State v. Salter

• Decision Date: 15 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. SC 88274.,SC 88274.
• Citation: 250 S.W.3d 705
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Robert SALTER, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

250 S.W.3d 705

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v.Robert SALTER, Appellant.

No. SC 88274.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

April 15, 2008.

Rehearing Denied May 20, 2008.

Irl B. Baris, St. Louis, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W.(Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Daniel N. McPherson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.

MARY R. RUSSELL, Judge.

Robert Salter("Defendant") appeals from his conviction for failure to insure workers' compensation liability under section 287.128.5, RSMo 2000,¹ which he contends is unconstitutional.Because this action involves the validity of a state statute, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this appeal.Mo. CONST. art. V, sec. 3.The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I.Facts

Defendant, president of Housecalls, Inc.("Corporation"), was charged with the class D felony of failure to insure workers' compensation liability under section 287.128.5.²Corporation had not carried insurance since February 2003, although it was required to do so as it had at least five employees in 2003 and 2004.

After trial by jury Defendant was found guilty, sentenced to one year of imprisonment, and fined $5,000.The court also imposed a penalty of $25,000 pursuant to section 287.128.5.He appeals.

II.Constitutionality of Section 287.128

Defendant asserts the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss his indictment in that the charges were based on his alleged failure to comply with section 287.128.5.³Section 287.128.5 states:

Any employer failing to insure his liability pursuant to this chapter shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor and, in addition, shall be liable to the state of Missouri for a penalty in an amount equal to twice the annual premium the employer would have paid had such employer been insured or twenty-five thousand dollars, whichever amount is greater.Any person who has previously pled guilty to or has been found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this section ... and who subsequently violates any of the provisions of this section ... shall be guilty of a class D felony.

Defendant argues that the statute violates article I, sections 10and11, and article III,section 23 of the Missouri constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause of the United States Constitution.

Pursuant to this Court's standard of review, laws enacted by the legislature and approved by the governor have a strong presumption of constitutionality.Trout v. State,231 S.W.3d 140, 144(Mo. banc 2007).Attacks against a statute's constitutionality based on procedural limitations are not favored.Id.The person challenging the validity of the statute has the burden of proving the act clearly and undoubtedly violates the constitutional limitations.Id.

Specifically, Defendant argues that section 287.128.5, as contained in enacting billsSenate Bill 251⁴ and House Bills 1237, 1409, 1166, 1154, and 1491 (collectively "H.B. 1237"), is unconstitutional in that it violates article III, section 23 of the Missouri constitution.⁵

Article III, section 23 of the Missouri constitution states, "No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title...."This provision contains two distinct but related procedural requirements: a single subject rule and a clear title requirement.In deciding whether a bill contains more than one subject, the test is not whether individual provisions of the bill relate to each other, but whether the challenged provision (1) fairly relates to the subject described in the title of the bill, (2) has a natural connection to the subject, or (3) is a means to accomplish the law's purpose.Trout,231 S.W.3d at 146.To determine a bill's subject, the Court looks first to the title of the bill.C.C. Dillon Co.,12 S.W.3d at 329.

The purpose of the clear title requirement is to keep legislators and the public fairly apprised of the subject matter of pending laws.Trout,231 S.W.3d at 144-45.This requirement is violated when the title is underinclusive or too broad and amorphous to be meaningful.Jackson County Sports Complex Auth. v. State,226 S.W.3d 156, 161(Mo. banc 2007).The only cases where this Court has found a title to be too broad and amorphous are those in which the title could describe the majority of all the legislation that the General Assembly passes.Id."In all other cases in which the bill's title `does not describe most, if not all, legislation enacted' or include nearly every activity the state undertakes, the Court has rejected arguments that a title was overinclusive."Id.

Defendant contends that the enactment of H.B. 1237, which was entitled "An Act to repeal [27 sections] relating to workers' compensation, and to enact in lieu thereof twenty-nine new sections relating to the same subject, with penalty provisions" was unconstitutional because it contained more than one subject.The bill set forth substantive provisions of the workers' compensation law, the means for enforcing that law, the penalties for noncompliance, and programs that further the purpose of the law.⁶The subject matter contained in H.B. 1237 fairly relates to its title.The contested bill does not contain more than one subject.

Defendant also takes issue with the title of the bill, arguing that it does not clearly express the subject contained therein.This Court has found that the following titles do not violate the clear title requirement: "relating to political subdivisions,"Id. at 162;"general not for profit corporations,"State ex rel. St. John's Mercy Health Care v. Neill,95 S.W.3d 103, 106(Mo. banc 2003);"relating to health services,"Mo. State Med. Ass'n v. Mo. Dept. of Health,39 S.W.3d 837, 841(Mo. banc 2001);"relating to transportation,"C.C. Dillon Co.,12 S.W.3d at 329; and "relating to environmental control,"Corvera Abatement Tech., Inc. v. Air Conservation Comm'n,973 S.W.2d 851, 861-62(Mo. banc 1998).The title "An Act to repeal [27 sections] relating to workers' compensation ..." is not so broad that it describes most of the legislation that the legislature enacts.The title contains one subject — workers' compensation.The title fully apprises the public and the legislature of the subject matter within the statute.

III.Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motions for judgment of acquittal and in entering judgment against him because there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate review is limited to determining whether there is enough evidence such that a reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.State v. Crawford,68 S.W.3d 406, 408(Mo. banc 2002).In applying this standard, this Court accepts all evidence favorable to the State as true, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence.Id. at 407.It will disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary.Id. at 408.

Defendant sets forth two arguments to support his contention that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.First, he asserts that he is not an employer, and the State failed to prove that he had any personal duty to acquire workers' compensation insurance for the employees working at Corporation.

Individuals can be liable for corporate conduct."A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a corporation ... to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf."Section 562.061.Under the workers' compensation laws, individuals are included in the definition of "employer."Seesection 287.030.1(1)(defining an "employer" as "[e]very person ... using the service of another for pay.").If Defendant had employed five or more people in his individual capacity, the failure to carry workers' compensation insurance would constitute an offense.Seesection 287.128.5.Thus, under section 562.061, Defendant is liable for Corporation's failure to provide insurance to its employees.

Second, Defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he acted or engaged in any prohibited conduct in that the failure to provide workers' compensation insurance does not constitute "conduct."Criminal liability is based on conduct involving a voluntary act.Section 562.011.1.A "voluntary act" includes "[a]n omission to perform an act of which the actor is physically capable."Section 562.011.2(2).However, a "person is not guilty of an offense based solely upon an omission to perform an act unless the law defining the offense expressly so provides, or a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law."Section 562.011.4.It is clear that an employer's failure to insure his liability as set forth under the workers' compensation laws is an offense.Seesection 287.128.5.

Defendant contends, however, that the word "conduct" as used in section 562.061 does not include a failure to act because the statute does not use the "omission to perform" language as contained in section 562.011.Defendant is essentially arguing that the meaning of the word "conduct" varies in the different sections of chapter 562.Such an argument goes against the rule that provisions in a legislative act are to be construed together, not read in isolation.Bachtel v. Miller County Nursing Home Dist.,110 S.W.3d 799, 801(Mo. banc 2003).Additionally, if it is possible, the provisions should be "harmonized with each other."Id.Applying these principles, "conduct," as used in both sections 562.061and562.011, includes the failure to act, and further, Defendant, as an individual, can be liable for the failure to act as set forth by section 562.011.

Defendant fails to demonstrate that there was an insufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment against him.As Corporation's president, he admitted to an investigator that Corporation had...