State v. Salimullah
| Decision Date | 10 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2018-0318,2018-0318 |
| Citation | 172 N.H. 739,235 A.3d 89 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Mohammad SALIMULLAH |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Susan P. McGinnis, Concord, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Thomas Barnard, senior assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the defendant.
A jury convicted the defendant, Mohammad Salimullah, on one count of attempted murder, see RSA 629:1 (2016), two counts of first degree assault, see RSA 631:1, I (2016), one count of second degree assault, see RSA 631:2, I (2016), and one count of reckless conduct, see RSA 631:3, I (2016). He appeals: (1) an order of the Superior Court (Ignatius, J.) denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds that the State failed to comply with RSA 135:17-a (2015) (amended 2019) in bringing indictments against him in 2016; (2) an order of the Superior Court (Smukler, J.) denying his motion for a competency determination prior to sentencing; and (3) an order of the Superior Court (Smukler, J.) imposing a no-contact condition on a stand-committed sentence. We reverse the imposition of the no-contact condition, but otherwise affirm.
The jury could have found the following facts. The defendant and the victim were married in 2007. On the evening of August 12, 2013, the defendant and S.S. discussed S.S.'s desire for a divorce. Later that night or early the next morning, while S.S. was asleep, the defendant attacked her with a knife. After S.S. managed to escape, the defendant sat down on the floor and stabbed himself in the stomach. Both S.S. and the defendant survived, but not without sustaining injuries.
The defendant was originally indicted in October 2013. Two doctors evaluated his competency to stand trial; both concluded he was not competent. In September 2014, the Superior Court (McGuire, J.) found, by agreement of the parties, that "[t]he defendant is not presently competent," but that his "competency [was] potentially restorable." The court ordered the defendant to undergo treatment for the restoration of competency "at a secure facility," and stated that the defendant "shall be held at the secured facility." In addition, the court stated that "the State shall commence with the procedures set forth in RSA 135-C:34 to have the defendant civilly committed."
The defendant was civilly committed by the Probate Division of the Circuit Court in October 2014. The civil commitment was to last for a period of up to three years. He was committed to the Secure Psychiatric Unit (SPU) of the New Hampshire State Prison, where he received treatment to restore competency.
In September 2015, twelve months after the defendant was found incompetent, the Superior Court (Colburn, J.) found that the defendant had not been restored to competency. Accordingly, the court dismissed the defendant's case "without prejudice." Then, in November 2015, the defendant was transferred from the SPU to the New Hampshire State Hospital. Hospital staff began working with him on a discharge plan, which involved housing, medication, and other conditions. Prior to his eventual release from the hospital at the conclusion of his civil commitment, the hospital planned to grant the defendant increasingly greater privileges, such as the ability to leave the hospital building.
In January 2016, the State obtained new indictments bringing the same charges that had been dismissed without prejudice four months earlier. The defendant's arraignment on the new indictments was scheduled to take place in February 2016. At the February hearing, the defendant orally moved to dismiss the indictments before arraignment, arguing that the State could not reinitiate criminal proceedings against him unless it demonstrated "that there's reason to believe that he has been restored to competency." The trial court initially ruled, at the hearing, that it would not proceed with arraignment, but ultimately denied the defendant's motion in a written order.
At his subsequent arraignment, the defendant informed the court that he planned to file a motion for a new competency evaluation. In response, the court issued an order for a new competency evaluation. The defendant then underwent three competency evaluations. After a hearing, the Superior Court (Colburn, J.) ruled that the defendant was competent to stand trial.
After the defendant was found guilty, but prior to sentencing, he filed a motion for an additional competency determination. Defense counsel stated that he had a "legitimate doubt ... as to [the defendant's] competency with respect to sentencing." The State objected. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced the defendant. This appeal followed.
The defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the 2016 indictments. He contends that " RSA 135:17-a sets forth prerequisites for reevaluating the competency of a defendant who has previously been found incompetent and either unrestorable or unrestored." Specifically, he points to paragraph VI of that statute, which states that the court may order further competency evaluations of persons who, like the defendant, have been involuntarily committed pursuant to RSA chapter 135-C "if the court finds that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the person's condition has changed such that competency to stand trial may have been affected." RSA 135:17-a, VI. The defendant argues that, by denying his motion to dismiss the 2016 indictments, the court allowed the State to "circumvent[ ]" this requirement. He also argues that the trial court incorrectly interpreted this court's opinion in State v. Demesmin, 159 N.H. 595, 992 A.2d 569 (2010), and that the court further erred in finding RSA 135:17-a, VI ambiguous as to the court in which the State must move for a reevaluation of the defendant's competency.
The defendant's arguments require us to engage in statutory interpretation. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Folds, 172 N.H. 513, 521, 216 A.3d 58 (2019). This court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Id. When interpreting a statute, we look first to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe the language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and to avoid absurd or unjust results. State v. Keenan, 171 N.H. 557, 561, 199 A.3d 729 (2018). Moreover, we do not read words or phrases in isolation, but in the context of the entire statutory scheme. Folds, 172 N.H. at 521, 216 A.3d 58.
" RSA 135:17-a lays out the procedures a trial court should follow after making an initial determination that the defendant is not competent to stand trial." Demesmin, 159 N.H. at 599, 992 A.2d 569. For example, the statute provides that, after finding a defendant incompetent to stand trial, "the court shall order treatment for the restoration of competency unless it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is no reasonable likelihood that the defendant can be restored to competency through appropriate treatment within 12 months." RSA 135:17-a, I. It further provides that the court may order that treatment take place "in the state mental health system or at the secure psychiatric unit only under an order for involuntary admission or involuntary emergency admission ... pursuant to RSA 135-C."
RSA 135:17-a, II. "In all other cases, the accused shall, if otherwise qualified, be admitted to bail," pursuant to which the court "may order bail supervision ... and impose ... conditions, in addition to the appropriate course of treatment to restore competency." Id. "Except for good cause shown," the court is required to hold "a further hearing to determine the defendant's competency ... no later than 12 months after the order committing the defendant for treatment." RSA 135:17-a, III.
The statute requires the court to dismiss the case against the defendant in two circumstances. See RSA 135:17-a, I, IV. If, after its initial determination that the defendant is not competent to stand trial, the court further finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant cannot be restored to competency within twelve months, "the case against the defendant shall be dismissed without prejudice." RSA 135:17-a, I. In addition, if, following the hearing to reassess the defendant's competency after he has undergone restoration treatment, the court determines that the defendant has not regained competency, "the case against the defendant shall be dismissed without prejudice." RSA 135:17-a, IV; see RSA 135:17-a, III. The statute does not purport to give the court the authority to dismiss a defendant's case with prejudice, however. See RSA 135:17-a.
The statute provides that the court retains authority to order further competency evaluations even after a defendant's case is dismissed. Specifically, if the court dismisses a defendant's case "and the court determines that he or she is dangerous to himself or herself or others, the court shall order the person to remain in custody for a reasonable period of time ... to be evaluated for the appropriateness of involuntary treatment pursuant to RSA 135-C:34 or RSA 171-B:2." RSA 135:17-a, V; see RSA 135:17-a, I, IV. Then, if the person is involuntarily committed pursuant to RSA chapter 135-C or RSA chapter 171-B, "the court may, upon motion of the attorney general or county attorney at any time during the period of involuntary commitment and before expiration of the limitations period applicable to the underlying criminal offense, order a further competency evaluation." RSA 135:17-a, VI. "Such further competency evaluations may be ordered if the court finds that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the...
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