State v. Saiz
Decision Date | 18 April 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 21,797.,21,797. |
Citation | 2001 NMCA 35,130 N.M. 333,24 P.3d 365 |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nestor F. SAIZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Thomas DeMartino, Assistant Public Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
Certiorari Denied, No. 26,931, May 29, 2001.
749 P.2d at 1114. "[W]here several sections of a statute are involved, they must be read together so that all parts are given effect." High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599.
{3} In this case, the legislature has defined key words within the statute itself. A "`moped'" is "a two-wheeled or three-wheeled vehicle with an automatic transmission and a motor having a piston displacement of less than fifty cubic centimeters, that is capable of propelling the vehicle at a maximum speed of not more than thirty miles an hour on level ground, at sea level." Section 66-1-4.11(F). A moped is a vehicle. See NMSA 1978, § 66-1-4.19(B) (1990) ( ). A moped is also a motor vehicle. See § 66-1-4.11(I) ( ). The class of vehicles is broader than the class of motor vehicles. See State v. Richardson, 113 N.M. 740, 741, 832 P.2d 801, 802 (Ct.App. 1992)
(. ) For example, a horse-drawn wagon would be a vehicle, but not a motor vehicle.
832 P.2d at 802 ( ).
{5} The purpose of Section 66-8-102 "is to prevent individuals who, either mentally or physically, or both, are unable to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle a vehicle with safety both to the individual and the public." Richardson, 113 N.M. at 742, 832 P.2d at 803. Our holding serves the purposes of the statute because a moped operated irresponsibly could endanger other traffic on the road. See id. ().
{6} Defendant argues that Section 66-3-1101 exempts persons operating mopeds from the provisions of Section 66-8-102(A). Section 66-3-1101 reads in pertinent part:
832 P.2d at 803 ( ).
{8} Defendant also maintains that the statutory scheme relating to mopeds is significantly different from the statutes relating to farm tractors, which statutes we construed in Richardson require compliance with the DWI statute. See Richardson, 113 N.M. at 742,
832 P.2d at 803. We reject Defendant's contention that Section 66-3-1101(C) exempts mopeds and operators of mopeds from all of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code which also relate to motor vehicles, regardless of whether those...
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