for the family's financial difficulties.

The jury found the defendant guilty of six counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed eleven-year sentences for each conviction as a Violent Offender and ordered that each be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixty-six years. The defendant filed this appeal.

I

On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his third statement to the authorities, arguing that it was the product of psychological coercion via persistent biblical references and appeals to the defendant's religious beliefs. The state responds that the trial court correctly rejected the defendant's claim that the statement was coerced and involuntary.

On review, an appellate court may consider the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as at trial in determining whether the trial court properly denied a pretrial motion to suppress. State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 297-99 (Tenn.1998). A trial court's factual findings in a motion to suppress hearing are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn.1996); State v. Jones, 802 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tenn. Crim.App.1990). Questions about the "credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact." Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. The prevailing party is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. State v. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tenn.2001). The application of the law to the facts as determined by the trial court is a question of law which is reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn.1997).

"The test of voluntariness for confessions under article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution is broader and more protective of individual rights than the test of voluntariness under the Fifth Amendment." State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn.1996) (citing State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn.1994)); see State v. Marco M. Northern, 262 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn., 2008). For a confession to be considered voluntary, it must not be the product of "`any sort of threats or violence, ... any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.'" State v. Smith, 42 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 187, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897)). The essential question therefore is "`whether the behavior of the [s]tate's law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined ....'" State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (1980) (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544, 81 S.Ct. 735, 741, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961)). The Supreme Court has held that in order for a confession to be involuntary, it must be the product of coercive state action. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).

The record reflects that the defendant was questioned by the police three times, in October 2004, March 2005, and April 2005. During the first two interviews, the defendant denied any sexual misconduct with his daughter. He said during the first interview that he sometimes assisted his daughter with bathing in the evenings and would afterwards lie down, hug, and hold hands with her. The defendant said he sometimes fell asleep and that the touching might have occurred while he was asleep, although he did not remember it. In the second interview, he again denied any inappropriate contact with his daughter. He said that if he ever touched her, it was when he was asleep or when they were play wrestling. The defendant stated that he attended church regularly and did not believe in having contact of a sexual nature with children.

The third interview lasted approximately two and one-half hours and was conducted by two detectives. The third interview took place at the police station, although the defendant arrived voluntarily and was told he was free to leave at any time. A videotape of the interview is part of the record. The detectives included in their discussion with the defendant references to the Bible, their religious beliefs, and the defendant's religion. These references were interspersed in their discussion of: the victim's allegations; the need for the defendant to admit and to take responsibility for his actions, both for the victim's and his own benefit; the detectives' disbelief of the defendant's previous statement that he did not remember touching the victim; and their urgings to the defendant to be forthcoming.

The detectives' religious references in the interview were as follows: (1) asking the defendant whether he was a Christian man; (2) they believed the defendant was a Christian whose beliefs had eroded; (3) the defendant's use of pornography was like that of Jimmy Swaggart and that of a person who attended church with one of the detectives; (4) the Bible was full of examples of men who slipped and were redeemed by admitting their wrongdoing and asking for forgiveness; (5) the Sermon on the Mount, in which Jesus instructed that before making an offering to God, a person should settle any grievances with other individuals; (6) people are God's servants, and they were there as servants and not to decide what would happen in the case; (7) the Biblical story of Sampson, a powerful man whose downfall was temptation for women, but who was redeemed and regained his power; (8) they were sure the victim prayed for the defendant not to touch her; (9) the Lord did not believe the defendant's story that he was asleep when he touched the victim; (10) the defendant needed to admit his wrongs because the victim needed to know that what had been preached to her was true; (11) the defendant could pray all day long, but God wanted him to do the right thing; (12) the defendant needed to get right with himself, God, and the victim; (13) the defendant had not decided to "walk on the faith" yet; (14) the defendant had been a good Christian man until pornography had eroded his mentality; (15) sexual desire is God-given; (16) Jesus talked about expelling a demon and seven more demons returning to take up residence — the defendant had been controlled by a demon when he touched his daughter; (17) all things are given by God, but excess brings about sin; (18) the Devil finds things to exploit in our lives, but God does the opposite; (19) demons had destroyed the defendant's life and his family relationship; and (20) one of the detectives had a man come in for an interview who had a Bible with him that he was working back and forth anxiously, and after the man admitted what he had done, he felt much better.

Approximately one hour into the interview, the defendant began acknowledging misconduct with the victim, although he claimed to have no memory of it. At this point, the detectives had made about half of the...

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  • Commonwealth v. Rushing
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Pennsylvania
    • June 28, 2013
    ...Commonwealth, 227 Va. 605, 318 S.E.2d 298, 304 (1984) and State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 45(III)(E)(3) (Mo.2006)). In State v. Saint, 284 S.W.3d 340, 343–346 (Tenn.Crim.App.2008), the Tennessee intermediate appellate court determined that far more extensive religious references did not re......
  • State v. Kelley
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    • Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
    • July 12, 2012
    ...... See State v. Saint, 284 S.W.3d 340, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). If no ex post facto waiver is filed and a defendant is sentenced under the 1989 Act, a trial court may not enhance a defendant's sentence above the presumptive minimum based upon factors, other than a defendant's prior convictions, that are not ......
  • State v. Saint
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    • Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
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    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
    • September 11, 2012
    ......Likewise, the record does not indicate that the Defendant executed a waiver of ex post facto rights that would have allowed the trial court to sentence the Defendant under the Sentencing Act including the 2005 amendments. See State v. Saint , 284 S.W.3d 340, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that the sentencing court was required to apply the sentencing laws in effect at the time of the Defendant's offenses because the Defendant did not waive his ex post facto rights).          5. Because we are remanding the case for ......
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