State v. Salgado
Decision Date | 30 December 1914 |
Docket Number | 2129. |
Citation | 145 P. 919,38 Nev. 64 |
Parties | STATE v. SALGADO. |
Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Elko County; E. J. L. Taber, Judge.
Jose Salgado was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed, with direction as to sentence.
Emanuel Q. Klein and Harold P. Hale, both of Elko, for appellant.
Geo. B Thatcher, Atty. Gen., and E. P. Carville, of Elko, for the State.
The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for the killing of an Indian girl known as Bessie Andy. From the judgment, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial defendant has appealed.
The killing took place on the main street of the town of Elko. The defendant, after throwing the girl into a mud puddle in the street, and after stabbing another party, who appears to have been a companion of the girl on that afternoon, returned to the spot where the girl stood, and plunged his knife into her body some three or four times, causing almost instant death.
The record in this case, in so far as the testimony is disclosed thereby, fails to set forth, with any degree of satisfaction any particular motive for the killing. The defendant testified in his own behalf during the trial, and stated that he was a native of Mexico, 23 years of age, and from his statement it may be gathered that the defendant and the woman whom he killed had been living together for a number of years. The deceased was an Indian woman, about 20 years of age. The defendant stated that on occasions when he came to town a certain Mexican, or half-breed, who, it appears, met the defendant and Bessie Andy, the deceased woman, immediately before the homicide, was always trying to make trouble with him, and it might be gathered by inference from his various statements that bad blood existed between the defendant and this half-breed Indian or Mexican and that Bessie Andy, the deceased, was the "woman in the case" about whom the unfriendly relations had grown up between the defendant and the half-breed. The defendant in his testimony, in relating occurrences immediately preceding the homicide, said that the half-breed wanted Bessie to go with him, and had made a threat that if Bessie did not go with him that he would kill Bessie and the defendant. Counsel for defendant asked, "What did the Mexican say he wanted with Bessie?" to which the defendant replied, "He wanted to take her to Golconda."
The father of Bessie Andy testified that the defendant had been about the Indian camp for some weeks prior to the homicide, and that the defendant and Bessie, daughter of the witness, had been together at least a part of this time. Just prior to the killing, the defendant and Bessie Andy, together with the father and mother of the latter, had dinner together at a Chinese restaurant. It appears from the testimony of the father of the girl that they had liquor, and that he became quite intoxicated. After the dinner the four, consisting of the defendant and the deceased girl, and the father and mother of the latter, left the restaurant and started toward the Indian camp, passing through the business section of the town of Elko on the way. The defendant and the deceased girl, who were traveling together on the way from the restaurant toward the Indian camp, met the half-breed Indian boy, or half-breed Mexican, as he is sometimes termed in the testimony of the several witnesses. The latter was in company with one Jim Odell on the occasion of the meeting, and from the deposition of Odell, taken at the preliminary examination and admitted in evidence, it appears that the defendant asked where they were going, and the half-breed boy replied:
Witness Odell was asked:
A conviction of murder in the first degree was the result of the trial, and, the jury having failed to designate the punishment, the court sentenced the defendant to death by shooting.
A statement of defendant's counsel, made to the jury before the presentation of his case, is significant, inasmuch as it may have some bearing on the principal assignments of error. In part, it is as follows:
The principal assignment of error relied upon by the appellant charges the trial court with error for having denied the defendant's challenge to the juror F. R. Jacoby. The defendant challenged the juror "for actual bias," and in this respect we deem it sufficient to say that the juror, by his answers to interrogatories propounded to him, signified that he had read of the case and had talked to several people with reference to the case; that from what he had read and heard he had formed and had expressed an opinion going to the merits of the case. It appears that none of the parties with whom he had conversed witnessed the homicide. His condition of mind with reference to the case is set forth in the following:
He further stated:
"I mean at the present time I have what you may call a fixed opinion, but, if the evidence disagreed with the opinion that I have formed and what I have read, I could change my opinion."
In response to questions propounded by the court, the juror answered that he could, if accepted as a juror, lay his opinion aside and try the case on the evidence presented at the trial. In view of the form of the objection interposed, the substance of the answer given by the juror Jacoby and the statements made by him are not subject to the same consideration as they would be if the objection had assumed another form.
The statute relative to this subject provides that a challenge for cause may be taken by either party relative to a particular juror, for reasons:
First: General; i e., that the juror is disqualified from serving on any case by reason of his having been convicted of a felony; for want of any qualifications prescribed by law; or is of unsound mind or has physical defects which would render him incapable of performing the duties of juror.
Second: Particular; i. e., that he is disqualified from serving in the action on trial.
Particular causes of challenge are by our statute divided into classes First, such a bias as, when the existence of the facts is ascertained, in judgment of law, disqualifies the juror--designated implied bias; second, such a state of mind on the part of the juror as leads to a just inference, in reference to the case, that he will not...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Fouquette
...19 Nev. 212, 218, 8 P. 456; State v. Vaughan, 22 Nev. 285, 296, 39 P. 733; State v. Simas, 25 Nev. 432, 449, 62 P. 242; State v. Salgado, 38 Nev. 64, 70, 145 P. 919, 150 P. 764; State v. Milosovich, 42 Nev. 263, 269, 175 P. 139; State v. Lewis, 50 Nev. 212, 224, 255 P. 1002; State v. Teeter......
-
State v. Teeter
...v. Raymond, 11 Nev. 98, 106; State v. Vaughan, 22 Nev. 285, 296, 39 P. 733; State v. Simas, 25 Nev. 432, 449, 62 P. 242; State v. Salgado, 38 Nev. 64, 70, 145 P. 919, 150 764; State v. Milosovich, 42 Nev. 263, 269, 175 P. 139; State v. Lewis, 50 Nev. 212, 224, 255 P. 1002. Moreover, had a s......