State v. Samora

Decision Date21 January 2022
Docket Number20190662-CA
Parties STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Eddie Angelo SAMORA, Appellant.
CourtUtah Court of Appeals

Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge Gregory K. Orme authored this Opinion, in which Judges David N. Mortensen and Ryan M. Harris concurred.

Opinion

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Eddie Angelo Samora challenges his convictions for attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a restricted person. Samora contends that errors made by the district court and his trial counsel warrant reversal of his convictions and a new trial. We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND1

¶2 On October 26, 2017, as the victim (Victim) played with his three young sons outside the first-floor apartment where the boys lived with their mother (Wife), Samora shot Victim multiple times with a .22 revolver in front of Wife and their sons. Victim was severely injured and would have died absent the immediate medical attention he fortunately received. Security cameras at the apartment building captured a portion of the shooting.

¶3 A witness (Witness 1), who knew Samora, was outside in the parking lot working on his car when he heard gunshots. He looked up to see Victim lying on the ground and Samora shoot Victim. Witness 1 then left the area because he did not want to be called as a witness. He did, however, have a phone conversation with police that day, during which he denied seeing who shot Victim. A few days later, this time speaking to police in person, Witness 1 confirmed that Samora was the shooter.

¶4 Another witness (Witness 2) heard "some screaming and yelling" as he stood outside his apartment approximately 80 to 100 yards away. As he turned to look in the direction of the noise, he saw Victim fall to the ground and then saw a "stocky" Hispanic male come into view and shoot Victim.

¶5 The day after the shooting, the State charged Samora with attempted murder and unlawful possession or use of a firearm by a restricted person. The State alleged that Samora was a restricted person because he previously served time in federal prison for armed carjacking and for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. After shooting Victim, Samora fled to Nevada and evaded arrest, but he was apprehended approximately six weeks later and extradited to Utah.

¶6 Samora, temporarily represented by a public defender, made his initial appearance on December 15, 2017, and informed the court that he was unsure whether he could afford to retain private counsel. The public defender requested that a hearing be held the next week to give Samora time to obtain private counsel. The court granted the request and scheduled a hearing for December 22. For unknown reasons, that hearing was then rescheduled to January 8, 2018. At the January 8 hearing, Samora appeared and, through the same public defender, informed the court that he would not be able to retain private counsel. The court then appointed a different public defender (Trial Counsel) to represent Samora. At Samora's request, another hearing was scheduled for January 24. At that hearing, Trial Counsel requested a continuance of "about six weeks." The court granted the request and scheduled the hearing for March 9. For unknown reasons, the March 9 hearing was rescheduled for April 11.

¶7 At the April 11 hearing, Samora conditionally waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and the district court bound the case over for trial. The court then scheduled the next hearing, at Trial Counsel's request, for April 30. At the end of this next hearing, Trial Counsel requested that the matter be set "out a month," and the court offered options of four and five weeks away. Trial Counsel chose the latter date, June 4. At the June 4 hearing, Trial Counsel requested that the case be set for a preliminary hearing after all and offered three dates on which he was available. The prosecutor was available only on the latest proposed date, July 20, and Trial Counsel represented that Samora was "okay with that."

¶8 At the July 20 preliminary hearing, the State called as witnesses, among others, Wife and Witness 1. Wife, however, refused to testify because she did not want "to put [herself] or [her] children in any more danger than what they've already been in." The court held her in contempt and jailed her until she agreed to testify. Due to Wife's reluctance to testify, the State requested a continuance, and the court continued the preliminary hearing without scheduling a specific date for resumption of the hearing. At this point, Trial Counsel asserted that Samora is "asking to have his right to a quick and speedy trial and invoke that process today."

¶9 The preliminary hearing was subsequently rescheduled for September 10. At the beginning of that hearing, Trial Counsel requested a six-week continuance to give Samora an opportunity to obtain private counsel. The court denied that request and proceeded to bind Samora over for trial without taking additional evidence because it determined Wife's testimony was not needed for the bindover. Trial Counsel then asked for the arraignment to be scheduled in six weeks, and the court offered either October 22—six weeks out—or October 29—seven weeks out—and both Trial Counsel and Samora responded that they preferred the October 29 option.

¶10 At his October 29 arraignment, Samora pled not guilty and Trial Counsel asked that the matter be set for further review in "six to eight weeks." Samora then personally confirmed that this was what he wanted. The court inquired whether Samora wanted it scheduled on, before, or after December 31. Trial Counsel represented that Samora was content with the matter being scheduled in January, and the court scheduled it for January 7, 2019.

¶11 At the January 7 review hearing, Trial Counsel requested yet another six-week continuance because Samora was in the process of retaining private counsel and was currently "working out a payment plan." Citing the age of the case, the court denied the request, but granted Samora three weeks to get things in order and scheduled a pretrial conference for January 28. At the pretrial conference, Trial Counsel again appeared, Samora having apparently been unsuccessful in his effort to retain private counsel. Trial Counsel requested a four-day jury trial. The court was unable to schedule four consecutive days for a trial, but Trial Counsel agreed to conduct jury selection a week before putting on evidence. Trial Counsel then agreed to have jury selection on April 25 and the rest of the trial on May 1 through May 3.

¶12 At the beginning of jury selection, the district court mentioned that the State had charged Samora with the "crimes of attempted murder and purchase, transfer, possession or use of a firearm by a restricted person." The court so advised the jury pool even though the latter charge was to be tried separately and only after the jury reached a verdict on the primary charge. Later, the court repeated to the jury pool that "Samora is alleged to have committed ... attempted homicide and possession of a firearm by a restricted person." One of the prospective jurors asked for "clarification" about the charges, "attempted murder and illegal—," at which point the court interjected and stated that the second charge was "basically, possession of a firearm or transport of a firearm as a restricted person" and provided no further explanation. These were the only references made to the restricted-person charge during jury selection, and the court did not disclose that Samora had prior felony convictions.

¶13 At trial, Victim testified about the shooting, as did Witness 1 and Witness 2.2 Witness 1 testified that he saw Samora shoot Victim multiple times. Victim testified that he was shot just outside Wife's apartment while reaching down to pick up one of his sons. He stated he did "[n]ot specifically" see Samora with a gun but that he could see Samora "in front of [him] moving around" as he was being shot. He also testified that Samora and Wife were arguing right before the shooting, and he just heard "pops" and felt pressure in his torso, hip, and chest before losing consciousness. Witness 2 testified that while he was too far away to identify who shot Victim, he could tell the shooter was a "Hispanic [male of] stocky build."3 The jury was also shown footage from the surveillance cameras that corroborated all the testimony. That footage showed Victim playing with his sons at the apartment complex and Samora arriving in an SUV and walking toward Wife's apartment. The video then showed Victim return to the apartment. The first shot was not captured on the surveillance video, but Victim is seen falling into view of the camera and then Samora is seen firing two more shots at Victim while Wife attempts to stop him.

¶14 As part of his defense, Samora called a detective from the county sheriff's office to testify about the recoil of the weapon used to shoot Victim, as seen on the surveillance footage.4 The detective testified that the height of the suspected shooter's arm after shooting the gun was not consistent with "the recoil that would come with the weapon shooting [a .22] caliber" round, and he would have expected it to be a larger caliber. On cross-examination, the detective conceded that he had not examined the actual revolver used in the case and as such could not "testify with certainty regarding the recoil of that particular weapon." Samora did not testify in his own defense. The jury convicted Samora of attempted murder. Following that conviction, the restricted person charge was tried before the same jury, which also convicted him on that charge. Samora appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶15 Samora raises four issues on appeal. First, he asserts that the district court erred in not ruling, sua sponte, that he had been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Second, he asserts that Trial Counsel...

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3 cases
  • State v. Hintze
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • October 14, 2022
    ...one that "must take into account the defendant's rights as well as the rights of public justice," State v. Samora , 2022 UT App 7, ¶ 18, 504 P.3d 195 (quotation simplified). ¶26 In Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the court set forth the familiar four-fa......
  • State v. Hintze
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • October 14, 2022
    ...is one that "must take into account the defendant's rights as well as the rights of public justice," State v. Samora, 2022 UT App 7, ¶ 18, 504 P.3d 195 (quotation ¶26 In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the court set forth the familiar four-factor framework by which we evaluate a Sixth......
  • State v. Hintze
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • October 14, 2022
    ...is one that "must take into account the defendant's rights as well as the rights of public justice," State v. Samora, 2022 UT App 7, ¶ 18, 504 P.3d 195 (quotation ¶26 In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the court set forth the familiar four-factor framework by which we evaluate a Sixth......

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